Quantum Immortality without MWI?

[Physicuser]

he will be "you" with respect to "this-you" (and then, don't make sense ask who of them you will be, you are all, since they are different with respect each other, but not with you now).

I am having troubles with this reasoning. It's seems that if you say "you will win the lottery in 2030", is true, but then this apply too if you say "next second you will tunnel into the moon", but well, you are still here...

 

[PeterDonis]

people are not even exact copies of themselves from moment to moment

You're misunderstanding my definition of a "person". As I have already emphasized, a person is not a snapshot at a single instant of time. A person is an entire sequence of experiences. Obviously for a sequence of experiences to be instantiated by any physical system, the state of that physical system must change from moment to moment. But to think of that as "the person changing" is a misunderstanding. The sequence of physical experiences, instantiated by a physical system that is changing from moment to moment to instantiate those experiences, is the person.

is there anything more to the expectation of a future experience than the existence (in all of reality) of an entity feeling like it's a future version of you now.

Yes: the question is whether the particular person here on Earth is that entity--whether the sequence of experiences that is going on here on Earth is the one that is going to include that future experience at some point. The fact that some such sequence exists somewhere in the infinite multiverse does not prove that the particular sequence here on Earth is that sequence.

 

[PeterDonis]

The two things I was thinking on were the sizes of infinite sets and Godel's incompleteness theorem.

Which are mathematical things, not physical things. We are not talking about abstract mathematics in this thread. We are talking about our actual universe and what is possible within it. So it's not enough to wave your hands and say "mathematically we know there are infinite sets with different cardinalities". Yes, we know that. But that says nothing about the cardinalities of the actual infinite sets (if there are any) that appear in our physical models, which is what we are talking about in this thread.

I was doing a similar "hand-waving" statement that the set of all possible universes created by splitting universes at every quantum event (all outcomes happen) leaves out the impossible ones.

Um, this isn't a "hand-waving statement", it's a tautology: obviously the set of possible universes does not include impossible universes.

Another hand-wave: MWI is based on a quantum mechanics view of the things happening in the universe. It can never include a universe that is NOT based on quantum mechanics

This is not a hand-wave either: it's another obvious statement that contributes nothing useful to the discussion in this thread.

If you don't have anything useful to contribute to the discussion in this thread, please refrain from further posting.

 

[PeterDonis]

I am having troubles with this reasoning.

Because you're not thinking through the implications of what "you" actually means. I suggest re-reading my post #58 in response to you again, particularly the last part of it. (I reiterated some of the same points in post #72.)

 

[Physicuser]

Because you're not thinking through the implications of what "you" actually means. I suggest re-reading my post #58 in response to you again, particularly the last part of it. (I reiterated some of the same points in post #72.)

It seems a good point, thanks.

 

[Jarvis323]

Of course you couldn't! That's the point. You have no capacity to process an infinite amount of data. And, the amount of data you need to collate to see Hamlet appear even once involves processing something like ##100^{130,000}## bytes of data, which you cannot do.

But there would be many worlds/yous. Every world would have a you, and a different message, and all of the possible messages would be seen by some you. One of them would see Hamlet.

This is one reason why MWI is disregarded by some people, because it implies absurdly statistically unlikely outcomes in some worlds.

 

[PeterDonis]

there would be many worlds/yous

Please, please be clear about exactly what you mean by "you". I have posted repeatedly about this already.

You, here and now on Earth, represent an initial portion (from your first experience up to now) of a particular entire sequence of human experiences--a particular person. But you, here and now on Earth, do not know exactly which entire sequence of experiences you are--which entire sequence the sequence of you here on Earth up to now is an initial portion of.

If Tegmark's reasoning is correct, whichever entire sequence of experiences your experience here on Earth up to now is an initial portion of, there are many other entire sequences of experiences elsewhere in the infinite multiverse that are identical. But that statement tells you nothing about which entire sequence of experiences your experience here on Earth up to now is an intial portion of. So it tells you nothing about what future experiences you, here and now on Earth, you should expect. Whichever future experiences you end up having, yes, there will be many other sequences of experiences, realized elsewhere in the infinite multiverse, that are the same; but that tells you nothing about which future experiences those will be.

