Does Consciousness Have Non-Causal Properties?

[StatusX]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness." Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow." There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow. The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical. If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me? The answer to this seems to be yes, and is evidence that there can be properties that do not cause and yet we can still know about (ie, I know what green looks like to me). There is nothing my inverted spectrum twin could say that would cause me to realize we see the color differently, and hence there is no infringement on the causal closure of the physical world. And yet, there is still a natural difference between me and him.

The more difficult question is "Can the existence or absence of experience have an effect?" The trouble is, while we can't convey the specific nature of an experience, which meshes well with that nature not being able to cause, we can tell people that we have experiences. How can it be that intrinsic properties cause us to talk about their existence? What causes us to believe in things that can't cause?

 

[Tournesol]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness."

If the (metaphysically neutral) world is causally closed, then there is a (metaphysically neutral) reason we talk about something called "consciousness."..which may be that exists and we are aware of it.
And which may or may not be capturable by the language of physics.

Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

OTOH any claim that we can physically explain the reason for
such claims is outlandish since physics does not concern
itself with consciousness,but with mass. charge, spin and so on.
We might be able to give a very cumbersome and uninfomative account of why (causally) such-and-such a series of phonemes issued from so-and-so's
mouth in terms of neural firings and so on, but it is unlikely to say
much about reasons, which are psychological, and not explicitly within
the vocabulary of physics. It could be objected that whatever reasons
are, and whatever consciousness is, they are implemented neurally,
and that some kind of bridging theory that matches nerual firings
off against experiences and reasons is therefore possible. However,
such a theory would be a solution to the Hard Problem. See
Davidson's Anomolous Monism.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow." There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow. The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical.

Or caused by something which has a physical AND a non-physical explanation.

If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

You have slid from "not defined solely by causal role" to "non-causal".
Something like a pain is both a quale and has a very obvious causal role.

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me? The answer to this seems to be yes,

This is not psychologically realistic. eg someone who saw geen as red
would think of green as a "warm colour". See "Consciousness Reconsidered",
by Owen Flanagan.

 

[StatusX]

First, from the other thread:

There is "something it is like" to have an experience. Staring at a color, it actually looks like something. It isn't just defined by what it causes you to say or think. Do you see the diffference? If you really do intend to say consciousness is nothing more than it's causal role, you in fact are an eliminativist.

I didn't say that. Consciousness can cause does not mean "there is nothing
more to consciousness than its causal role". And "consciousness can cause" includes qualia.

Yes, but the problem is, how do we know there are aspects of consciousness that can't cause? What causes us to talk about them?

Back to your reply here:

OTOH any claim that we can physically explain the reason for
such claims is outlandish since physics does not concern
itself with consciousness,but with mass. charge, spin and so on.
We might be able to give a very cumbersome and uninfomative account of why (causally) such-and-such a series of phonemes issued from so-and-so's
mouth in terms of neural firings and so on, but it is unlikely to say
much about reasons, which are psychological, and not explicitly within
the vocabulary of physics. It could be objected that whatever reasons
are, and whatever consciousness is, they are implemented neurally,
and that some kind of bridging theory that matches nerual firings
off against experiences and reasons is therefore possible. However,
such a theory would be a solution to the Hard Problem. See
Davidson's Anomolous Monism.

"Experiences" and "reasons" (by which I assume you mean something like "intentions") are not the same thing, and there is no hard problem of intentions. Intentions could conceivably be explained by starting with mass and charge, moving up to atoms, chemicals, complex biochemicals, cells, and then the brain. The reason this could be possible is that intentions are defined by their causal roles. That is, when I intend to do something, it means I am in a state that causally inclines me to do that thing with a higher probability, or something roughly like that. But experiences (including the experience of an intention) are not defined by such a role. Dennett might say experiences are those things that cause us to say we are having experiences, but this is clearly oversimplifying.

This is not psychologically realistic. eg someone who saw geen as red
would think of green as a "warm colour". See "Consciousness Reconsidered",
by Owen Flanagan.

I've read those types of arguments, but it is perfectly conceivable that someone could see green, be taught all their life that this is called "red" and is "warm" and never think twice about it. Warm is just a label we assign to the colors "red", "orange", etc, whatever they happen to look like to each of us.

A more powerful argument I've heard against the inverted spectrum argument is that there are more shades of blue than, say, red, so phenomenal red could not fill all the roles of phenomenal blue. However, this just seems to be reflecting a lack of imagination. Even if not, it is not inconceivable to imagine a twin who looks at the sky and sees some color I can't even imagine, but is capable of having as many different shades as my experience of blue.

 

[Tournesol]

Yes, but the problem is, how do we know there are aspects of consciousness that can't cause?

You're asking the wrong guy: I don't think there are.

"Experiences" and "reasons" (by which I assume you mean something like "intentions") are not the same thing, and there is no hard problem of intentions.

Maybe, maybe not. Davidson's Anomolous Monism is all about intentionallity.

Intentions could conceivably be explained by starting with mass and charge, moving up to atoms, chemicals, complex biochemicals, cells, and then the brain.

That might explain the causal role of intentions, but for Davidson it is a
defining an necessary characteristic of a physical explanation that it
does not use intentional terms, like "thought", "belief" etc. So a complete
theory would have to "bridge" intentional terms to physics, just as
a solution to the HP would have to relate experience to physics.

The reason this could be possible is that intentions are defined by their causal roles. That is, when I intend to do something, it means I am in a state that causally inclines me to do that thing with a higher probability, or something roughly like that.

