Why the bias against materialism?

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
I guess it's not necessarily a wrong (though I haven't ever had a conversation about non-physical concepts without eventually dead-ending or going in circles before) observation, but it is based on Inductive reasoning, and is thus could thus be wrong in any occasion in the future. IOW, we can logically say (if it's true) that we have not had such a conversation, but can incompletely reason that such a conversation cannot occur.

True enough, but, as I stated about nine hundred pages ago, this is more of a working viewpoint, rather than ultimate truth.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
True enough, but, as I stated about nine hundred pages ago, this is more of a working viewpoint, rather than ultimate truth.

You mean kind of like an easy way of referring to much more complicated issues?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
You mean kind of like an easy way of referring to much more complicated issues?

Kind of as a useful guide, considering the likelihood that we will never know everything, and the fact that treating the universe as though every effect has a physical cause is the only consistantly successful method of finding useful answers.

 

[sascha]

Mentat and Zero, your view is still not clear to me. When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat and Zero, your view is still not clear to me. When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

When you think like me, your brain is working correctly.

 

[sascha]

Interesting. So you are proposing yourself as my guru?

Seriously: what is your answer to my question?

 

[Zero]

Brain fuction would be judged on...hmmm, I'm not sure. Accurate processing of external stimulus, internal cohesion, and not hearing strange voices?

 

[sascha]

Okay, but the problem is that all these functions require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part require a verification which for their part ... ?

Note that in philosophy there is a section called predication theory, and it has a problem: predicating leads finally into a version of Russell's paradox (the property of being a non-self-predicable property both falls and does not fall under the concept of being a non-self-predicable property -- or on the other side it both falls and does not fall under the concept of being self-predicable. The proposed solutions till now are of mere avoidance ...).

More in the field which you probably know better, you have the crux of the continuum hypthesis, the indeterminism of QT, the floating character of RT, etc...

In the last resort things are not as easy as many believe. We must be very careful. That's what I am advocating here, since quite a while and in many ways of expressing it -- including positive proposals. I mean: I don't think we have to postulate some barrier, or limit, or so ...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat and Zero, your view is still not clear to me. When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

How do "I" know when my brain "does it correctly"? I am fully confused by this question.

First off, "I" cannot know anything that my brain doesn't because I am my brain.

But, more importantly, I don't think it's possible for my brain to "do it wrong", who would be the judge? What would be the criteria (I really don't know since I never said (I don't think I said, anyway) anything about whether it thought "correctly" or "incorrectly")?

 

[sascha]

That's why this question is so interesting. If (as you seem to believe) it is not possible for your brain to "do it wrong", and you "are" your brain, you are compelled to feel infallible, isn't it. This reminds me of Zero's sneering remark on 11 September "There is no problem with a purely material brain 'running' in purely mechanical ways... except it doesn't make you feel special, does it?"

If you tell me the brain knows, then you are at the mercy of whatever happens to go on in your brain. And if you have to check, it is not the brain that has the ultimate word, and hence it is not the brain that thinks.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
That's why this question is so interesting. If (as you seem to believe) it is not possible for your brain to "do it wrong", and you "are" your brain, you are compelled to feel infallible, isn't it. This reminds me of Zero's sneering remark on 11 September "There is no problem with a purely material brain 'running' in purely mechanical ways... except it doesn't make you feel special, does it?"

The brain is mechanical (it is an organic machine), but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exert self-control. It obviously does, or else we humans wouldn't have free will (and we are assuming, for the purpose of this thread, that we do).

If you tell me the brain knows, then you are at the mercy of whatever happens to go on in your brain. And if you have to check, it is not the brain that has the ultimate word, and hence it is not the brain that thinks.

When will you stop seperating us from our brains? Seriously, you say that the "automaton human" is a result of our being the same thing as our brains, but then you speak of "us" being "at the mercy of our brains". You speak of "you" having "it" in check. This is a non-sequitor: "WE" ARE "IT"!

