- #1
Ilja
- 676
- 83
Against "realism"
Ok, no problem.
That's not a problem, once I indeed favour a Bohmian interpretation.
What he describes as naive (out of memory, once we start a new thread about it, I would have to reread it) is naive if taken as an axiom. EPR argue that this special situation follows from locality. Such an argumentation is not naive at all.
It is clearly important to recognize that it is the first part of Bell's theorem (and, essentially, the EPR argumentation) that from weak realism and locality follows what is appropriately named "naive realism".
Many presentations of the violation of BI fail to recognize this, and from point of view of these presentations it looks like only the "naive realism" (which is, indeed, quite unreasonable to postulate even in classical situations), fails.
To give up weak (meatphysical) realism is quite another category. It means to give up the search for realistic explanation with only one reason: One does not like the fact that all realistic explanations require a preferred frame.
Then, giving it up does not preserve the realistic versions of Einstein causality or relativistic symmetry: Without reality, they are about nothing, thus, become meaningless anyway.
Thus, they have to be given up anyway. No reason to give up metaphysical realism.
DrChinese said:If you would like to discuss the pros and cons of Norsen's paper (and I would be happy to do so), we should start another thread for that.
Ok, no problem.
My point about Norsen's paper is that IF you accepted his basic argument - as you say you do - THEN you naturally wind up with a favorable perspective on Bohmian interpretations. That is not the only way to get to that point, but I think it is natural. Because then, you essentially view Bell's Theorem as a rejection of locality - as Norsen essentially does, since he thinks that "naive realism" (his words) is not so relevant to Bell's Theorem.
That's not a problem, once I indeed favour a Bohmian interpretation.
(By the way, I laughed when Norsen attached the word "naive" to a respectable viewpoint. Apparently, no one bothered to explain to Einstein that his cherished viewpoint was in fact naive.
What he describes as naive (out of memory, once we start a new thread about it, I would have to reread it) is naive if taken as an axiom. EPR argue that this special situation follows from locality. Such an argumentation is not naive at all.
Anyway, realism - robust, healthy and meaningful - is fully present in Bell's Theorem as an assumption and there is nothing weak about it. It is difficult to imagine how Bell's famous paper can be considered absent the arguments presented in the EPR paper - in which the famous phrase "elements of reality" is defined - given the title Bell chose. I think Bell could have labeled his realism assumption more clearly, but that does not change the argument or its impact.)
It is clearly important to recognize that it is the first part of Bell's theorem (and, essentially, the EPR argumentation) that from weak realism and locality follows what is appropriately named "naive realism".
Many presentations of the violation of BI fail to recognize this, and from point of view of these presentations it looks like only the "naive realism" (which is, indeed, quite unreasonable to postulate even in classical situations), fails.
To give up weak (meatphysical) realism is quite another category. It means to give up the search for realistic explanation with only one reason: One does not like the fact that all realistic explanations require a preferred frame.
Then, giving it up does not preserve the realistic versions of Einstein causality or relativistic symmetry: Without reality, they are about nothing, thus, become meaningless anyway.
Thus, they have to be given up anyway. No reason to give up metaphysical realism.