One of those consciousness threads

[octelcogopod]

Ok so let's have a focused thread on consciousness, both in general and specific areas..

I will propose some questions, and the known speculations on them, along with my personal opinions.

First off this is a tough area, one where we don't yet have a solution, so this thread might not give any insight into the science part of things, but it may be able to let people grow individually, and teach them to think in new ways, subjectielly.

The main question will always be What is consciousness?
However since that is too broad of a topic to discuss, I will divide this main question into several small ones.

1. Can we really define consciousness?
As it is, a definition is created after we know most of what there is to know about something.
Since this issue is so broad and diverse, defining consciousness will be difficult, but I will try.

Definition 1: A Materialist view;
Consciousness is simply reactions in the brain and body, created by external stimuli to the sensory system, along with memories and a very complex neuralnet that cross checks this information for relevance to the stimuli.

Pros of this theory: If everything is physical, then surely this must be the solution, all there is to consciousness is its physical parts, as such wem ust study the brain and its workings until we figure out how everything works. Quantify, calculate, predict.

Cons: Not many cons at this point, read later on.

Definition 2; A more solipsistic view;

Only the self can be verified. We can never quantify and predict the emotion of happiness with math or science.
Even if we knew everything about the brain, there is still something there beyond the veil, that cannot be predicted.
Qualia is a good example; you can never measure or predict the subjective qualia state.

Pros: Well, it is true that solipsism is true, nobody can prove otherwise.
Cons: Some materialists say that qualia is just "magical."
It has no relevance because if it can't be observed in a lab, or predicted with math, then it by default doesn't exist.

Conclusion for part 1 and some more opinions;

I firmly believe that there is more to consciousness than just its physical parts.
Take for instance the image you see with your eyes, or the music you hear with your ears. Typical qualia experience;
Now, the image you see is not inherently represented in the physical world as anything physical.
The only thing others will have to do is trust you on your word that you are seeing that image or hearing that sound.

The only reason they do trust you is because they can also see that image and hear that sound.
But if a scientist were to go completely neutral and logical, like materalists claim to do, then they would even have to drop this assumption that anyone is actually seeing anything or hearing anything.
Because as it stands now, qualia does not exist in the physical world, it only appears to do so.

We can only observe its after effects, these living organisms seem to react to their environment, so they must be at least sensing something.
But do they see an image? I don't think so, I can't seem to find this image on any mr scans, nor can I find any images on my elite Electron Neuralnet Analyzer.

Keep in mind, this image you are seeing with your eyes, the combined "big picture" that your eyes and brain creates, is not stored anywhere explicitly, we can only see its after effects in the brain.

Comments?
Oh yeah and part 2 will be added to the thread soon.

 

[moving finger]

First off this is a tough area, one where we don't yet have a solution,

Not sure I agree with your remark here. I think we DO have a “solution” (it’s just that not everyone is happy with the implications of that “solution”). But before we can discuss possible “solutions”, we need to be clear just what we think the “problem” is………. What is the problem? (and please don’t say “the Hard Problem”, because that begs the question : “What IS the Hard Problem exactly?”)

The main question will always be What is consciousness?

My answer : A particular complex dynamical arrangement of temporally extended (but usually spatially localised) self-representational neurophysiological states based on some form of information exchange with the “external” world.

1. Can we really define consciousness?

With respect, your suggestions of definitions seem to lean more towards defining “what consciousness consists of” rather than defining what we mean by the word “consciousness”.

How about this for a definition of (the meaning of) consciousness :
Consciousness is defined as the ability of an agent to form a temporally extended and detailed self-representation, and to relate this self-representation to information gathered from (exchanged with) the “external” world.

(I’m not suggesting this is the best definition for a “meaning of consciousness”, but it’s a start.)

I firmly believe that there is more to consciousness than just its physical parts.

Maybe so, but “firmly believe” does not unfortunately carry much weight in scientific or philosophical discussion.

Take for instance the image you see with your eyes, or the music you hear with your ears. Typical qualia experience;
Now, the image you see is not inherently represented in the physical world as anything physical.

What makes you think that the “image you see” exists at all as an entity in its own right? Remember that the “image you see” is NOT actually an “image” that is being “seen” by anyone, much less yourself. This is the mistake of the Cartesian Theatre view of conscious experience. There is no movie projector in the brain which is projecting images for you to see. Rather, it is the case that “you”, “the image” and “you in the act of seeing the image” are all inextricably linked into one complex dynamic series of neurophysiological states in your brain – there is no separate and well-defined “you” experiencing a separate and well-defined “image” – they are both part and parcel of the same thing (which you mistakenly interpret as “you” seeing an “image” – this is the illusion created by conscious experience).

The only thing others will have to do is trust you on your word that you are seeing that image or hearing that sound.

The only reason they do trust you is because they can also see that image and hear that sound.

You have no idea whether they are hearing the “same” sound or not. In fact, in the view I am presenting here it makes no sense to ask whether two people hear the same “sound”, because the “sound” that is “heard” does not exist as an entity in its own right – it only exists as part and parcel of the experience of consciousness. The only commonality between two people exposed to a common source of noise is that the source is (approximately) the same for both of them; the actual “sound they hear” is locked up inside their own conscious experiences.

But if a scientist were to go completely neutral and logical, like materalists claim to do, then they would even have to drop this assumption that anyone is actually seeing anything or hearing anything.
Because as it stands now, qualia does not exist in the physical world, it only appears to do so.

Exactly right. “Qualia” are a shorthand invention to “explain” something which does not need explanation. Qualia simply do not exist, nor do they need to exist in order to explain conscious experience.

We can only observe its after effects, these living organisms seem to react to their environment, so they must be at least sensing something.
But do they see an image? I don't think so, I can't seem to find this image on any mr scans, nor can I find any images on my elite Electron Neuralnet Analyzer.

No, they don’t see an “image” in the sense of an agent viewing an image – again this is the “Cartesian Theatre” illusion

Keep in mind, this image you are seeing with your eyes, the combined "big picture" that your eyes and brain creates, is not stored anywhere explicitly, we can only see its after effects in the brain.

We do not “see an image with our eyes” (the eyes just act as dumb photoreceptors), instead we create the impression that we are viewing an image inside our brains. But in fact there is no separate “image” and no separate “viewer”, both are inextricably bound up together in the conscious illusion of a “self seeing an image”.