 

[sascha]

You should read my post a bit more attentively, especially for the second part of your answer. Or does your brain not want to?
I am not separating you from your brain. Or do you see some surgical instruments hovering over you?
Exactly how do you link self-control and free will?
When you say "WE" ARE "IT"!, you merely express a massive conflation: everything of "you" is one big mix of everything. But then why do you only declare being your brain and not also your toenails, your stomach, your excretions, etc?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
You should read my post a bit more attentively, especially for the second part of your answer. Or does your brain not want to?
I am not separating you from your brain. Or do you see some surgical instruments hovering over you?
Exactly how do you link self-control and free will?
When you say "WE" ARE "IT"!, you merely express a massive conflation: everything of "you" is one big mix of everything. But then why do you only declare being your brain and not also your toenails, your stomach, your excretions, etc?

Actually I have said, and do say, that the "self" is the entire organism. However, the conscious self is a part of the brain, and nothing more, that is the point that I was trying to get across.

Anyway, when I said that you keep "seperating me from my brain", it's because you continually refer to things like "keeping our brains under our control", which separates the concept of the conscious self (which would be the thing that "keeps things under control") and the brain.

 

[sascha]

Ugh, where did I continually "refer to things like 'keeping our brains under our control'"? Nobody can control his brain, but only his thoughts, and some have trouble even with that.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Ugh, where did I continually "refer to things like 'keeping our brains under our control'"? Nobody can control his brain, but only his thoughts, and some have trouble even with that.

Originally posted by you (if you don't believe me, look a few posts above this one):

If you tell me the brain knows, then you are at the mercy of whatever happens to go on in your brain. And if you have to check, it is not the brain that has the ultimate word, and hence it is not the brain that thinks.

When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

In the first one you speak of "us" having to check "our brains" (clear, obvious, separation of the "self" from the "brain").

In the second one you speak of "our brains" doing the thinking; and ask "how do you know when it does that correctly...?"[Italics mine].

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Royce is my buddy, so I witheld from him. But I think it only right to express that I think it utterly childish to plug your ears and scream "I'm right, your wrong, you don't understand enough philosophy", which is what you are (figuratively) doing (not just when you type "WRONG!" and leave it at that, but when you restate that I don't know enough, instead of addressing my point head-on). Alexander and Lifegazer did the same thing, and they are gone. Way before that, Scandium did the same thing, and he's gone too.

It is a hinderance to logical and open-minded discussion.

I'm going to respond to this comment because I don't like to be preached to. Especially when it is by someone who does the very thing they are accusing me of. There is only one person posting in this thread who has admitted to reading only the views that suit them. So I don't believe I'm the one with fingers in my ears. Regardless, I said "WRONG" because it was a word that you used in the previous paragraph. I HATE that word. It is a most arrogant and pathetic use of language in a philosphy forum. I just thought I'd let you taste it. As for who has been banned from the forum? Well, of those that you mentioned that I am aware of, I notice one thing they all had in common. They all knew exactly what they believed in and nothing anyone ever said could change their minds. Even if you posted links/references to established industry literature for them to research. Sounds familiar to me.

BTW, I have read much of Dennett. I haven't read the specific book that you refer to all the time in it's entirety but I suspect it is classic Dennett based on what I've read in it and about it. Since I don't perceive us as being able to get past semantics, I haven't had a chance to say what I think of the actual debate itself or Dennett. My general observation is that typically Dennett doesn't actually solve any problem. He merely reframes the issue and defines his way out of it so that there is no problem to begin with. Whether this is correct or not depends on the topic and the way it is done. That many philosphers still think he has only avoided the issue of consciousness, is a good enough reason for me to read what others think. But this is off topic for now.

I would ask you not to leave this discussion open like this, but if you stayed you'd probably continue to get more and more frustrated about how counter-intuitive my "radical" ideas are (though they are not my own, but those of very highly respected Philosophers; not that that matters to me, but it seems to matter to you), instead of addressing my arguments head-on. It's probably a waste of your time and mine (though an excellent way to increase post-count ) to continue as we are, but I don't have anything else to say until you counter what I've alread said (and "it's radical" or "it's not the traditional definition" or "you haven't studied the opposite position enough" are not counters they are dodges, and weak ones at that since you also have not studied the positions that I'm holding (those of Dennett, Le Doux, and Schwartz (sort of, though he's less materialistic)), and your ideas seem equally "radical" to me, since they imply a way for the physical to interact (physically? metaphysically?) with the metaphysical).