In other words, there are many different possible entire sequences of experiences, all of which start with the same initial portion as your experience here on Earth up to now. Only one of those sequences is the one being instantiated here on Earth. So the term "you" is ambiguous: it can refer to just the particular entire sequence of experiences being instantiated here on Earth, or it can refer to the set of all possible entire sequences of experiences that have the same initial portion as the one being instantiated here on Earth--your experience here on Earth up to now. You seem to be using it with the latter meaning, but the latter meaning doesn't say anything about what the you here on Earth will experience. It is perfectly possible to formulate a notion of "probability" in which it is meaningful to say that the probability is absurdly tiny that you, here on Earth, will see Hamlet emerge from a series of random quantum fluctuations. Which is all we can actually establish from experiment.

 

[Jarvis323]

Please, please be clear about exactly what you mean by "you". I have posted repeatedly about this already.

You, here and now on Earth, represent an initial portion (from your first experience up to now) of a particular entire sequence of human experiences--a particular person. But you, here and now on Earth, do not know exactly which entire sequence of experiences you are--which entire sequence the sequence of you here on Earth up to now is an initial portion of.

If Tegmark's reasoning is correct, whichever entire sequence of experiences your experience here on Earth up to now is an initial portion of, there are many other entire sequences of experiences elsewhere in the infinite multiverse that are identical. But that statement tells you nothing about which entire sequence of experiences your experience here on Earth up to now is an intial portion of. So it tells you nothing about what future experiences you, here and now on Earth, you should expect. Whichever future experiences you end up having, yes, there will be many other sequences of experiences, realized elsewhere in the infinite multiverse, that are the same; but that tells you nothing about which future experiences those will be.

In other words, there are many different possible entire sequences of experiences, all of which start with the same initial portion as your experience here on Earth up to now. Only one of those sequences is the one being instantiated here on Earth. So the term "you" is ambiguous: it can refer to just the particular entire sequence of experiences being instantiated here on Earth, or it can refer to the set of all possible entire sequences of experiences that have the same initial portion as the one being instantiated here on Earth--your experience here on Earth up to now. You seem to be using it with the latter meaning, but the latter meaning doesn't say anything about what the you here on Earth will experience. It is perfectly possible to formulate a notion of "probability" in which it is meaningful to say that the probability is absurdly tiny that you, here on Earth, will see Hamlet emerge from a series of random quantum fluctuations. Which is all we can actually establish from experiment.

This is all true. But one being that shares your prefix up to this point, will experience a chain of experiences that includes setting up a device and seeing Hamlet printed. In fact one will experience being in a reality where experimentally, all quantum random number generators always print Hamlet and nothing else. Being one who experiences that will be absurdly unlikely. But it will happen according to MWI. For them, experimentally, they would appear to live in a quantum Hamlet universe.

 

[PeterDonis]

one being that shares your prefix up to this point, will experience a chain of experiences that includes setting up a device and seeing Hamlet printed

Yes. But among the set of all beings that share the same prefix (good shorthand term, btw!), only a very tiny fraction will have that experience.

one will experience being in a reality where experimentally, all quantum random number generators always print Hamlet and nothing else

Yes, but this will be a much, much tinier fraction than the subset above.

it will happen according to MWI. For them, experimentally, they would appear to live in a quantum Hamlet universe

Yes, this is one argument for being skeptical that the MWI is true. It probably needs to be discussed in a separate thread if you want to go into it in more detail, since this thread is supposed to be about QI without the MWI.