Note : I am NOT suggesting that consciousness is an “illusion” (just as Dennett does not). What I am suggesting is that the notion that a conscious agent has of “seeing” and “image”, with the idea that the “image” exists as an entity in its own right, being viewed by some homunculus inside the brain, is an illusion. This is the Cartesian Theatre illusion.

Best Regards

MF

 

[eggman]

Can we really define consciousness?

Yes...

If I fall down...You would say I have lost consciousness...

If I got up and revived...You would say I have regained consciousness...

: )

Here is a standard model for philosophy and the 'me'

http://faculty.virginia.edu/consciousness/home.html

The dellusion is understandable...

Enjoy

 

[moving finger]

Can we really define consciousness?

Yes...

If I fall down...You would say I have lost consciousness...

If I got up and revived...You would say I have regained consciousness...

This is not a definition!

It reminds me of one of Searle's definitions of consciousness that I read somewhere, which went something like "consciousness is the state that we experience when we are not unconscious"

Gobbledigook!

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

[...] What makes you think that the “image you see” exists at all as an entity in its own right? Remember that the “image you see” is NOT actually an “image” that is being “seen” by anyone, much less yourself [...] “Qualia” are a shorthand invention to “explain” something which does not need explanation. Qualia simply do not exist, nor do they need to exist in order to explain conscious experience ...

All though there might not be a single “you” in the act of seeing an "image”, that doesn't stop something from seeing the image. One can doubt Cartesian dualism, but even though different parts of the brain trick themselves into believing that they er one, something do have the notions that constitute the whole experiences. After all, you know the world through observations. Take away qualia, and we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.

 

[selfAdjoint]

All though there might not be a single “you” in the act of seeing an "image”, that doesn't stop something from seeing the image. One can doubt Cartesian dualism, but even though different parts of the brain trick themselves into believing that they er one, something do have the notions that constitute the whole experiences. After all, you know the world through observations. Take away qualia, and we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.

This is still way over simplified. There is nothing correspopnding to an "image" in your brain and nothing corresponding to a "viewer". Not one, not many, not any. What there is is a tremendously complex collection of neuron/synapse interactions which form a process updating your working memory and at a high level this is integrated into a memory stream which appears in your consciousness as an image. Many many psychology experiments demostrate that your "image" is, as moving finger puts it, virtual. Just as a rainbow isn't really a thing in the sky, so your image isn't really there in your head.

 

[Lars Laborious]

[...]Many many psychology experiments demostrate that your "image" is, as moving finger puts it, virtual. Just as a rainbow isn't really a thing in the sky, so your image isn't really there in your head.

I agree that the image of a rainbow is an illusion in a way that it's just made up of innumerable notions. But still, at the bottom of it all, notions do exist. Rejecting simple qualia on the basis that our "brain images" doesn't match the "real physical world", is incoherent. The "images", or at least the notions of different parts of the "images", doesn't go away just because one call it an illusion. All we see is just bundles of sense-data, also called qualia. It's harder to prove the physical world.
To state it in an extreme form: Qualia are like paint on a canvas. When different colors are mixed together in different ways they become various paintings. The physical facts (as we have learned to know it), on the other hand, are what the painting represent. From this one might conclude that there is a real physical world outside the qualia, maybe even causing the qualia, but all we know for sure by experiencing, is qualia (since experiencing is qualia). We only see/experience a mixture of what might be the effects of something physical.

 

[moving finger]

Take away qualia, and we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.

Look upon qualia and the self as "conceptual products" of consciousness.
Without the concept of qualia we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.
Without the concept of self we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.
But if both qualia and self arise from consciousness, all we are saying is that without consciousness we wouldn't be able to have these discussions.
None of this means that the concepts of either qualia or self have any independent existence.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

To state it in an extreme form: Qualia are like paint on a canvas. When different colors are mixed together in different ways they become various paintings. The physical facts (as we have learned to know it), on the other hand, are what the painting represent. From this one might conclude that there is a real physical world outside the qualia, maybe even causing the qualia, but all we know for sure by experiencing, is qualia (since experiencing is qualia). We only see/experience a mixture of what might be the effects of something physical.

But don't make the mistake (as Chalmers does) of thinking that these so-called qualia have any kind of independent physical or other form of existence (ie independent of the conscious experience which is generating them as a virtual phenomenon) - because once you take that road you are on the way to the illusion of Chalmers' "Hard Problem" and the need for a "whole new physics".

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

Look upon qualia and the self as "conceptual products" of consciousness. [...] But don't make the mistake (as Chalmers does) of thinking that these so-called qualia have any kind of independent physical or other form of existence [...]

Maybe we operate with different definitions of what qualia is, but what I'm talking about is the raw experience that our consciousness has to have in order to be conscious. It comes before consciousness. A computer can store information, but for it to be conscious it needs some sort of experience. The experience itself doesn't necessary have any influence on anything, but it's there and doesn't turn into an illusion just because we find it handy. I know physicists would prefer not to think about qualia since it doesn't match physical observations yet, but that doesn't mean it's an illusion. Unlike Chalmers, I think qualia are intrinsic properties within the physical world, or rather physical properties are a part of a qualia field. Crazy, huh?

 

[moving finger]

Maybe we operate with different definitions of what qualia is, but what I'm talking about is the raw experience that our consciousness has to have in order to be conscious. It comes before consciousness.

These raw materials (inputs) are the combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states. The brain constructs consciousness by information processing these raw materials. But I don't think most qualia-buffs would argue that the raw incoming sensory data (sensory signals from the eyes, ears etc) are the actual qualia.

A computer can store information, but for it to be conscious it needs some sort of experience. The experience itself doesn't necessary have any influence on anything, but it's there and doesn't turn into an illusion just because we find it handy.

I have not said that the “conscious experience” itself is an illusion (and I don’t think Dennett does this either). But the conscious experience is a unity, an entirety or a “one” which cannot be reduced to separate physical components of “quale” and “self”. These latter constructs are not physical, but virtual constructs produced by the very real conscious experience.

I know physicists would prefer not to think about qualia since it doesn't match physical observations yet, but that doesn't mean it's an illusion.