I am ready to continue discussion whenever you are.

There is a big difference between discussion and talking to a brick wall. I'll remind you that any person has the intellectual right to leave a discussion if they feel that the conversation is not productive. Neither I nor anyone else has to submit to on-going nonsense for the sake of "saving face" or to refrain from being a "cop out" or whatever else you can think of.

And I cannot keep spending my time responding to your quick responses and telling you over and over that I am not claiming idealists things to be true. Even this very post I am responding to is littered with the same accusations of "you haven't proved your point blah blah blah". I have no point on the materialism/Idealism debate to prove! We either "can" use words in a sentence to communciate what an idealists believes or we cannot. The view that you and Zero are taking (Zero's last post on page 47 is an example) make it impossible to even define idealism! Read his last post on page 47 and tell me that this isn't true. You will see that if you accept what he's saying then you have allowed your materialistic conclusion to constrain the definitions to the point that Idealism cannot be defined, let alone be argued for. This is what I've been saying all along about your conclusion being built into the definitions. Now the definition that "You" have proposed does not necessarily have this flaw. But it is too vague. It simply invites an infinite regress of semantics as I've shown. The reason why is because the true distinction between the 2 views has not been touched by that definition. Both sides would not be able to use that definition and agree on what their beliefs represent. A philosophical discussion cannot happen with such a definition.

Mentat, if you can define the 2 views to the point that everyone can agree on it, then fine I'll move on. But I don't believe that you can do it while restricting your use of useful words. Before you respond, PLEASE read what zero is posting and read what I've posted and actually "think" about it. Don't spend what little time you have online (1 hour?) doing your thinking and responding. Print this stuff out if you can and in your non- internet time, think about it. Then come back and respond. Otherwise we get no where.


And since I was mentioned in the same sentence with names like Alexander, LifeGazer etc, I'll leave with a quote from another member here. This thread is so long we may have forgotten that it isn't just me making the claims of sloppy semantics:

LWSleeth

You believe matter is all there is, but you want to put a spin on that so it comes out "materialists only believe in what can be shown to exist."

That is NOT the definition of materialism, which means that all which exists is either material or derived from what is material. Matter, for a materialist, is the origin and end of all, which at least Heusdan and AG honestly acknowledge. It is obvious to me you are playing mind games to get a tactical advantage in this debate. "We superior materialists only believe what is shown to exist." Of course, the only thing you are willing to accept as having been shown to exist is that which is material. Fliption was on to you right off.

 

[amadeus]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat and Zero, your view is still not clear to me. When you say your brain does the thinking, how do you know when it does that correctly and when it does not? What is the criterion?

Sascha, this is not as simple as you are trying to make it. I think you are exposing a major flaw in the materialist position, but I don't think any of the alternative views are free from paradox either. I guess the best way to put it is that everyone is wrong, and the issue is simply to choose which part of our knowledge we don't mind being wrong. That is, as far as I can tell, where materialists and spiritualists differ - they are wrong in different ways.

Sure, it does seem like the result of our thinking has to be judged. That's how people learn that something they took to be true or fact was not so. That's how we know we make mistakes and experience illusions. But the problem is, who or what plays the role of judge? If you say something other than the brain does it, you have to explain what this "something" has which the brain lacks - not a simple thing to do.

I believe it's easier to assert that whatever it is that does the thinking is the same thing that does the judgement. The reason I say that is because there's a clear way to judge your own thoughts, which is by seeking for self-consistency. That is, you choose a set of things that can be taken for granted (axioms) and make sure that all your knowledge and experiences can be expressed in terms of those axioms. No need for an infinite chain of a judge who judges the judge who judges the judge...

If the mind really works like that, by seeking self-consistency, then we can immediately explain why people believe in different things. First, it's because people have different experiences. For instance, a person who has an out-of-body experience needs to see his experience in a way that is consistent with all his other experiences. That process often leads to a change in the things one takes for granted. The particular axioms we choose as our basic beliefs are not important, any set that yields self-consistency is good enough.