You could be inclined to do A rather than B as a result of being drunk. That
doesn't really capture intentionallity.

A more powerful argument I've heard against the inverted spectrum argument is that there are more shades of blue than, say, red, so phenomenal red could not fill all the roles of phenomenal blue. However, this just seems to be reflecting a lack of imagination. Even if not, it is not inconceivable to imagine a twin who looks at the sky and sees some color I can't even imagine, but is capable of having as many different shades as my experience of blue.

Whatever. There is no good reason to suppose epiphenomenalism is true, so there is no good reason to believe in the real possibility of inverted spectra.

 

[Steve Esser]

So:
First-person conscious experience is not reducible to physical descriptions, but it is absurd to think it is epiphenomenal. It is necessarily connected to the world described by physics (specifically our body/brain), but science proceeds assuming physics is causally closed at the micro-level.

What is the way out? It could be that there is an aspect of causation which is unacknowledged presently, but is manifested in complex natural systems. This aspect may be a combining, binding or organizing property responsible for the seemingly irreducible (emergent) macro-level behavior of these systems. From the perspective of the system itself, this aspect of causation is manifested as experience.

(here I must plug the reading group discussion of "a place for consciousness", a book which has a much more sophisticated treatment linking a new theory of causality to the problem of consciousness).

 

[StatusX]

(here I must plug the reading group discussion of "a place for consciousness", a book which has a much more sophisticated treatment linking a new theory of causality to the problem of consciousness).

I know, and I felt a little bad posting this now, since I'm participating in that discussion, but I wanted to know of any other possible theories. Obviously Rosenberg's isn't embraced by all philosophers who believe in the hard problem, so how do they resolve this paradox?

It is also for other people who aren't participating in the Rosenberg discussion. If there isn't any interest from these people, maybe we can bump this thread back up after the discussion is over and talk about all the ways the paradox can be resolved, including Rosenberg's.

 

[StatusX]

You're asking the wrong guy: I don't think there are.

Well that makes you an eliminativist, and our ideologies are so different, we'll never come to any agreement here.

That might explain the causal role of intentions, but for Davidson it is a
defining an necessary characteristic of a physical explanation that it
does not use intentional terms, like "thought", "belief" etc. So a complete
theory would have to "bridge" intentional terms to physics, just as
a solution to the HP would have to relate experience to physics.

How do you bridge from "quark" to "table"? Table is not a word in physics, and yet no one should deny we'll be able derive facts about tables with physics. If you want to derive every possible fact from the physical facts, including ones like "Most dining rooms have tables" and "John Smith intends to ask Sally Sue to be his wife", you need to include definitions of all the terms involved with your available information. This isn't extra information you're stealing from some non-physical source, it is just a way of putting these facts into the particular form that makes it easiest for us to talk about them.

You could be inclined to do A rather than B as a result of being drunk. That
doesn't really capture intentionallity.

It is usually impossible to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for some object to be x. But we don't need strict conditions, as long as we know what it takes to be x. We might be at a point where we're looking at all the atoms in some drunk guys head and we say "well he seems to fit the textbook defintion of having an intention, but he's drunk, so I'll say he doesn't." There's nothing wrong with that. And some might say he still can have an intention, but then you can hardly blame that on the physical. It just means that particular fact doesn't have a well defined truth value.

 

[Tournesol]

Well that makes you an eliminativist, and our ideologies are so different, we'll never come to any agreement here.

I don't think there are aspects of consciousness which don't cause.
Obviously I'm not an eliminatavist - I think "consciousness is a real feature of brains".

How do you bridge from "quark" to "table"? Table is not a word in physics, and yet no one should deny we'll be able derive facts about tables with physics. If you want to derive every possible fact from the physical facts, including ones like "Most dining rooms have tables" and "John Smith intends to ask Sally Sue to be his wife", you need to include definitions of all the terms involved with your available information. This isn't extra information you're stealing from some non-physical source, it is just a way of putting these facts into the particular form that makes it easiest for us to talk about them.

A theory that could explain thoughts, ideas and feelings in terms
of physics would have to be able to predict entirely new thoughts (etc)
generate by novel brain-states. What vocabulary could express such thoughts?

It is usually impossible to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for some object to be x. But we don't need strict conditions, as long as we know what it takes to be x. We might be at a point where we're looking at all the atoms in some drunk guys head and we say "well he seems to fit the textbook defintion of having an intention, but he's drunk, so I'll say he doesn't."

The textbook defintion of inetionality or purpose involves consciousness, not just
a disposition to behave in certain ways.

 

[Tournesol]

So:
First-person conscious experience is not reducible to physical descriptions, but it is absurd to think it is epiphenomenal. It is necessarily connected to the world described by physics (specifically our body/brain), but science proceeds assuming physics is causally closed at the micro-level.

What is the way out? It could be that there is an aspect of causation which is unacknowledged presently, but is manifested in complex natural systems. This aspect may be a combining, binding or organizing property responsible for the seemingly irreducible (emergent) macro-level behavior of these systems. From the perspective of the system itself, this aspect of causation is manifested as experience.

Or it could be that the fact that consciouness isn't captured by physical
descriptions is a limitation of physical descriptions. An explanation
in terms of subjectivity ("I went ouch! because I felt a pain") and an
explanation in nerual terms ("I went ouch becuase my C-fibres were stimulated") are two different accounts of the same event. Since there is
not a phsyical event and a separate mental event, the "closure" of the
physical explanation does not exclude the mental explanation.

 

[StatusX]

I don't think there are aspects of consciousness which don't cause.
Obviously I'm not an eliminatavist - I think "consciousness is a real feature of brains".