 

[votingmachine]

Which are mathematical things, not physical things. We are not talking about abstract mathematics in this thread. We are talking about our actual universe and what is possible within it. So it's not enough to wave your hands and say "mathematically we know there are infinite sets with different cardinalities". Yes, we know that. But that says nothing about the cardinalities of the actual infinite sets (if there are any) that appear in our physical models, which is what we are talking about in this thread.

I thought the original question was precisely about whether everything imaginable happens in a MWI. Maybe I focused on the wrong part:

... a person like you in another galaxy or a brain that popped out in the middle of space, so even if there is no causal connection between them, there is a subjective sensation of continuity...

I'm not sure of the cardinality of the set of MW, but it seems smaller than the set of MW we can imagine. And that might be impossible. I'm not sure why a brain is popping up in the middle of space, with the exact conscious history of another brain, on earth. I did mention impossible things because that seemed impossible.

 

[PeterDonis]

I thought the original question was precisely about whether everything imaginable happens in a MWI.

Please read the thread title. The OP does mention the MWI, but only to describe where the "quantum immortality" idea originally came from. The thread is specifically about whether something similar is possible if the MWI is not true.

Maybe I focused on the wrong part:

What the OP described there does not require the MWI. In fact, one of the rather counterintuitive points made in the Tegmark paper referenced earlier is that, in a spatially infinite universe with inflation at the start, anything that would happen in some branch under the MWI will also happen in some Hubble volume of the spatially infinite universe on a single-world interpretation of QM. The latter kind of scenario is what we are discussing in this thread.

 

[PeterDonis]

I'm not sure of the cardinality of the set of MW, but it seems smaller than the set of MW we can imagine.

This is off topic. Please start a separate thread if you want to discuss this.

 

[votingmachine]

What the OP described there does not require the MWI. In fact, one of the rather counterintuitive points made in the Tegmark paper referenced earlier is that, in a spatially infinite universe with inflation at the start, anything that would happen in some branch under the MWI will also happen in some Hubble volume of the spatially infinite universe on a single-world interpretation of QM. The latter kind of scenario is what we are discussing in this thread.

I see the link and paper now. But doesn't it also make the same point that I am after in discussing the cardinality? The Level-1 multiverse is a subset of the Level-4 multiverse. The cardinality of the two is different.

I see that an infinite spatial universe is likely to have infinitely many variations of 14 billion light-year spheres. But I think that infinite set of 14 billion light year spheres is incomplete. The cardinality is lower. There should be an infinite number of those 14 billion light year spheres with 1 hydrogen atom in them (placed at an infinite number of positions), Each with the atom somewhere slightly different. And another infinite set with 2 helium atoms.

If the cardinalities are different then we can say some things are not in there. Level-3 variations are not found in the Level-1 set.

"Level I: A generic prediction of cosmological inflation is an infinite “ergodic” space, which contains Hubble volumes realizing all initial conditions."

There needs to be proof that the infinite set of initial conditions can be mapped one-to-one to infinite space. Perhaps that proof is in one of the references, but none is presented in that paper.

 

[PeterDonis]

The Level-1 multiverse is a subset of the Level-4 multiverse.

Yes, but this does not prove that the cardinality of the latter is greater than the cardinality of the former. Remember that we are dealing with infinite sets: an infinite set can have a proper subset that has the same cardinality. (In fact that's the definition of an infinite set.)

 

[votingmachine]

Yes, but this does not prove that the cardinality of the latter is greater than the cardinality of the former. Remember that we are dealing with infinite sets: an infinite set can have a proper subset that has the same cardinality. (In fact that's the definition of an infinite set.)

True.

But I also find it difficult to swallow that a universe is determined by the initial conditions ... that seems to contradict the results we see in this section of the Multiverse. But I see the parallel between the "unitary" part of MWI and that of determinism set by initial conditions. And thus why it is possible to consider the two functionally equivalent.

It does seem like that requires hidden deterministic variables ... and I cannot resolve that with the contradiction of that assumption seen in Bell's Theorem experiments. But I suppose we could anthropically live in a subsector where the results of Bell experiments are confusing. Although I would argue that to be an identical me, there has to be that set of experimental data.