Second, a good way to achieve self-consistency is by playing with language. Except for tautological statements, words do not have clear, fixed meanings, so we always have some room to interpret a particular word in a certain way that makes some statements sound as true. For instance, if I define "God" as "that which I do not understand", then it becomes true for me that "God exists". Of course people who define "God" differently will disagree, and there's nothing we can do about it.

So, to wrap it all up, I think we play the role of our own judges by a process of constantly searching for self-consistency in our ideas and experiences. But I also think you're right in that the brain cannot possibly "think", although that only means you and I define "brain" and "think" in similar ways.

Have fun,

Amadeus

 

[sascha]

Mentat, I have looked through all post lately with the search word "control", and I found nothing of the sort you say I said ('keeping our brains under our control'). What you quote is the result of your interpretation. In what I wrote, 'havc to check' refers to what 'the brain knows', i.e. if you have to check its results, then it is not the brain that does the final thinking. I admit that my formulation might have been a bit flimsy. BTW, what I say does not exclude the automatisms in judging which many people have installed -- gut reactions, knee jerk gestures, etc. But that's not the best of the mind -- which is why, for making sure, the automat won't do (which some call "the brain", but which is in fact only the automatized mind and its physiological traces of mental activity). When I talk about our brains doing some thinking, I take up your own view, and I ask how that can be. There is no need to mix up things.

Amadeus, you are of course right in saying that ultimately "whatever it is that does the thinking is the same thing that does the judgement" (of the result of our thinking). Maybe what I just mentioned about automatized ('learned') reactions is helpful for necessary distinctions. In everyday life the automat is most often sufficient, there is no need for anything else than the memorized items. But whenever one is not sure, or something new crops up, the automat is not reliable any more. Then we have to really think, attentively checking what is the case. The use of axioms is fine in the field for which they are designed. But when it comes to the whole -- quaestions of foundation of a science -- they are too limited. Self-consistency in the sense of logical systems is fine for specific aims, but self-limited. Wanting to clarify the role of the mind needs better than that, because it is simultaneously the agency and the acted upon. This requires conceptual (in fact: categoreal) systems that are up to the task.

 

[amadeus]

Originally posted by sascha
Amadeus, you are of course right in saying that ultimately "whatever it is that does the thinking is the same thing that does the judgement" (of the result of our thinking). Maybe what I just mentioned about automatized ('learned') reactions is helpful for necessary distinctions. In everyday life the automat is most often sufficient, there is no need for anything else than the memorized items. But whenever one is not sure, or something new crops up, the automat is not reliable any more. Then we have to really think, attentively checking what is the case. The use of axioms is fine in the field for which they are designed. But when it comes to the whole -- quaestions of foundation of a science -- they are too limited. Self-consistency in the sense of logical systems is fine for specific aims, but self-limited. Wanting to clarify the role of the mind needs better than that, because it is simultaneously the agency and the acted upon. This requires conceptual (in fact: categoreal) systems that are up to the task.

Well, what I meant by "axiom" was not necessarily the same thing as used in logic, after all our minds are capable of thinking in ways that transcend logic. Perhaps "belief" would be a better word. So all our experiences must be consistent with our beliefs. If we experience something which does not agree with our beliefs, we only have two options: change our beliefs or dismiss the experience.

Anyway, all I'm trying to say is that this mechanism of constantly seeking for "consistency with belief" works, because it's self-reflexive and requires no infinite chain of regression. But it does require that the self be separated from its perceptions - in other words, that the mind is not made of matter. The alternative leads to solipsism.

 

[Mentat]

Fliption, it's probably not going to make any difference that I right this, but I am sorry about having sounded preachy. I was already in a bad mood, and then I started to see indications that we were still going around in circles (partially my fault) and so I just wrote what came to mind (which, FYI, I don't usually do) and posted it. You are one of the few people that I really worry about offending, and yet I seem to keep doing it. Sorry again.

Originally posted by Fliption
There is only one person posting in this thread who has admitted to reading only the views that suit them.