That obviously depends on how you define consciousness. If you think it is nothing more than the web of causal connections in our brain, you are an eliminativist. If you think there is something intrinsic about experiences, that goes beyond what they do, then you aren't.

A theory that could explain thoughts, ideas and feelings in terms
of physics would have to be able to predict entirely new thoughts (etc)
generate by novel brain-states. What vocabulary could express such thoughts?

I don't know, ask a neuroscientist. They study the brain, including thoughts, ideas and feelings, and their basis is physics, just like a chemist or biologist. Words aren't the problem, it's explaining events in a systematic way, and there are no indications this won't be possible for the brain.

The textbook defintion of inetionality or purpose involves consciousness, not just a disposition to behave in certain ways.

Seperate them out, into p-intentionality (the experience) and a-intentionality (the causal state). That is, unless you believe you can't act like you intend to do something unless you're experiencing that intention. But that would be hard to show, unless you could somehow prove the people around you are conscious.

 

[Philocrat]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness." Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow." There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow. The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical. If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me? The answer to this seems to be yes, and is evidence that there can be properties that do not cause and yet we can still know about (ie, I know what green looks like to me). There is nothing my inverted spectrum twin could say that would cause me to realize we see the color differently, and hence there is no infringement on the causal closure of the physical world. And yet, there is still a natural difference between me and him.

The more difficult question is "Can the existence or absence of experience have an effect?" The trouble is, while we can't convey the specific nature of an experience, which meshes well with that nature not being able to cause, we can tell people that we have experiences. How can it be that intrinsic properties cause us to talk about their existence? What causes us to believe in things that can't cause?

Well, the spooky 'DRIVER INSIDE A DRIVER' version of Dualism (the Cartesian type) tends to suggest this. That Consciousness does possesses causal power. That if you are driving, for example, the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver. The mind. Aristotle's Soul is slightly more sophisticated in that certain aspect of it is 'FORMLESS', NEUTRAL and IMMORTAL in a non-material sense. Aristotle argued that this aspect of the soul is formless and only takes the forms of things when they are being perceived. The eye, for example, takes the form of a red car when the red car is being perceived. The same is true about thinking. During thinking, the soul takes the form of whatever we think about. This is sort of way by which Aristotle distinguished PERCEPTION via visual organs from THINKING via the intellect. In a sense, they are just capacities. But he controversially upheld the Intellect as an aspect of the soul that is immortal, independent and post-exist mortal material body.

Occassionalism (Malebranche and others) claims that the soul is devoid of causal power and that God is constantly respossible for maintaining causal relations between the mind and the body, including when we are not consciouslly or visually attending to things.

Well, all well and good. On a whole and deeper reflection, it is just plain strange that something could be part of something and be causally redundant. The BIG question now is WHAT TYPE OF CAUSE are we talking about?:

1) CONTRIBUTORY CAUSATION: Are we talking about things coming together to form something else by everyone of it actively particiapting in making this possible? Something is partly the cause of another thing when it does something that helps create or bring that thing into existence, or temprorarily or ephemerally participate in keeping that thing going, or both (participatively creates and participatively keeps it going).

2) SINGLE (WHOLE) CAUSATION: Something is wholly the cuase of another thing if it single-handedly creates and maintains that thing. It may form part of the thing or may not form part of the thing but nevertheless manages to externally create and control it. All the working parts of what is created and controlled in this way are functionally redundant, regardless of whether the creator forms part of it or not. The creator and controller of the thing concerned.

NOTE: The problem in being a creator of any sort is that you may be independently observed and judged according to how well or good or perfect what you create works. It is universally, a very serious responssibility because you are not only expected to wholly or perticipatively create but also to wholly or participatively take charge and control of what you create. Those who invent belief systems should take note of this. It is intellectually very tasking, and we must be very careful as we fundamentally but consequentially owe those we propagate such beliefs to a DUTY OF CARE.

 

[Canute]

("I went ouch! because I felt a pain") and an
explanation in nerual terms ("I went ouch becuase my C-fibres were stimulated") are two different accounts of the same event.

I'm not sure this affects your point but - these are only superficially different accounts. Both require that you are conscious so in this context there is no real difference between them. They can be elided by saying "I, whoever or whatever 'I' is, experienced myself saying ouch! and conclude that the reason I did this was because I felt pain which, given that according to science pain is non-causal, I will intentionally assume was caused by my C-fibres being stimulated". The problem is the same for both accounts. It is not why we went ouch, but how we know we went ouch.

 

[Tournesol]

That obviously depends on how you define consciousness. If you think it is nothing more than the web of causal connections in our brain, you are an eliminativist. If you think there is something intrinsic about experiences, that goes beyond what they do, then you aren't.

I've already explained what I think. I am neither an eliminativist nor a metaphysical dualist.

A theory that could explain thoughts, ideas and feelings in terms
of physics would have to be able to predict entirely new thoughts (etc)
generate by novel brain-states. What vocabulary could express such thoughts?

I don't know, ask a neuroscientist.

It's a rhetorical question; the point is that it is supposed to be
imposible in principle. Of course neuroscience hasn't advanced to anything like the stage of having that predictive kind of theory.
BTW, it's kind of amusign that you think that all neuroscientists are
happy to work with folk-psyhological terms, when eliminativists are always insiting that none of them are.

The textbook defintion of inetionality or purpose involves consciousness, not just a disposition to behave in certain ways.

Seperate them out, into p-intentionality (the experience) and a-intentionality (the causal state). That is, unless you believe you can't act like you intend to do something unless you're experiencing that intention.