 

[PeterDonis]

I also find it difficult to swallow that a universe is determined by the initial conditions ... that seems to contradict the results we see in this section of the Multiverse.

How so?

 

[votingmachine]

How so?

If there is an identical me in an identical multiverse measuring the identical electron present, and I measure the spin in one and the position in the other then the spin and position are both knowable with infinite precision. I don't have to presuppose entanglement, I merely have to suppose multiverse identity to that moment.

Every experiment with entangled things says that the two conjugate variables CAN NEVER be known with infinite precision. The identical multiverses are Einstein's Princes.

You either have to hold that conjugate variables are knowable, or unknowable. The experimental results in this multiverse are only consistent with them being unknowable.

Put another way, the two variables can be shown to not coexist at a level beyond the uncertainty principle. But the existence of Multiverses creates a situation where even though a singular I does not know the two, the two measurements exist, on what is the same particle.

Or if there is FTL hidden variable communication, I would notice that the particle was measured for spin, and therefore, my measurement was impossible. Maybe FTL hidden variable swapping works ... it eludes me how though. The two particles are merely identical, not entangled.

 

[PeterDonis]

If there is an identical me in an identical multiverse measuring the identical electron present, and I measure the spin in one and the position in the other

Inconsistent. If the two "mes" make different measurements on the electron, they're not identical.

The rest of your post just builds on this initial error.

 

[votingmachine]

Inconsistent. If the two "mes" make different measurements on the electron, they're not identical.

The rest of your post just builds on this initial error.

Hmm. I'm stuck in a loop on that response. Of course they are not identical once they are measured, but they were before the measurement. And that seems to be the EPR objection to QM completeness.

But I'll have to think on it. It seems a circular argument.

Let me try the same thing stated another way:

6 identical Multiverses where I have entangled pairs of photons headed for the usual ABC detectors. Now the multiverses diverge and I put all 6 possible pairs of settings (AA, AB, AC, BB, BC, CC). The results of those measurements of the same pair create a requirement for a complete instruction set. And a complete hidden instruction set is incompatible with the experimental results.

That may be the same issue ... once the pairs are measured, they are non-identical. Now I can't KNOW that there was a complete instruction set, unless another multiverse has me reincarnated with the previous 6 bits of knowledge.

I could be being anthropic though ... Tegmark does warn against that trap.

 

[PeterDonis]

Of course they are not identical once they are measured, but they were before the measurement.

So what?

that seems to be the EPR objection to QM completeness

No, it isn't. The EPR objection has nothing to do with what you are saying.

The results of those measurements of the same pair create a requirement for a complete instruction set.

No, they don't. The fact that results occur for all 6 pairs of settings does not mean all of those results were predetermined.

a complete hidden instruction set is incompatible with the experimental results.

Only if it obeys Bell's locality condition.

 

[PeroK]

This is all true. But one being that shares your prefix up to this point, will experience a chain of experiences that includes setting up a device and seeing Hamlet printed. In fact one will experience being in a reality where experimentally, all quantum random number generators always print Hamlet and nothing else. Being one who experiences that will be absurdly unlikely. But it will happen according to MWI. For them, experimentally, they would appear to live in a quantum Hamlet universe.

Without MWI, that's true of our universe: that a random character generator could produce Hamlet, but it is absurdly unlikely. And we can run an experiment to confirm/justify that claim.

You claim that if MWI is true then there must be a random character generator somewhere that generates Hamlet (and nothing but Hamlet).

What I ask is at least a description of an experiment that would test that claim. If you cannot provide at least an outline of how you would test that (to see whether it's true of not), then I claim that statement is physically meaningless and metaphysics, rather than physics.

We can all wave our hands and say there must be this and there must be that, but unless you can propose an experiment to confirm what you're saying, then it's not physics.

