- #1
NihilNominis
- 6
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I would be most gratified if someone learned in Physics would explain Physicists' point of view on the question of the Universe's origin in the following philosophical context:
It seems to me that to avoid infinite regress it is necessary at some point in the causal chain to posit incontingent being.
The Universe may not, it seems to me, be posited as the pagan snake-which-eats-its-own-tail, for this model fails to avoid the problem of infinite regress. Let's take the simplest such loop, of two members. If A causes B, which causes A, then A's being caused depends on B's having been caused, which depends upon A's having been caused, and so forth. As such, even if what my vulgar conception conceives of the Big Crunch model (if I'm not mistaken, that would be a repeating universe) had been proved, I think it would still be a worthwhile question to ask what caused that loop to a) begin or b) to come into being (qua a loop, if we are viewing time as something internal to it, static to the external observer).
The Universe, then, may be conceived of in two ways: it may be conceived of either as externally caused, in which case its cause is either external contingent result of Incontingent Being or external Incontingent Being itself, or it may be conceived of as itself Incontingent Being, given that matter can neither be created or destroyed.
This first conception of the Universe, although inscrutable to natural science, is philosophically quite handy, for it neatly accounts both for the existence of the Universe and its motion.
The second conception, on the other hand, has this difficulty: if we are to take the Parmenidean conception of the Universe, and to hold that matter makes up the One Incontingent Being, which alone truly exists, and that all change within the One is meaningless, nevertheless we still find that change certainly occurs within the One, even if we cannot conclude from that change the contingency of the Universe. This change betrays motion in the Universe, and motion would seem to demand a cause.
If modern Physics best supports the first conception of the Universe, I would ask only why it does so. I understand as well as any that any further discussion of the topic is meaningless, given that it is the internal laws of the Universe which Physics devotes itself to studying.
If the second, however, I would ask both what its grounds are for doing so and how it would account for motion in the Universe.
Thanks,
NN
It seems to me that to avoid infinite regress it is necessary at some point in the causal chain to posit incontingent being.
The Universe may not, it seems to me, be posited as the pagan snake-which-eats-its-own-tail, for this model fails to avoid the problem of infinite regress. Let's take the simplest such loop, of two members. If A causes B, which causes A, then A's being caused depends on B's having been caused, which depends upon A's having been caused, and so forth. As such, even if what my vulgar conception conceives of the Big Crunch model (if I'm not mistaken, that would be a repeating universe) had been proved, I think it would still be a worthwhile question to ask what caused that loop to a) begin or b) to come into being (qua a loop, if we are viewing time as something internal to it, static to the external observer).
The Universe, then, may be conceived of in two ways: it may be conceived of either as externally caused, in which case its cause is either external contingent result of Incontingent Being or external Incontingent Being itself, or it may be conceived of as itself Incontingent Being, given that matter can neither be created or destroyed.
This first conception of the Universe, although inscrutable to natural science, is philosophically quite handy, for it neatly accounts both for the existence of the Universe and its motion.
The second conception, on the other hand, has this difficulty: if we are to take the Parmenidean conception of the Universe, and to hold that matter makes up the One Incontingent Being, which alone truly exists, and that all change within the One is meaningless, nevertheless we still find that change certainly occurs within the One, even if we cannot conclude from that change the contingency of the Universe. This change betrays motion in the Universe, and motion would seem to demand a cause.
If modern Physics best supports the first conception of the Universe, I would ask only why it does so. I understand as well as any that any further discussion of the topic is meaningless, given that it is the internal laws of the Universe which Physics devotes itself to studying.
If the second, however, I would ask both what its grounds are for doing so and how it would account for motion in the Universe.
Thanks,
NN