I don't see what you mean. If you make up your mind to do something , and
do it, it is intentional. If it is a mere reflex action , it isn't.

But that would be hard to show, unless you could somehow prove the people around you are conscious.

Huh ? If they are walking and talking they are conscious. As usual,
you seem to be insisting that consc. is epiphenomenal, so, as usual,
I will have to point out that I disagree.

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not sure this affects your point but - these are only superficially different accounts.

To you perhaps. Yet they are the starting point for eliminativism, epiphomenalism, etc.

Both require that you are conscious so in this context there is no real difference between them. They can be elided by saying "I, whoever or whatever 'I' is, experienced myself saying ouch! and conclude that the reason I did this was because I felt pain which, given that according to science pain is non-causal,

No, according to certain philosophers it is. They may insist that they
are being scientific, but scientists may not see things the same way.
All psychologists tacitly assume that human subjects are conscious,
because they expect subjects to understand and follow their instructions.

I will intentionally assume was caused by my C-fibres being stimulated".

But that can be verified independently of what seems to me to be the case.

The problem is the same for both accounts. It is not why we went ouch, but how we know we went ouch.

The Hard Problem is the nature and role of the feeling. All other
asepcts of consc. are behavioural and therefore more easily dealt with.

 

[StatusX]

Tournesol,
I'm not sure what you're trying to say anymore. You seem to think you've found an explanation of consciousness (brain states looked at from a different point of view), but then you claim these brain states cannot be physically explained. Are you saying both consciousness and the accompanying brain states are unphysical? If so, then I could see why you would believe they could be aspects of the same thing. But I'm making the assumption that brain states are physical. It is an argument for another thread, but I could point you to David Chalmers' paper: Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness. In the introduction, Chalmers, someone who takes consciousness and the hard problem very seriously, admits and explains how things like reportability and intentions (at least their functional roles) could be explained physically.

The problem is that if you accept that brain states are physical, and can be explained in terms of atoms interacting by forces, then it is very difficult to see how this is another way of looking at consciousness. Perhaps it is, but it is far from obvious how this could be, and you have not taken it any further than to say "they are different aspects of the same thing." How this could be is the hard problem.

But whatever one's take on the relationship is, they still have to answer the question in the title of this thread. Because consciousness, the thing they're trying to explain, is characterized as being more than just it's functional role. But how can something that has no functional role cause us to talk about it's existence? Even if some parts of consciousness are functional, the question still applies to the parts that are not. It seems awkward to say there is a causal property of consciousness that makes us talk about the non-causal part, unless you can describe a way in which these are inseperable, and in which the causal part couldn't exist even in principle without the non-causal part. Otherwise we're back to epiphenomenalism.

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not sure what you're trying to say anymore. You seem to think you've found an explanation of consciousness (brain states looked at from a different point of view), but then you claim these brain states cannot be physically explained.

yes,they can be explained in that the Easy Problem behavioural aspects of consc. can be explained causally.

No they can't in that a physical account of consciousness does not capture
the Hard problem Phenomenal aspects.

Are you saying both consciousness and the accompanying brain states are unphysical?

I am saying that there are no physical things and no non-physical things.
(There are no French or German things either)
There are things which we can look at in a physical or non-physical way.

The problem is that if you accept that brain states are physical, and can be explained in terms of atoms interacting by forces, then it is very difficult to see how this is another way of looking at consciousness.

Perhaps it is, but it is far from obvious how this could be, and you have not taken it any further than to say "they are different aspects of the same thing." How this could be is the hard problem.

I am not claiming to solve the HP, just to state it in a way that avoids
eliminatavism, dualism, and epiphenomenalism.

But whatever one's take on the relationship is, they still have to answer the question in the title of this thread. Because consciousness, the thing they're trying to explain, is characterized as being more than just it's functional role.

Everything that actually exists is more than its functional role, because
funcitonal roles are abstractions.

But how can something that has no functional role cause us to talk about it's existence?

Again, there is no inference from "not entirely characterised by a functional role" to "entirely lacking a functional role".

Even if some parts of consciousness are functional, the question still applies to the parts that are not.

Which parts of consciousness are entirely lacking a functional/causal role ?
I see no evidence for the problem in the first place

 

[Tournesol]

It is generally suppose that the causal powers of an entity 'latch onto' the
properties of that entity (it has the particular powers it has by virtue of the properties it has), and that the properties it has cannot be defined in terms of further causal
powers without leading to a vicious regress. So we would should expect
to find some properties that are not defined in terms of causal powers (although they are still causally relevant in that they explain why entities have the
causal powers they have).

 

[Tournesol]

http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/mm.htm

 

[Doctordick]

OTOH any claim that we can physically explain the reason for
such claims is outlandish since physics does not concern
itself with consciousness,but with mass. charge, spin and so on.

Aristotle introduced the word "metaphysics" meaning "beyond physics". Since that time many things have come to be understood and things which were once "metaphysics" and thought to be "occult" are now very much a part of physics. Once, electricity and magnetism were thought to be very much a part of the "occult". And now chemistry, after first graduating from the "occult" field of "alchemy" into the more exact field of "chemistry" has become a fundamental area of physics "physical chemistry". Why should any of you believe the process is over? In many chemical laboratories today, the question, to actually do the experiment with real chemicals or to calculate the result on a computer, is a budget question. When neurosicence reaches that stage (and to think it cannot seems to me to be quite foolish), does consciousness not become a "physical" concern. The only cavil I might have is that the "physics" academy might move itself completely into a religious mode and "exact thinkers" would have to come up with a new title.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Or it could be that the fact that consciouness isn't captured by physical
descriptions is a limitation of physical descriptions. An explanation
in terms of subjectivity ("I went ouch! because I felt a pain") and an
explanation in nerual terms ("I went ouch becuase my C-fibres were stimulated") are two different accounts of the same event. Since there is
not a phsyical event and a separate mental event, the "closure" of the
physical explanation does not exclude the mental explanation.