Believing MWI doesn't give anyone the right to abandon the principles of confirming claims by experimental evidence. This is my challenge to all your claims: that you are using a blind belief in MWI to avoid actually thinking about the universe from an experimental point of view and claiming things to be true that cannot be confirmed experimentally.

Further, I suggest that if MWI is true and even if you could somehow investigate more than one branch of the wavefunction, then (in any experiment constrained by the speed of light, and the lifetime of the universe) the chance of finding such a machine is still absurdly unlikely. So, from a physics standpoint it is still absurdly unlikely that you can show such a thing to exist.

 

[PeterDonis]

You claim that if MWI is true then there must be a random character generator somewhere that generates Hamlet (and nothing but Hamlet).

What I ask is at least a description of an experiment that would test that claim.

If you agree that without the MWI, a random character generator would have an extremely tiny, but not zero, probability of producing Hamlet and nothing but Hamlet, then it must be the case, because all QM interpretations use the same underlying math, that in the MWI, there would be a branch in which a random character generator produced Hamlet and nothing but Hamlet. You don't need an experiment to test that.

Bear in mind that the MWI is an interpretation of QM. That means it makes all of the same experimental predictions as any other interpretation of QM, including whichever one you are using to make the claim that without the MWI, there would be an extremely tiny, but not zero, probability of a random character generator producing Hamlet and nothing but Hamlet. So you can't distinguish between those two interpretations by any experimental test. All you can do is observe that they both use the same underlying math; the only difference between "there is an extremely tiny but nonzero probability of X occurring" and "there will be a branch in which X occurs" is which QM interpretation you choose.

 

[PeroK]

If you agree that without the MWI, a random character generator would have an extremely tiny, but not zero, probability of producing Hamlet and nothing but Hamlet, then it must be the case, because all QM interpretations use the same underlying math, that in the MWI, there would be a branch in which a random character generator produced Hamlet and nothing but Hamlet. You don't need an experiment to test that.

The adoption of the idea where we do not need experimental evidence for these claims, I suggest, is allowing metaphysical wool to be pulled over our eyes.

I'm drawing a distinction between the mathematics and the physics. Mathematically, you have an infinite sequence of worlds. But, once you introduce the need for experimental confirmation of these claims, you can't process an infinite sequence. I would like to insist that:

Everything that is claimed to exist has at least a theoretically plausible experiment that could find it.

This would ultimately allow us to assign some sort of probabilities to events in MWI according to the maximum practical probability of finding it - given certain fundamental constraints, such as the speed of light, the amount of available energy in the observable universe and the lifetime of the universe.

In other words: if we hypothetically dedicated all the available resources in the observable universe for the lifetime of the universe to finding out Hamlet machine, then the probability of finding it is still absurdly small. And that would allow us to say - with some well-defined physical meaning - that's it's absurdly unlikley that there is one. And to claim the definite existence of something we will (almost certainly) never find is metaphysics.

In a nutshell, my argument against blindly accepting the existence of everything that MWI may produce is to impose at least some measure of experimental verifiability. You could argue with my methodology, but I suggest some experimental methodology (that goes beyond hand waving) is necessary for us to be discussing physics at all.

 

[Jarvis323]

What I ask is at least a description of an experiment that would test that claim. If you cannot provide at least an outline of how you would test that (to see whether it's true of not), then I claim that statement is physically meaningless and metaphysics, rather than physics.

We can all wave our hands and say there must be this and there must be that, but unless you can propose an experiment to confirm what you're saying, then it's not physics.

If this is true, then quantum interpretations are not in the realm of physics.

Believing MWI doesn't give anyone the right to abandon the principles of confirming claims by experimental evidence. This is my challenge to all your claims: that you are using a blind belief in MWI to avoid actually thinking about the universe from an experimental point of view and claiming things to be true that cannot be confirmed experimentally.

Who has said they believe in MWI? Personally, I don't.