I don’t think it’s so much that physicists don’t like to “think about qualia”, I think it’s more that (many of those who study this field) recognise that qualia are not real, existing artefacts, but instead are virtual entities created within conscious experience.

I quite happily “think about qualia” – the term is a very useful shorthand term for referring to the virtual entities created within my conscious experience. But I have absolutely no evidence, and no reason, to think that qualia exist as some kind of physical object.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

I'm sorry I don't have time right now to get involved in this most interesting discussion, but I couldn't let this pass without comment:

The brain constructs consciousness by information processing these raw materials.

You seem to make this categorical assertion as if you believe it to be absolutely true. Do you not think there is a possibility that the brain does not, or even cannot, construct consciousness? If you are so sure that it can, and does, can you describe how the brain does it? You indicated once that you think Metzinger has described the method, but I think he has not. We need to talk more, but for now are you absolutely sure that the brain constructs consciousness?

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Hi MF,

I'm sorry I don't have time right now to get involved in this most interesting discussion, but I couldn't let this pass without comment:You seem to make this categorical assertion as if you believe it to be absolutely true. Do you not think there is a possibility that the brain does not, or even cannot, construct consciousness? If you are so sure that it can, and does, can you describe how the brain does it? You indicated once that you think Metzinger has described the method, but I think he has not. We need to talk more, but for now are you absolutely sure that the brain constructs consciousness?

Paul

Come now, Paul, I think we both know the idea of "absolute truth" is a chimera.

Sure, there is a possibility that the brain does/can not construct consciousness (severe brain damage would do it for one).

Hehehe, if I could describe exactly how the brain does it then I wouldn't be wasting my time here, I would be stepping up for my Nobel Prize. I think Metzinger's ideas are a step in the right direction however.

I cannot be absolutely sure of anything - certain knowledge (as we started to discuss on another thread) is unattainable. All I can ever do is to evaluate different possible explanations and choose what (to me) seems the most rational.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Lars Laborious]

These raw materials (inputs) are the combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states.The brain constructs consciousness by information processing these raw materials.
[...]
I have not said that the “conscious experience” itself is an illusion (and I don’t think Dennett does this either). But the conscious experience is a unity, an entirety or a “one” which cannot be reduced to separate physical components of “quale” and “self”
[...]
I quite happily “think about qualia” – the term is a very useful shorthand term for referring to the virtual entities created within my conscious experience. But I have absolutely no evidence, and no reason, to think that qualia exist as some kind of physical object.

I agree to the idea that combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states are things that an “upper consciusness”, with it’s personality and feeling of self, needs for coming into existence. But it also needs the possibility for experience (which you agreed to not beeing an illusion), and that is the basis for all consciousness – experience and raw conciousness are the same.

Dennet, Metzinger, Blackmore and other qualia-opponents fail to explain how phenomenally represented information gets to be experienced in the first place. They only have theories on how already experienced information accumulate and creates an illusion of a self.

Now, whether qualia are separated from the experience (conscious unit) itself, or actually is the experience, is a tuff question. But just as you can compare qualia with an organization, and state that “an organization is only a concept or illusion - it’s actually just a bunch of people”, you can say that yes, consciousness might only be a concept or illusion, but it’s components are just as real as that bunch of people.

Consciousness consists not of data, but of phenomenal information, since it’s experiencable. Again, that information might be experience itself, but still the components are real since experiencing is real. So, why can’t we locate qualia in the brain? Because qualia are the instruments through which "we" (the experiences) examine the world. We would have to leave experiencing to be able to find qualia, but then of course we wouldn’t be able to experience the finding of qualia. In this sense you might be right when you say that qualia are not physical objects. But I would rather say that physical objects are properties of a qualia field.

 

[moving finger]

I agree to the idea that combinations of various sensory data plus data from memory states are things that an “upper consciusness”, with it’s personality and feeling of self, needs for coming into existence...

...I would rather say that physical objects are properties of a qualia field.

Hi Lars

This looks like the same post that you placed in the Metzinger thread. Rather than copy my reply here, I'll just redirect you to the Metzinger thread.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=997305#post997305

Best Regards

MF

 

[Rade]

...there is no separate and well-defined “you” experiencing a separate and well-defined “image” – they are both part and parcel of the same thing (which you mistakenly interpret as “you” seeing an “image” – this is the illusion created by conscious experience)...

I have a question. What exactly do you call the "thing" you mention above--e.g., what name do you give to this thing ? Is it a real "thing" that exists, or an illusion ? How do you claim to have such knowledge ? If there is not a "separate you" what type of "you" are you talking about -- that is, how do you know that you are not a separate and well-defined entity that exists ? Are you then saying that you know that you do not exist as a well-defined entity ? Sorry for so many questions--but when someone makes the comment "there is no..." as you do above--my first question is "how do you know", where is your evidence that your philosophic bent holds absolute truth ?

 

[moving finger]

What exactly do you call the "thing" you mention above--e.g., what name do you give to this thing ?

Consciousness

Is it a real "thing" that exists, or an illusion ?

Consciousness is very real, just as real as the software program that is currently running on my computer

How do you claim to have such knowledge ?

Just the same way anyone else does. This is (to my mind) the best rational explanation of consciousness which avoids metaphysical dualism.

If there is not a "separate you" what type of "you" are you talking about -- that is, how do you know that you are not a separate and well-defined entity that exists ?

In the sense that “I” am the physical body that supports my conscious experience, I do exist. Without that physical body, I would not exist.

Are you then saying that you know that you do not exist as a well-defined entity ?

I am saying that the notion that there is a separate metaphysical “self” somewhere within the brain which is somehow “observing” the world through consciousness is an illusion – this is the “cartesian theatre illusion” (read Dennett’s consciousness explained for more details).

Sorry for so many questions--but when someone makes the comment "there is no..." as you do above--my first question is "how do you know", where is your evidence that your philosophic bent holds absolute truth ?

The first rule of philosophy is there no access to absolute truth. We each make sense of the world in more or less rational ways. To me, the dualism inherent in the cartesian theatre illusion is an irrational intuition. The better rational explanation, which avoids metaphysical dualism, is that the conscious self is created as a virtual self as part of the process of consciousness.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

Consciousness is very real, just as real as the software program that is currently running on my computer

Agreed.