Much of what you say is concerned with the inadequacies of language itself. I think that you and I see a lot of things in a very similar manner. So far I have found nothing you say to be poorly thought out. I appologize again for not paying attention.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

The Hard Problem is the nature and role of the feeling.

I really don't see that as a very "hard". The "feeling" is a reference to the fact that we are made intensely aware of a problem in a manner which is extremely difficult (but not impossible) to ignore. This brings our higher faculties to bear on the issue causing the pain and that is certainly beneficial to our behavior from a survival perspective.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[moving finger]

Well, the spooky 'DRIVER INSIDE A DRIVER' version of Dualism (the Cartesian type) tends to suggest this. That Consciousness does possesses causal power.

I would go further and suggest that everything which "exists" possesses causal power (where by causal power we mean the ability to influence events). Even something as epehemeral as an "idea" has causal power. Consciousness clearly exists (even in the solipsist's world there is at least one consciousness) therefore consciousness has causal power.

That if you are driving, for example, the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver.

This is something different, and I do not agree that "the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver". This way leads to an infinite regression, so why not simply stop at the first level - the driver is "I" and "I" is self-contained with no further reduction (to a smaller "I" within the "I") possible.

The mind. Aristotle's Soul is slightly more sophisticated in that certain aspect of it is 'FORMLESS', NEUTRAL and IMMORTAL in a non-material sense. Aristotle argued that this aspect of the soul is formless and only takes the forms of things when they are being perceived. The eye, for example, takes the form of a red car when the red car is being perceived.

How quaint and naive . And your point is?

The same is true about thinking. During thinking, the soul takes the form of whatever we think about.

What soul? What is this thing?

This is sort of way by which Aristotle distinguished PERCEPTION via visual organs from THINKING via the intellect. In a sense, they are just capacities. But he controversially upheld the Intellect as an aspect of the soul that is immortal, independent and post-exist mortal material body.

Yes. Quite.

Occassionalism (Malebranche and others) claims that the soul is devoid of causal power and that God is constantly respossible for maintaining causal relations between the mind and the body, including when we are not consciouslly or visually attending to things.

Pretty much like Newton’s God had to constantly intervene to re-adjust the clockwork universe? Yes. Quaint.

Well, all well and good. On a whole and deeper reflection, it is just plain strange that something could be part of something and be causally redundant. The BIG question now is WHAT TYPE OF CAUSE are we talking about?:

1) CONTRIBUTORY CAUSATION: Are we talking about things coming together to form something else by everyone of it actively particiapting in making this possible? Something is partly the cause of another thing when it does something that helps create or bring that thing into existence, or temprorarily or ephemerally participate in keeping that thing going, or both (participatively creates and participatively keeps it going).

What do you mean by “keeping that thing going”?

2) SINGLE (WHOLE) CAUSATION: Something is wholly the cuase of another thing if it single-handedly creates and maintains that thing.

What do you mean by “creates and maintains”?

It may form part of the thing or may not form part of the thing but nevertheless manages to externally create and control it.

Causation has nothing to do with “maintaining” or “controlling” things, that I am aware of, except in the sense that all macroscopic events are caused.

All the working parts of what is created and controlled in this way are functionally redundant, regardless of whether the creator forms part of it or not. The creator and controller of the thing concerned.

NOTE: The problem in being a creator of any sort is that you may be independently observed and judged according to how well or good or perfect what you create works. It is universally, a very serious responssibility because you are not only expected to wholly or perticipatively create but also to wholly or participatively take charge and control of what you create. Those who invent belief systems should take note of this. It is intellectually very tasking, and we must be very careful as we fundamentally but consequentially owe those we propagate such beliefs to a DUTY OF CARE.

I disagree. I believe in evolution, and I believe our belief systems also evolve. It matters not if poor beliefs are postulated from time to time, the “fit” ones will survive and reproduce, and the “unfit” ones will fall by the wayside and decay.

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

This is something different, and I do not agree that "the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver". This way leads to an infinite regression, so why not simply stop at the first level - the driver is "I" and "I" is self-contained with no further reduction (to a smaller "I" within the "I") possible.

You have overlooked many possibilities here. There are many numbers between 1 and infinity. I agree with your dismissal of an infinite set of drivers. But your choice of only one self-contained driver leads to the Hard Problem, which doesn't seem to have an explanation in physicality alone.

Please give some thought to some other possibilities, starting with 2 and going as high as maybe 11. I think there might be a finite explanation for everything if we expand our thinking.

 

[moving finger]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness." Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow."

Need to be careful to distinguish between “the colour yellow” and “the experience of the colour yellow”.

There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow.

Yes, and this (the experience of the colour yellow) is a particular neurophysiological state within each consciousness. It is also peculiar to that consciousness (which is why Mary could never know all there was to know about the colour yellow, no matter how much scientific information she had about the colour, if she had never known the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow).

The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical. If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me?

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

The answer to this seems to be yes, and is evidence that there can be properties that do not cause and yet we can still know about (ie, I know what green looks like to me).

Why do you think that the neurophysiological state of seeing green does not “cause” anything (if this is indeed what you are saying)?