Further, I suggest that if MWI is true and even if you could somehow investigate more than one branch of the wavefunction, then (in any experiment constrained by the speed of light, and the lifetime of the universe) the chance of finding such a machine is still absurdly unlikely. So, from a physics standpoint it is still absurdly unlikely that you can show such a thing to exist.

If MWI is true, then the mathematics implies Hamlet machines. If what it implies is false, then MWI would have been false in the first place. We've assumed it was true as a thought experiment already.

 

[Jarvis323]

In other words: if we hypothetically dedicated all the available resources in the observable universe for the lifetime of the universe to finding out Hamlet machine, then the probability of finding it is still absurdly small. And that would allow us to say - with some well-defined physical meaning - that's it's absurdly unlikley that there is one.

You can argue that it's not worth discussing since it's just mathematics we're discussing. But the argument you've given is self contradictory. If we discuss mathematics, then we should be consistent.

If experimentally you find it extremely unlikely for a Hamlet machine to exist, that is fine.

But if you claim that a world where all quantum random number generators are Hamelet machines doesn't exist, and you've assumed many worlds interpretation is true, then all you've done is contradict your assumption.

In other words, even if we do some hand waiving and assume you could disprove a Hamlet machine exists, then all you could hope to do is disprove the assumption (MWI).

Physics is based on math. If we can't discuss the math itself (because in your opinion mathematics is just hand waiving), then we can't do any kind of physics in the first place. In other words, you're claiming physics isn't physics.

 

[akvadrako]

In a nutshell, my argument against blindly accepting the existence of everything that MWI may produce is to impose at least some measure of experimental verifiability. You could argue with my methodology, but I suggest some experimental methodology (that goes beyond hand waving) is necessary for us to be discussing physics at all.

Testing MWI might be possible if it implies QI and the other interpretations don't. QI can be tested because it assigns different probabilities to "living to 200" and "living to 1M" than there not being QI. So each time you find yourself living longer than you expected, seemingly by being lucky to be in the right world, it should increase your credence of QI and hence of MWI.

 

[PeroK]

If this is true, then quantum interpretations are not in the realm of physics.

I think it's generally accepted that taking an interpretation literally is metaphysical. But, an interpretation is a practical way of making sense of the theory.

In the case of MWI, there is a possibility that it might in future be experimentally verifiable.

Who has said they believe in MWI? Personally, I don't.

Okay, fair enough.

If MWI is true, then the mathematics implies it. If what it implies is false, then MWI would have been false in the first place. We've assumed it was true as a thought experiment already.

I'm saying you still need to make physical sense of the mathematics. In a way, I'm defending MWI by saying you can have it as a mathematical framework and then impose an experimental methodology which means you can (in a physically meaningful way) assign probabilities to things - in terms of some sort of maximum probability of such a things ever being "found" - assuming you can simulate looking through as many worlds as possible, for example.

Alternatively, you could take MWI with a finite branching - that's perhaps a simpler way to achieve the same thing.

 

[PeroK]

(because in your opinion mathematics is just hand waiving), then we can't do any kind of physics in the first place. In other words, you're claiming physics isn't physics.

There's no way to argue with such a nonsensical misrepresentation of what I've said.

 

[Jarvis323]

There's no way to argue with such a nonsensical misrepresentation of what I've said.

I apologize. I am coming around to understanding your point better I think. If I'm not mistaken, you're disagreement seems to be in making the assumption.

 

[mattt]

As others pointed out earlier, the existence of a Hamlet machine does not depend on the many-worlds interpretation of QM.

In the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, it exists as a branch of the wave function of the universe, whereas in type 1 scenario of Tegmark, it exists in some bubble.

In both cases, the probability of finding it experimentally, it's almost zero.

On the other hand, I see no problem in discussing about what the mathematics of quantum mechanics imply.

 

[votingmachine]

No, they don't. The fact that results occur for all 6 pairs of settings does not mean all of those results were predetermined.