To me, the dualism inherent in the cartesian theatre illusion is an irrational intuition.

Since I'm not sure what baggage comes along with the "cartesian theatre illusion", I would prefer to skip the labeling. What do you think is irrational about dualism?

In your example, is it not useful to distinguish between the software program running in your computer and the actual hardware made of atoms? After all, there is no such "real" distinction; the computer and its "software" is simply a single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics. What we think of "software" is nothing but a conceptual pattern of some specific states of parts of the machine. Is it irrational to think of the "software" as somehow existing independently of the hardware?

In the sense that “I” am the physical body that supports my conscious experience, I do exist. Without that physical body, I would not exist.

To paraphrase, using your example again, "In the sense that your computer is the physical entity that supports the software execution, your computer does exist. Without that computer, the computer would not exist." True enough.

But you have switched the identification of "I". At least you have in my opinion. You claim that ""I" am the physical body", and then proceed to ignore consciousness, which you identified with the software in your computer. In my opinion, it is the software which should be identified with the "I" in your example. In my humble opinion, "I" am my consciousness, not my chemical body. When you talk to me, my body may be doing the reporting, but it is my consciousness that is providing the answers and opinions.

So, if we take my perspective, for the moment, we can paraphrase your example differently: "In the sense that "I" am the software that is running in the computer, I do exist (which you seem to acknowledge in your first quote above). Without the computer hardware (physical body), "I", the software could very well exist." In fact, software typically exists independently of hardware before, during, and after the hardware might be built, operated, and destroyed.

To push your excellent example just a little further, no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind. All software begins as a collection of general and rather vague concepts in a mind. From there, the concepts get refined, and expressed symbolically. Those symbols are further refined and transformed with considerable interest, involvement, and intervention by additional conscious thought, and eventually the software attains a form that is useful in the computer hardware. From that point on, and only then, it can operate without conscious attention.

The first rule of philosophy is there no access to absolute truth.

So, of course, I take your statement that, "Without that physical body, I would not exist." to be only a belief or conjecture on your part and not a claim to absolute truth.

We each make sense of the world in more or less rational ways.

Agreed. Now, to me it makes sense to interpret the phenomenon of consciousness along the lines of your software/hardware example. In doing so, we can see that a sort of "dualism", i.e. the hardware/software dichotomy, makes sense whether or not we acknowledge that any such dichotomy exists in physical reality.

Where does that interpretation not make sense to you? Where is it irrational?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[selfAdjoint]

In your example, is it not useful to distinguish between the software program running in your computer and the actual hardware made of atoms? After all, there is no such "real" distinction; the computer and its "software" is simply a single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics. What we think of "software" is nothing but a conceptual pattern of some specific states of parts of the machine. Is it irrational to think of the "software" as somehow existing independently of the hardware?

The instances of the software apart from the computer are finite and clearly known. Copies on disk or on paper, partial instances in the memories of its programmers, descriptions in manuals, etc. The instance of "consciousness" apart from the body is neither clear nor understood, so to postulate it when you don't have to, in order to account for the objective phenomena, is irrational.

 

[Lars Laborious]

The instances of the software apart from the computer are finite and clearly known. Copies on disk or on paper, partial instances in the memories of its programmers, descriptions in manuals, etc. The instance of "consciousness" apart from the body is neither clear nor understood, so to postulate it when you don't have to, in order to account for the objective phenomena, is irrational.

Software is just hardware as long as it's not beeing experienced. A computer program that translates data from one form to another, is just physical equipment exchanging physical signals. The experienced "concept of software" (the nature of software), on the other hand, is qualia - phenomenal experience. Comparing consciousness with a software program is actually saying that consciousness equals qualia, which of course don’t explain how consciousness arise.

 

[Paul Martin]

The instance of "consciousness" apart from the body is neither clear nor understood, so to postulate it when you don't have to, in order to account for the objective phenomena, is irrational.

The key here is, "when you don't have to". Except for disinterest, the only reason one would not "have to" would be that there is a satisfactory alternative explanation. I have not seen or heard a satisfactory physical-based explanation for consciousness. Until I do, I consider it rational to consider any premise that might lead to a consistent and understandable explanation. In my view, the premise that consciousness is seated outside the physical world can lead to a consistent, satisfactory, explanation for consciousness. I have not heard a reasonable rebuttal of the inferences I have drawn from this premise. Dismissals such as, "Can you say 'Inverse square law?'", for example, are not rational arguments in my opinion.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Lars Laborious]

I am saying that the notion that there is a separate metaphysical “self” somewhere within the brain which is somehow “observing” the world through consciousness is an illusion – this is the “cartesian theatre illusion” (read Dennett’s consciousness explained for more details).

Coining a term like the Cartesian theatre, is easy. In fact, I will coin one myself. It’s called the Process illusion (Ok, it's not as catchy as Cartesian theatre), and it refers to the belief that qualia is just information being processed. The Process illusion is the deceit caused by detecting physical activity near phenomenal presentations. This apparent connection leads to the illusion that they are in fact the same, and so, many theorists are misled to believe that a process – by the power of just existing - can be something more than just physical movements; that it equals a phenomenal presentation of itself, albeit it is illusory.
(Feel free to make it a world traveling meme ;-)

 

[octelcogopod]

The software/hardware analog is a fallacy because the programming of the software is inherent in how the monitor views it.
It's kind of like, the monitor is analogous to the image we see with our eyes, and the reason it's a fallacy is because every step from the circuit boards to the pixels in the monitor can be explained physically.
We can't say the same for consciousness.

Also you might say that "yes, but we can't SEE the software by just analyzing the hard drive." and this is true, but you can easily do so with a mouse, keyboard and a monitor.
The step from hard drive and circuit boards to the image we see on the monitor is not magical, but the step from our neurons in the brain to the image we see with our eyes is.

And not only that, but the image we see with our eyes cannot be quantified and predicted with math/physics.
Like, ever.
The image you see with your eyes represent more than just pixels on a monitor, it also represents emotions, forms, structure and meaning.
You can mathematically calculate th forms and structure the eyes see, but the meaning and emotion of those forms is lost.