There is nothing my inverted spectrum twin could say that would cause me to realize we see the color differently,

Again, I would argue that the question is meaningless.

and hence there is no infringement on the causal closure of the physical world. And yet, there is still a natural difference between me and him.

No matter what he sees and what you see, your neurophysiological states will not be identical.

The more difficult question is "Can the existence or absence of experience have an effect?"

If you mean causal effect then yes, I would say this is obvious. Even a simple “idea” can have a dramatic causal effect (just look at how many people died in religious wars).

The trouble is, while we can't convey the specific nature of an experience, which meshes well with that nature not being able to cause, we can tell people that we have experiences. How can it be that intrinsic properties cause us to talk about their existence? What causes us to believe in things that can't cause?

I think the assumption that "experiences do not cause" is false. Where is the support for such a notion?

MF

 

[moving finger]

You have overlooked many possibilities here. There are many numbers between 1 and infinity. I agree with your dismissal of an infinite set of drivers. But your choice of only one self-contained driver leads to the Hard Problem, which doesn't seem to have an explanation in physicality alone.

Please give some thought to some other possibilities, starting with 2 and going as high as maybe 11. I think there might be a finite explanation for everything if we expand our thinking.

I agree that in going from infinity to 1 I have skipped over the possibility of 2, 3, 4... and even 42. But unless and until someone can show how the introduction of another "level" explains anything that is not explained at the top level then I see no point in inventing additional levels of explanation.

I personally do not agree that there IS a "hard problem".

MF

 

[medium]

Questionn the cause and effect issues here; Is there a general "reaction" to experiencing something for the first time or the experience of deja'vu!? What is academic is that everything already exists. What is not is our coming to realize this!?? Please comment>...MEDIUM.....>

 

[Paul Martin]

I agree that in going from infinity to 1 I have skipped over the possibility of 2, 3, 4... and even 42. But unless and until someone can show how the introduction of another "level" explains anything that is not explained at the top level then I see no point in inventing additional levels of explanation.

I personally do not agree that there IS a "hard problem".

Fair enough. If I didn't see a Hard Problem I wouldn't see a need for additional levels of explanation either. In my case, I have seen the Hard Problem for most of my life so I had no problem relating to Searles' and Chalmers' expositions of it. (Maybe I was too receptive to their arguments and gave them a pass.) If they haven't convinced you of the existence of the problem, then I am sure nothing I could say would either.

It would help me, though, if you would explain why their arguments and analysis fail. Maybe you could change my mind.

 

[moving finger]

It would help me, though, if you would explain why their arguments and analysis fail. Maybe you could change my mind.

I may not be thinking of the same arguments and analysis that you are. There have been many expositions of so-called Hard Problems. I am aware that some (like Searle & Chalmers) seem to consider that consciousness is for some reason not amenable to neuroscientific investigation, whereas others (Churchland and Dennett for example) see no problem.

Perhaps if you could provide (or at least provide a link to) an explanation of the arguments and analysis that you refer to, I might then be able to explain why I think there is not in fact a Hard Problem.
MF

 

[Tournesol]

Need to be careful to distinguish between “the colour yellow” and “the experience of the colour yellow”.

and, thirdly, the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale.

Yes, and this (the experience of the colour yellow) is a particular neurophysiological state within each consciousness. It is also peculiar to that consciousness

There is no reason to suppose that.

(which is why Mary could never know all there was to know about the colour yellow, no matter how much scientific information she had about the colour, if she had never known the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow).

By hypothesis, Mary's scientific information will include the neurophysiological
state, it just doesn't include the yellow-quale.

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

There is good reason to suppose that this is not the case. People
cannot have unique, in some strong sense, brains because you would
not be able to form a single, coherent brain out of two genomes.
All brains must be broadly similar. Likewise psychological states
in anatomically normal humans must have broadly similar neurla correlates.

Why do you think that the neurophysiological state of seeing green does not “cause” anything (if this is indeed what you are saying)?

Probably the causal closure of the phsycial coupled with rejection of any kind
of identity theory.

No matter what he sees and what you see, your neurophysiological states will not be identical.

But if they are very similar -- and they almost certainly are -- why should
we not say the subjective expereiences will be very similar ? How
does "not identical" come to do the job of "completely different" ?

 

[moving finger]

and, thirdly, the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale.

Please explain what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

Yes, and this (the experience of the colour yellow) is a particular neurophysiological state within each consciousness. It is also peculiar to that consciousness

There is no reason to suppose that.

Au contraire, mon ami, there is no reason to suppose, and also no evidence to suggest, that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow.

(which is why Mary could never know all there was to know about the colour yellow, no matter how much scientific information she had about the colour, if she had never known the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow).

By hypothesis, Mary's scientific information will include the neurophysiological state, it just doesn't include the yellow-quale.

I prefer the hypothesis that the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow is entirely subjective, and 3rd person objective science is unable to represent this in an objective manner which could be transferred to Mary in any other way.
The idea that there is a “quale” of the colour yellow, which is somehow distinct from the neurophysiological state of “experiencing the colour yellow”, I find (IMHO) unnecessary and absurd.

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

There is good reason to suppose that this is not the case. People cannot have unique, in some strong sense, brains because you would not be able to form a single, coherent brain out of two genomes.

I cannot make any rational sense out of this statement at all. Why on Earth do you think (what rational argument is there to support the idea) that a single coherent brain could not be formed from two genomes?

All brains must be broadly similar. Likewise psychological states in anatomically normal humans must have broadly similar neurla correlates.