OK. I was seeing Tegmark's argument as requiring predetermined conditions and a deterministic path ... I see the difference now. It's an infinite number of multiverse's with every path taken for everything from each and every initial starting condition. I thought that each multiverse was being called determinist. All 6 of my parallel multiverses had indeteminate potential.

So there is no contradiction.

 

[PeterDonis]

The adoption of the idea where we do not need experimental evidence for these claims, I suggest, is allowing metaphysical wool to be pulled over our eyes.

As @Jarvis323 points out, this argument would apply to any interpretation of QM, not just the MWI. None of them are experimentally testable as compared with other interpretations, because they all make the same predictions for all experimental results (since they all use the same underlying mathematical machinery to make those predictions).

One of the reasons we spun off this subforum is to allow discussion of QM interpretations in spite of the above fact. We can't stop people from wanting to discuss the topic, but we also can't resolve discussions of it the way we can resolve discussions of things that are experimentally testable--i.e., the way we resolve disagreements in other forums here at PF.

So while your statement is true, it is (rather ironically) off topic in this particular subforum, because it's already understood that no claims that anyone makes about QM interpretations are experimentally testable.

Further, as I've already pointed out in this thread, discussion of the MWI is off topic because the thread is specifically supposed to be about what the possibilities are for quantum immortality without the MWI.

 

[onqm]

Yes, I know the concept. Boltzmann Brains are usually dismissed saying that if you were one, it would be more probable to don't observe a coherent world. Mallah makes a similar objection to QI: if it was true and you could be live indefinitely, since there are more "survival" observer moments, it would be more probable to you being experiencing one of these than one of the few "normal".

A doubt I have is if the important thing here is the number of observers or observer-moments, I mean, if there are 100 versions of you, 99 drinking water and 1 drinking coke, since the 99 observer are same observer-moment, what are the chances? 99-1 or 1-1?

Hello. I'm Jacques Mallah, and was invited to join this conversation. (I'm not sure which member here emailed me.)

The 'doubt' raised in the above quote is important to the topic. If the effective odds of drinking the water were 1-1 instead of 99-1, then all types of conscious observations (among those that do actually exist somewhere in the wavefunction) would have equal effective probability. Our observations would then be very atypical, for reasons that should be obvious (such as seeing a lot of regularities around us). So we can dismiss that and conclude that the observers that are more physically numerous (or in the MWI, have more amplitude) are in fact more "probable" and not equally "probable".

So by the same reasoning, observations within a lifespan than does not require rare events to continue would be more "probable" than those outside of that. Thus, FAPP, no immortality or unusual longevity.

 

[Physicuser]

Hello. I'm Jacques Mallah, and was invited to join this conversation. (I'm not sure which member here emailed me.)

The 'doubt' raised in the above quote is important to the topic. If the effective odds of drinking the water were 1-1 instead of 99-1, then all types of conscious observations (among those that do actually exist somewhere in the wavefunction) would have equal effective probability. Our observations would then be very atypical, for reasons that should be obvious (such as seeing a lot of regularities around us). So we can dismiss that and conclude that the observers that are more physically numerous (or in the MWI, have more amplitude) are in fact more "probable" and not equally "probable".

So by the same reasoning, observations within a lifespan than does not require rare events to continue would be more "probable" than those outside of that. Thus, FAPP, no immortality or unusual longevity.

Hello.
I misunderstood your paper, then, I thought you were arguing the opposite.

 

[onqm]

Physicsuser,

I would like my writings to be clear, so would appreciate it if you could explain what was not clear in there.

In the post I quoted, you correctly noted that I was making an objection to "QI", and that I was saying that if it were true than our actual observations would be of low "probability" as one argument against it. So I actually thought that you had understood what I was saying.

To be clear, in the language used in this thread, I argue that "identity of indiscernibles" (plus MWI or sufficiently many similar planets of the appropriate sort in a large universe) would have commonly observable consequences that already show it to be false with high Bayesian probability. The paper also includes other arguments against "QI".