When I see a beautiful woman on the street, I see more than just a mere bag of bones and flesh, I also see beauty, sexual tension, memories, nervousness etc.
This is of course because of how my brain works.
For qualia to exist, you need a complete set of physical prerequisites.
You need a brain, a body, a sensory system and memories stored in that brain for cross checking stimuli.
The kicker of it is that we can't quantify qualia with math/physics.

 

[selfAdjoint]

The software/hardware analog is a fallacy because the programming of the software is inherent in how the monitor views it.
It's kind of like, the monitor is analogous to the image we see with our eyes, and the reason it's a fallacy is because every step from the circuit boards to the pixels in the monitor can be explained physically.
We can't say the same for consciousness.

Also you might say that "yes, but we can't SEE the software by just analyzing the hard drive." and this is true, but you can easily do so with a mouse, keyboard and a monitor.
The step from hard drive and circuit boards to the image we see on the monitor is not magical, but the step from our neurons in the brain to the image we see with our eyes is.

And not only that, but the image we see with our eyes cannot be quantified and predicted with math/physics.
Like, ever.
The image you see with your eyes represent more than just pixels on a monitor, it also represents emotions, forms, structure and meaning.
You can mathematically calculate th forms and structure the eyes see, but the meaning and emotion of those forms is lost.

When I see a beautiful woman on the street, I see more than just a mere bag of bones and flesh, I also see beauty, sexual tension, memories, nervousness etc.
This is of course because of how my brain works.
For qualia to exist, you need a complete set of physical prerequisites.
You need a brain, a body, a sensory system and memories stored in that brain for cross checking stimuli.
The kicker of it is that we can't quantify qualia with math/physics.

Well YOUR qualia, which just seem to be associated emotions and memories, can be studied, and in principle quantified. This would be a fiercely complex undertaking and science is not ready to even begin it yet, but there is no firm non-contingent obstacle to doing so.

 

[moving finger]

What do you think is irrational about dualism?

I’m not being evasive here, but there are many different notions of dualism, just like there are many different notions of free will. I could explain what I think is irrational about one particular concept of dualism, only to find out that you have a completely different concept in mind. If you would care to explain your particular concept of dualism I’ll tell you why I think it is irrational.

In your example, is it not useful to distinguish between the software program running in your computer and the actual hardware made of atoms? After all, there is no such "real" distinction; the computer and its "software" is simply a single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics.

Agreed, but there are “states” where there is no program running, and “states” where there is a program running. Each state is a “single coherent collection of atoms strictly obeying the laws of physics”, but the states are very different in their content and behaviour.

What we think of "software" is nothing but a conceptual pattern of some specific states of parts of the machine. Is it irrational to think of the "software" as somehow existing independently of the hardware?

The “idea of the program” can exist as an idea, without substance, in the same way as Plato’s world of forms “exists”, wherein there is a perfect circle. Plato’s world of forms would also contain “copies” of every possible program. But such a program would be totally ineffectual as far as our world is concerned. The program can only be effectual (in our world) if it exists as the patterns connected with some form of physical substrate on which it can run; the program can certainly not interact with our world (in the sense of inputs and outputs) in the absence of such a substrate.

But you have switched the identification of "I". At least you have in my opinion. You claim that ""I" am the physical body", and then proceed to ignore consciousness, which you identified with the software in your computer.

I recognise that there is more than one possible meaing of “I”.

It could mean (a) “I in the sense of the virtual conscious self which thinks that it inhabits my physical body” or it could mean (b) “I in the sense of the physical body”.

(a) is a virtual “I”, whereas (b) is a physical “I”.

In my humble opinion, "I" am my consciousness, not my chemical body. When you talk to me, my body may be doing the reporting, but it is my consciousness that is providing the answers and opinions.

I don’t think everyone sees it as clear-cut as that, which is why we need to be clear about whether, when we refer to “I”, “my” or “mine”, we are referring to only the conscious experience, or to the physical body as well.

Example : If I say “I can run fast”, I don’t mean “my conscious experience can run fast”, I mean “my physical body can run fast”.

So, if we take my perspective, for the moment, we can paraphrase your example differently: "In the sense that "I" am the software that is running in the computer, I do exist (which you seem to acknowledge in your first quote above).

I would phrase it differently. “In the sense that I am the virtual conscious self which thinks that it inhabits my physical body, I exist as a virtual entity”

Without the computer hardware (physical body), "I", the software could very well exist."

Without the computer hardware (physical body), the program could not run (the virtual conscious self, the “I”, could not exist).

In fact, software typically exists independently of hardware before, during, and after the hardware might be built, operated, and destroyed.

No. The “idea” of the software may exist independently of the hardware, in the same way that the “idea” of a circle exists before anyone has ever drawn a circle (see my reference to Plato’s world of forms above). But such “idea” of program is totally ineffectual (in our world) in absence of any physical substrate.

To push your excellent example just a little further, no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind.

I would have to ask you to clarify your definition of “software” first.

I take your statement that, "Without that physical body, I would not exist." to be only a belief or conjecture on your part and not a claim to absolute truth.

Did you ever think otherwise?
Show me a man who claims to possesses access to absolute truth and I’ll show you a fool.

Now, to me it makes sense to interpret the phenomenon of consciousness along the lines of your software/hardware example. In doing so, we can see that a sort of "dualism", i.e. the hardware/software dichotomy, makes sense whether or not we acknowledge that any such dichotomy exists in physical reality.

In what sense is this dualism? Sorry, but I don’t see it. As I pointed out above, we need to distinguish between the “idea” of a program (in Plato’s sense, which would be ineffectual in the real world), and the “actual running program” (which can be effectual in the real world only as part of the properties of a hardware substrate). How is this dualism?

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

The software/hardware analog is a fallacy because the programming of the software is inherent in how the monitor views it.
It's kind of like, the monitor is analogous to the image we see with our eyes, and the reason it's a fallacy is because every step from the circuit boards to the pixels in the monitor can be explained physically.
We can't say the same for consciousness.

What is it exactly that you think we cannot explain about consciousness?

Also you might say that "yes, but we can't SEE the software by just analyzing the hard drive." and this is true, but you can easily do so with a mouse, keyboard and a monitor.

No. All you see is a either the physical output of the software, or a “description of the software” (ie a listing of the program instructions), don’t confuse this with the actual running program.