Broadly similar is very different to identical.
All people are broadly similar, but no two people have identical experiences.
One cannot reach the conclusion that my neurophysiological states are identical to yours just because we are broadly similar.

Why do you think that the neurophysiological state of seeing green does not “cause” anything (if this is indeed what you are saying)?

Probably the causal closure of the phsycial coupled with rejection of any kind of identity theory.

A neurophysiological state is a dynamic physical pattern/arrangement of neurons/chemicals/synapses in space and time, in this sense it is physical, in this sense it can have causal powers. I fail to see what “identity theory” has to do with this.

No matter what he sees and what you see, your neurophysiological states will not be identical.

But if they are very similar -- and they almost certainly are -- why should we not say the subjective experiences will be very similar ? How does "not identical" come to do the job of "completely different" ?

How does “very similar” come to do the job of “identical”? It does not.
I did not say that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not similar; I said that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not identical. This is the critical point. Similar states can give rise to similar effects, but only identical states give rise to identical effects.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Please explain what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

according to your definition (which I find odd) the "experience" is a neurophysiological state.

Au contraire, mon ami, there is no reason to suppose, and also no evidence to suggest, that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow.

Nor is there any eveidence to suggest that they are different in
a problematical way -- certainly not amounting to the "meaninglessness"
of questions about what different people's experience is like, as you have claimed.

I prefer the hypothesis that the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow is entirely subjective, and 3rd person objective science is unable to represent this in an objective manner which could be transferred to Mary in any other way.

Your use of the word "neurophysiological" is confusing, if you are in
fact talking about a 1st-person experience and not neuroscience.

The idea that there is a “quale” of the colour yellow, which is somehow distinct from the neurophysiological state of “experiencing the colour yellow”, I find (IMHO) unnecessary and absurd.

You are not making it clear whether you are talking about the sorts
of states that are subjectively accesible, or the sort
that neurosicnetists deal with.

I cannot make any rational sense out of this statement at all. Why on Earth do you think (what rational argument is there to support the idea) that a single coherent brain could not be formed from two genomes?

Obviously they can, but only because the brain the genomes code
for are variations on a theme and not radically different. The question
is: if every brain is a variation on a theme,

Broadly similar is very different to identical.
All people are broadly similar, but no two people have identical experiences.
One cannot reach the conclusion that my neurophysiological states are identical to yours just because we are broadly similar.

But if our brains differ only a little bit, why shouldn't our subjective states
also differ a litte bit ?
How do you justify the idea that there is no resemblance at all between
the subjective expreience of different people, when it is based on slight
variations in brain structure ?

A neurophysiological state is a dynamic physical pattern/arrangement of neurons/chemicals/synapses in space and time,

All of which is objective and 3rd-person. Yet a while back you were claiming
that NP states are somehow equivaent to subjective exprience.

in this sense it is physical, in this sense it can have causal powers. I fail to see what “identity theory” has to do with this.

You have just answered your own question. If there is some
sort of identity betwen subjective expereinces and brain-states,
expriences have whatever causal powers brain states have.
However, the identity is not simple and total, because we do
not experience brain states as such.

How does “very similar” come to do the job of “identical”? It does not.
I did not say that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not similar; I said that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not identical. This is the critical point. Similar states can give rise to similar effects, but only identical states give rise to identical effects.

That is not what you were saying before:-

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

Why should the question be meaningless (!) when all you can muster
is the idea that people with slightly different brains will see
slightly different shades ?

 

[moving finger]

Please explain what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

according to your definition (which I find odd) the "experience" is a neurophysiological state.

Sorry, is this supposed to be an explanation of what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

Au contraire, mon ami, there is no reason to suppose, and also no evidence to suggest, that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow.

Nor is there any eveidence to suggest that they are different in a problematical way -- certainly not amounting to the "meaninglessness" of questions about what different people's experience is like, as you have claimed.

If there is no evidence either way then the most we can conclude is that it comes down to beliefs. I believe that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is not necessarily identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow, whereas you believe it is necessarily identical?

I prefer the hypothesis that the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow is entirely subjective, and 3rd person objective science is unable to represent this in an objective manner which could be transferred to Mary in any other way.

Your use of the word "neurophysiological" is confusing, if you are in fact talking about a 1st-person experience and not neuroscience.

Not if one believes that there is a neurophysiological basis for consciousness.

The idea that there is a “quale” of the colour yellow, which is somehow distinct from the neurophysiological state of “experiencing the colour yellow”, I find (IMHO) unnecessary and absurd.

You are not making it clear whether you are talking about the sorts of states that are subjectively accesible, or the sort that neurosicnetists deal with.

Neuroscientists deal with the objective (3rd person) manifestations of neurophysiological states; the subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state is not accessible to 3rd person objective science.
No neuroscientist has ever seen a “quale” in a scientific experiment, neither has he/she experienced a neurophysiological state in a scientific experiment (except as a 1st person subject). There is no evidence to suggest that anything like qualia, as distinct from neurophysiological states, exist.

I cannot make any rational sense out of this statement at all. Why on Earth do you think (what rational argument is there to support the idea) that a single coherent brain could not be formed from two genomes?

Obviously they can, but only because the brain the genomes code for are variations on a theme and not radically different. The question is: if every brain is a variation on a theme,

The genomes are essentially the blueprint for a particular design. The brain is developed, from conception, based on this design but modified by experience. Thus no two developed brains are identical, regardless of genomes.

Broadly similar is very different to identical.
All people are broadly similar, but no two people have identical experiences.
One cannot reach the conclusion that my neurophysiological states are identical to yours just because we are broadly similar.