The step from hard drive and circuit boards to the image we see on the monitor is not magical, but the step from our neurons in the brain to the image we see with our eyes is.

You are confusing “the external appearance of the effects of the running software” with “the internal sense-perceptions of the mind”, these are completely different things. There is nothing magical about conscious experience (except that some people have to believe it is magical because they refuse to accept the rational explanation).

And not only that, but the image we see with our eyes cannot be quantified and predicted with math/physics.

And….. what does this prove? If I build a robot with visual sense-receptors and the ability to describe what it feels like when it “sees” with those receptors, and then ask it to describe to me what it “feels like” to see the colour red, do you think I could necessarily predict exactly what “it feels like” for the robot to see the colour red?

The image you see with your eyes represent more than just pixels on a monitor, it also represents emotions, forms, structure and meaning.

And what are these, but correlations between various internal neurophysiological states? There is no “magic” here (except, as mentioned, a magical explanation is the only way out for anyone who rejects the rational)

You can mathematically calculate th forms and structure the eyes see, but the meaning and emotion of those forms is lost.

Because conscious experience is subjective. How can anyone calculate, using objective methods, what a subjective experience is like? The two concepts are incompatible. It’s like asking “if I tell you the square root of 16 is 4, what is the capital of China?”

When I see a beautiful woman on the street, I see more than just a mere bag of bones and flesh, I also see beauty, sexual tension, memories, nervousness etc.

Again, what are these but correlations between various internal neurophysiological states? There is no “magic” here (except, as mentioned, a magical explanation is the only way out for anyone who rejects the rational)

For qualia to exist, you need a complete set of physical prerequisites.
You need a brain, a body, a sensory system and memories stored in that brain for cross checking stimuli.

But you don’t need magic.

Best Regards

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

And….. what does this prove? If I build a robot with visual sense-receptors and the ability to describe what it feels like when it “sees” with those receptors, and then ask it to describe to me what it “feels like” to see the colour red, do you think I could necessarily predict exactly what “it feels like” for the robot to see the colour red?

Back when I was in IT, I used to have fantasies about doing just this; a dedicated color perceiver. Its whole world would be nothing but different instances of colors presented to its sensor. I could almost see how to program it. It's important to have the processing behind a Metzinger style wall, so the program won't attribute its internal inputs to processes but see them as pseudo perceptions. Then behind the wall you have every color-precept generating a partly directed partly random learnable (Hebbian) association with records of past encounters with that color-precept. You also need pleasure/pain capabilities so the program has something to remember about each color-precept. I think you could generate with this toy system a very convincing color perceiver and discusser.

 

[octelcogopod]

moving finger and selfadjoint;
I'm interested in your answer to this "problem."
You say "because they can't accept the truth", well tell us, what is the truth?

Also, I think the whole "image seen with your eyes" example is too non specific for there to come a point out of it, so I will use another example.

Simply, color.
The whole problem I am having with this consciousness deal is that, if the universe is all physical, where is this subjective qualia represented in its unabridged and original form in the physical universe?
A color seemingly doesn't exist unless it is perceived, it only exists as a visible portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, but only a receptor, like an eye or other (maybe electronic) device can detect the lightwave.
So, my problem does not lie with this, my problem lies with the fact that a color is perceived differently depending on the receptor, and that means that the color red as it were, does not exist anywhere other than the qualia of a human brain or other device that works similar to the human brain.

If the universe is indeed only a moving mass of energy and mass, where in this mass is the color red stored as it is seen by the human eye?

 

[moving finger]

moving finger and selfadjoint;
I'm interested in your answer to this "problem."
You say "because they can't accept the truth", well tell us, what is the truth?

Sorry, but I’m not sure where either of us said “they can’t accept the truth”. Can you perhaps point out where this statement comes from?

What I did say above is “Show me a man who claims to possesses access to absolute truth and I’ll show you a fool.”

The whole problem I am having with this consciousness deal is that, if the universe is all physical, where is this subjective qualia represented in its unabridged and original form in the physical universe?

You are assuming there is such a thing as an “unabridged and original form” of a quale. Why should that necessarily be the case?
To me, a quale stands in relation to the virtual self in a similar way that the outside of a box stands in relation to the inside of a box. Neither “outside the box” nor “inside the box” exists as standalone entities in their own right, they are brought into existence by the phenomenon of the box. Take away the box, and it makes no sense to talk of “inside” or “outside” the box, these concepts have meaning only as relational concepts, ie in relation to the box. With “quale” and “self’ it is just the same, these concepts have meaning only as relational concepts, ie in relation to consciousness. Take away the consciousness, and it makes no sense to talk of “quale” or ‘self”.

The reason you are having a problem, therefore, is because you are assuming that a quale is some kind of stand-alone pre-existing entity which somehow exists in the physical world in absence of consciousness. Try to let go of this false intuition.

A color seemingly doesn't exist unless it is perceived, it only exists as a visible portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, but only a receptor, like an eye or other (maybe electronic) device can detect the lightwave.

Detection and (conscious) perception are not the same thing. You are right in thinking that a colour does not exist unless it is (consciously) perceived – this fits precisely with what I have said above.

So, my problem does not lie with this, my problem lies with the fact that a color is perceived differently depending on the receptor, and that means that the color red as it were, does not exist anywhere other than the qualia of a human brain or other device that works similar to the human brain.

Exactly. But why do you think this is a problem?

If the universe is indeed only a moving mass of energy and mass, where in this mass is the color red stored as it is seen by the human eye?

Simplistically : The brain stores memories of previous neurophysiological states. Some of these states will be states when you previously perceived red objects. Each time you consciously perceive an object, the brain compares the information coming from your eyes with the information stored in memory, and if it finds a match or series of matches, a “light-bulb” clicks in your consciousness and you say “aha, that is a red object”. Not because there is a “red quale” stored anywhere in memory, but simply because there are in your memory parts of previous neurophysiological states which you have labelled “this is a red object” with which the brain can compare present neurophysiological states. If you did not have these memories with which to compare your present state of awareness, you would be unable to say “aha, this is a red object”.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

In what sense is this dualism? Sorry, but I don’t see it. As I pointed out above, we need to distinguish between the “idea” of a program (in Plato’s sense, which would be ineffectual in the real world), and the “actual running program” (which can be effectual in the real world only as part of the properties of a hardware substrate). How is this dualism?