But if our brains differ only a little bit, why shouldn't our subjective states also differ a litte bit ?

I never said that they didn’t “differ a little bit”. I said they are not identical.

How do you justify the idea that there is no resemblance at all between the subjective expreience of different people, when it is based on slight variations in brain structure ?

Please read my posts more carefully. I never said that “there is no resemblance at all”, I said (in most cases) the experiences are not identical, and (in one case) the experiences do not necessarily resemble each other. And I still stand by those statements.

With respect, which part of the word “identical” do you not understand?

A neurophysiological state is a dynamic physical pattern/arrangement of neurons/chemicals/synapses in space and time,

All of which is objective and 3rd-person. Yet a while back you were claiming that BOP states are somehow equivaent to subjective exprience.

The manifestation of a neurophysiological state within a consciousness leads to subjective experience within that consciousness. This is 1st person subjectivity.
The external observation of a neurophysiological state (which is what neuroscientists do) tells us nothing directly about that subjective experience. This is 3rd person objectivity.

in this sense it is physical, in this sense it can have causal powers. I fail to see what “identity theory” has to do with this.

You have just answered your own question. If there is some sort of identity betwen subjective expereinces and brain-states, expriences have whatever causal powers brain states have. However, the identity is not simple and total, because we do not experience brain states as such.

Hypothesis : The subjective experience, along with the rest of consciousness, is not identical with but is contained within (is part of) the neurophysiological (brain) state. The neurophysiological state contains a lot more information than is accessible to subjective experience. Thus there is indeed not a total identity between subjective experiences and neurophysiological states.

How does “very similar” come to do the job of “identical”? It does not.
I did not say that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not similar; I said that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not identical. This is the critical point. Similar states can give rise to similar effects, but only identical states give rise to identical effects.

That is not what you were saying before:-

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

Nowhere in here does it say that similar states cannot give rise to similar effects. What on Earth are you trying to say?

Why should the question be meaningless (!) when all you can muster is the idea that people with slightly different brains will see slightly different shades ?

I did NOT say that people with slightly different brains will see slightly different shades! Where did you get this idea from?

To explain – the original question was :

if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me?

To which I answered

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

In other words, the neurophysiological state of “person A seeing green” does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the neurophysiological state of either “person B seeing red” or “person B seeing green”, therefore why should it necessarily follow that they cannot behave in a similar way?

Honestly, Tournesol, and with respect, I am trying to discuss things rationally with you and I am doing my best to answer your questions where I can, but in return I find that you not only usually avoid answering my questions but you continually accuse me of saying things that I have not said!

MF

 

[<<<GUILLE>>>]

I think that consciousenss causes everything that happens in reality and under a level of logic.

 

[Tournesol]

If there is no evidence either way then the most we can conclude is that it comes down to beliefs. I believe that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is not necessarily identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow, whereas you believe it is necessarily identical?

No

Not if one believes that there is a neurophysiological basis for consciousness.

"Basis" is not straightforward identity. There is still the 1st person/3rd person differerence.

Neuroscientists deal with the objective (3rd person) manifestations of neurophysiological states; the subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state is not accessible to 3rd person objective science.
No neuroscientist has ever seen a “quale” in a scientific experiment, neither has he/she experienced a neurophysiological state in a scientific experiment (except as a 1st person subject). There is no evidence to suggest that anything like qualia, as distinct from neurophysiological states, exist.

"Quale" is just a label for what you call "subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state". Whether and how qulia
are distinct from NP states depends on your stance on the HP. It
is neither a fact, nor an idea wtih no evidence whatsoever (the
evidence of course being the difference between the 1st and 3rd person views).

Hypothesis : The subjective experience, along with the rest of consciousness, is not identical with but is contained within (is part of) the neurophysiological (brain) state. The neurophysiological state contains a lot more information than is accessible to subjective experience. Thus there is indeed not a total identity between subjective experiences and neurophysiological states.

So subjective experience is a mere subset of the total NP state, and if you had a complete description of an NP state, you would be able to find
subjective experience within it ? That is not most peoples intuition.

In other words, the neurophysiological state of “person A seeing green” does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the neurophysiological state of either “person B seeing red” or “person B seeing green”, therefore why should it necessarily follow that they cannot behave in a similar way?

But if consciousness is produced naturally, the NP state of A haviong a green
quale must differ from the state of B having a red quale-- otherwise you would have
to concede that there is no realtionship between neural activity and experience.

 

[medium]

Forgive my brief digress to something that at the moment seems to me to be quite profound: On the nature of ""can consciousness cause"". I''m struck with an immediate ""yes indeed"!. I've been considering the question,""Are we just fixed by destiny( reflecting on the ultimate consciousness), or are we somehow just floating like on a breeze""(doing our own, or someone elses thing). It would appear at this point, that it must be a little of both. We are indeed expeiencing the ""great experience""(as prime mover), but because there are other beings arround us, we are experiencing their reflections as well. Some reflections, we will all agree, are quite harmless, even vivifying. Some though, quite deadly. My point arrives when I considered its natural counterpart in nature, namely, in plants. Plants, as you recall, heliotrophe towards the sun to maximize the full impact of the suns nurishing rays. We too, I propose, do much the same when we, unaware(search) and or on purpose,(meditate): heliotrophe towards the ""great experience"". A kind of turning towards the source of some great ?? inspiration/motivation ?? as it were. The warning potential of such a ""receptive"" state has been afore mentioned. This seems to me, that this is what was being alluded to in ""Eastern"" thought, as the ""net of gems, or the ""net of Indra"". Please comment>...MEDIUM.....>