As you pointed out, there are many connotations of 'dualism'. And, as I mentioned, I am not very much interested in labels, especially those which end in 'ism'. So let me withdraw my question about why you think dualism is irrational. What I am interested in is what, exactly, you think is irrational. You said:

To me, the dualism inherent in the cartesian theatre illusion is an irrational intuition.

And more recently, you said:

There is nothing magical about conscious experience (except that some people have to believe it is magical because they refuse to accept the rational explanation).

First, I am interested in what "the rational explanation" is. I'm guessing you buy into Metzinger's or Dennett's explanation, neither of which I accept. We can discuss my reasons further if you like.

Second, I take it that by 'magical' you mean 'irrational'. I'm trying to categorize my own ideas according to your usage here but I am going to need some of your help. You said you would tell me whether my idea of dualism was irrational if I told you what it is. Let's just discuss it without referring to the label of 'dualism' and you just tell me if it is rational or not.

I'll try to explain my ideas using your computer example. As we have done before, I'll talk only about an abstract conscious agent and not confuse things by using personal pronouns.

Without the computer hardware (physical body), the program could not run (the virtual conscious self, the “I”, could not exist).

Forgetting the reference to "I", you are saying that if we consider consciousness to be analogous to a running program, then consciousness cannot exist without a physical body, just as a running program cannot exist without a computer. Agreed.

The “idea of the program” can exist as an idea, without substance, in the same way as Plato’s world of forms “exists”, wherein there is a perfect circle. Plato’s world of forms would also contain “copies” of every possible program.

I'm not sure how to take this. Are you a Platonist who believes in the real existence of Plato's world of forms? If so, we might be able to come to a quick and easy agreement. If not, then the "idea of the program" does not exist in the same way as Plato's forms; the "idea of the program" really does exist independently of the computer both as a purely mental idea and also as a symbolic representation of those ideas in some physical medium. Which is it?

But such “idea” of program is totally ineffectual (in our world) in absence of any physical substrate.

I agree with this. But if the "idea" exists (which you seem to agree "can exist as an idea") and then the physical substrate somehow shows up, the "idea" can be loaded into the substrate whereupon it can become effectual (in the world of the substrate).

Now to continue the analogy between running programs/computers and consciousness/brains I claimed that "no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind" and you asked me to clarify my definition of "software" before you would comment. By 'software' I simply mean any and all computer programs. The kicker here is its "ultimate origin". Certainly there are programs that have been generated by other running programs. But the ultimate origin is not the generating program, but instead it is the programmer who designed the generating program. It is this fact that does not seem to have an analog in the consciousness/brain system if consciousness is nothing more than a brain process.

In my view, the analogy works because I don't think consciousness originates in the brain, just as the ideas which lead to the existence of programs don't originate in computers.

It doesn't seem to me that the analogy works for you even if you equate consciousness with a running instance of a program and not with the set of symbols representing the program.

It seems to me that my interpretation is more rational. What do you think?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Hi Paul

I am interested in what "the rational explanation" is.

An explanation along the lines of Metzinger’s paper. I'm not suggesting this is the "only" rational explanation, but explanations along these lines are the only rational ones that I have seen so far.

I'm guessing you buy into Metzinger's or Dennett's explanation, neither of which I accept. We can discuss my reasons further if you like.

Yup. I would be interested to know your reasons for rejecting Metzinger’s explanation.

I take it that by 'magical' you mean 'irrational'.

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X, when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts. In other words, suggesting that "X gives rise to Y" is not very useful if (a) it leaves unanswered the question of what gives rise to X, and (b) X is not needed to explain anything else.

For example, the medieval idea that wandering stars (planets) are pushed around the sky by angels may not have seemed magical at the time (because a more rational explanation was not available), but we can see now (with the benefit of a more rational explanation based on mechanics) that this angel idea is a "magical" concept.

The current idea that our feeling of free will is explained by the fact that we are genuinely free agents (in the libertarian sense) is also what I would call a magical explanation, because the mechanism of libertarian free will is itself unexplained (in fact I believe unexplainable), positing libertarian free will does not actually explain anything that we observe empirically apart from our subjective feeling of free will, and there is a perfectly rational alternative explanation for the subjective feeling of free will based on a purely deterministic model which does not need the magical premise of libertarian free will.

We need parsimony in our fundamental concepts, we need to resist the desire to multiply fundamental concepts needlessly.

you are saying that if we consider consciousness to be analogous to a running program, then consciousness cannot exist without a physical body, just as a running program cannot exist without a computer. Agreed.

Good.

Are you a Platonist who believes in the real existence of Plato's world of forms?

It depends what you mean by “real existence”. I believe in Plato’s world of forms only in the sense of an idealistic representation. In the “universal set of ideas” there is the idea of a perfect circle. This does not mean that the universal set of ideas has any kind of material, physical existence. Similarly, in the “universal set of mathematical equations” there is every conceivable mathematical function, but this does not mean the universe of mathematical equations has any kind of material, physical existence. It’s an ideal, not a reality. Similary, there is a “universal set of computer programs”.

the "idea of the program" really does exist independently of the computer both as a purely mental idea and also as a symbolic representation of those ideas in some physical medium.

In the same way the “idea of the perfect circle” really does exist (in the real world) in the form of a mathematical equation describing that circle, independently of any real circles ever created in the physical world.

I do believe that mathematicians discover mathematical truths and proofs rather than invent them, but this belief does not entail that these truths have any "material existence" prior to their discovery (although of course it all comes down to how one defines "existence").

But such “idea” of program is totally ineffectual (in our world) in absence of any physical substrate.

I agree with this. But if the "idea" exists (which you seem to agree "can exist as an idea") and then the physical substrate somehow shows up, the "idea" can be loaded into the substrate whereupon it can become effectual (in the world of the substrate).

Agreed.

I claimed that "no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind" and you asked me to clarify my definition of "software" before you would comment. By 'software' I simply mean any and all computer programs. The kicker here is its "ultimate origin". Certainly there are programs that have been generated by other running programs. But the ultimate origin is not the generating program, but instead it is the programmer who designed the generating program. It is this fact that does not seem to have an analog in the consciousness/brain system if consciousness is nothing more than a brain process.

It is correct that all instances of computer programs presently known to homo sapiens are ultimately descended from programs that were originally created by homo sapiens. But what does this prove? It is also true (if one believes in evolutionary theory) that all homo sapiens are descended from non-conscious organisms. There are only certain ways in which extremely complex systems can arise in nature, and evolution and design are two of these ways. Are you perhaps suggesting that consciousness can arise only by “pure evolution in absence of any design” and not by “evolution initiated by design”? If you are suggesting this, why do you think this is the case?

In my view, the analogy works because I don't think consciousness originates in the brain, just as the ideas which lead to the existence of programs don't originate in computers.

Understood. But if your explanation for how consciousness arises in individuals is based on something that is in turn equally unexplained, then that’s what I would call magical.

It doesn't seem to me that the analogy works for you even if you equate consciousness with a running instance of a program and not with the set of symbols representing the program.

I don’t understand what you mean here, sorry.

It seems to me that my interpretation is more rational.

To me, the more rational explanation is the one with the greater explanatory power, ie the one that accurately explains the phenomenon in question whilst relying in turn on the minimum of new unexplained concepts for that explanation. We should adhere to parsimony in concepts, only inventing new concepts if the existing ones have been demonstrated to be inadequate. Simply explaining one unexplained concept by replacing it with an additional, new and equally unexplained concept is not, to me, a rational explanation.

Best Regards

MF

 

[octelcogopod]

First I must apologize, you said "accept the rational explanation" not "truth."
Sorry.
Anyway

moving-finger, so you do agree that qualia exists, but you do not have an explanatin for consciousness?
I'm a little confused by your post at this point.

You say that conscious experience and detection are not the same.
Then you explain how the brain sees red in the consciousness, but we are no closer to knowing what consciousness IS.
What IS conscious experience?

It's quite a baffling post you made though, I never thought about it like this before.
I think your point is that a quale and conscious experience are not the same things.

Would you care to elaborate a little bit or should I go read metzingers writings?

 

[Lars Laborious]

Moving finger, a concept like “inside” or “outside” a box is a mental idea. And a mental idea consists of sensations that are processed in the right way so that the idea (the concept) is presented to itself (or for those who believe in dualism, to homunculus). Either way, a concept is secondary, whilst the nature of sensations itself is the unexplained substance we seek to understand when we (at least some of us) speek of qualia.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

I would be interested to know your reasons for rejecting Metzinger’s explanation.

See post #3 at https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=119221

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X, when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts. In other words, suggesting that "X gives rise to Y" is not very useful if (a) it leaves unanswered the question of what gives rise to X, and (b) X is not needed to explain anything else.

Thank you for this explanation. Not that it is important to define or use the term 'magical', but that it helps me understand where our differences are and maybe how to address them.

It seems to me that our difference can be summarized as follows: My view is that consciousness gives rise to physicality, while your view is that physicality gives rise to consciousness. We have reversed roles for X and Y in the proposition "X gives rise to Y".

Now, let's examine the "usefulness" of our respective positions using your criteria (a) and (b) above. I'll start with mine, where X = consciousness, and Y = physicality.

(a) Since I consider X to be primordial and ontologically fundamental, the question of what gives rise to X either does not arise or it is unanswerable. (In any system of ontology, something must be primordial and ontologically fundamental. Either the question of what gives rise to it does not arise, or the question is unanswerable in principle.) So it is a matter of opinion as to whether criterion (a) is met or not.

(b) X is needed to explain consciousness as experienced in at least one human, so criterion (b) is met.

Next, we'll consider yours, where X = physicality and Y = Consciousness.

(a) In order for X to exist, something -- call it X' -- must be primordial and ontologically fundamental in order to account for the existence of X. (I don't know what you might consider X' to be, but regardless of whether it is a false vacuum, a "true" vacuum, a Higg's Field, a set of laws, a set of principles, an endless stack of turtles, or what, it doesn't matter for the purposes of this argument.) Since X' is primordial and ontologically fundamental, the question of what gives rise to X' either does not arise or it is unanswerable. So, just as in my case, it is a matter of opinion as to whether criterion (a) is met or not.

(b) X' is needed to explain the existence of the world, so criterion (b) is met.

Our views seem to be equally magical (or rational) by these criteria.

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X,...

My X is an observed phenomenon, not new at all (we each experience consciousness beginning in childhood), and it is as directly observed as anything can be -- more directly, in fact, than anything physical can be observed. Your X', on the other hand, is to date not only an unobserved phenomenon, but as yet has not even been identified. When it is finally identified, it may not be "totally new", but in all likelihood it will be a directly unobserved concept.

My view seems much less magical than yours on this score.

...when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts.

My X is an integral part of at least my explanation of human conscious experience, which is the most in-your-face existing phenomenon there is. It is, however, not explained by our other concepts. Your X', when identified, will no doubt be a part of explanations for other existing phenomena, but it too, will not likely be explained by other concepts.

Our views seem to be about equal on this score.

We need parsimony in our fundamental concepts, we need to resist the desire to multiply fundamental concepts needlessly.

Agreed. I think my view is more parsimonious than yours since I posit nothing new; we know consciousness exists and we are pretty sure physicality exists. Those are all I ask. Yours still needs the elusive X' and it brings along The Hard Problem of how consciousness can arise from physicality.

Gotta run. Good talking with you MF,

Paul

 

[octelcogopod]

Paul I really like your post, but it leaves me with an unfulfilled feeling nonetheless.

I like both your arguments really, but I still feel a piece is missing in both.

for MF I have one question; what are your proposed ways of solving the hard problem?

For Paul I have another; Do you feel it is satisfying to know that consciousness can never be "solved?"
It seems as if you're saying that we shouldn't dig into the physicality to develop our understanding of conscious experience, but rather just say "consciousness is fundamental, so where it arises from is not a question."

However, if you are saying that yes, physicality is 100% responsible for conscious experience, but we can't answer the hard problem from within our conscious "sphere" of experience, then yes, I agree.

Do you also feel that qualia / consciousness exists seperately from the physical world? Or is this simply a subjective viewpoint / excercise in logic?