If I may interject, I didn't say that, I just said that I had seen a logical flaw with certain views, and so I didn't spend my time reading how someone expounded on a view that was already (as far as I could see) logically impossible.

So I don't believe I'm the one with fingers in my ears. Regardless, I said "WRONG" because it was a word that you used in the previous paragraph. I HATE that word. It is a most arrogant and pathetic use of language in a philosphy forum. I just thought I'd let you taste it.

Already have, Royce used it (much to my irritation). However, I (at least) explained why I used it, though I probably shouldn't have anyway...

As for who has been banned from the forum? Well, of those that you mentioned that I am aware of, I notice one thing they all had in common. They all knew exactly what they believed in and nothing anyone ever said could change their minds. Even if you posted links/references to established industry literature for them to research. Sounds familiar to me.

Oh please, you have yet to get beyond the two logical (notice, not scientific or philosophical, but just plain logical) flaws in the Idealistic (any Idealistic) philosophies of the mind. I know that you weren't trying to prove Idealism, but you have taken the side of many Idealistic beliefs in previous threads, and (more importantly) have used Idealistic terms in your very definitions (which you said were supposed to be free of bias).

BTW, I have read much of Dennett. I haven't read the specific book that you refer to all the time in it's entirety but I suspect it is classic Dennett based on what I've read in it and about it.

For most practical purposes, you are right, except that he never really tackled the subject of consciousness - in nearly that amount of depth - in any of his other books, and thus left some room for interpretation of what his personal opinion on consciousness really was.

There is a big difference between discussion and talking to a brick wall.

Yes, but you must realize that I often feel the same way about you. I have shown (repeatedly) a bias in your definitions (biased definitions being a severe flaw according to Heusdens and yourself, since they attempt to tackle the issue itself before having fully defined it), and you have yet to counter, and show that your definitions really aren't biased.

I, OTOH, have presented a possible set of definitions (almost ridiculously simple ones, but that's what you need (IMO) when you are trying to remain free of bias (I didn't want to make the same mistake that you accuse Zero of and that I accuse you of)) which seemed to fit the purpose of this discussion and I still don't know what was wrong with them.

And I cannot keep spending my time responding to your quick responses and telling you over and over that I am not claiming idealists things to be true. Even this very post I am responding to is littered with the same accusations of "you haven't proved your point blah blah blah". I have no point on the materialism/Idealism debate to prove!

I know this, I have and do acknowledge that you are not "choosing sides" yet, you are just trying to come up with definitions that are not biased toward either side, so that we can know what it is that we are arguing about later. I just don't think you have yet succeeded, since I see clear bias in your definition.

We either "can" use words in a sentence to communciate what an idealists believes or we cannot.

I know, and I'm of the belief that we can use words. I just think that none of these words should be ones that only make sense in an Idealisitic paradigm...you are going to be debating with Materialists, so it (the definition that we decide on) should at least mean something in both paradigms. That's the point of my simplifying and saying that Idealistic philosophy of the mind is: The belief that is something other than the physical involved in consciousness.

What's wrong with that? (refine it, if you feel it needs refining, but is there anything logically wrong or biased in it?)

The view that you and Zero are taking (Zero's last post on page 47 is an example) make it impossible to even define idealism! Read his last post on page 47 and tell me that this isn't true.

His last post on page 47 is:

Originally posted by Zero
No, because if we stay on topic, he's out of special cases and exceptions!

What does that have to do with defining Idealism?

Originally posted by Fliption
You will see that if you accept what he's saying then you have allowed your materialistic conclusion to constrain the definitions to the point that Idealism cannot be defined, let alone be argued for.

This may or may not be true. Try using the definition that I suggested. It just might still be usable.

This is what I've been saying all along about your conclusion being built into the definitions. Now the definition that "You" have proposed does not necessarily have this flaw. But it is too vague. It simply invites an infinite regress of semantics as I've shown. The reason why is because the true distinction between the 2 views has not been touched by that definition. Both sides would not be able to use that definition and agree on what their beliefs represent. A philosophical discussion cannot happen with such a definition.

I disagree here. I've though about it and I think that the distinction is perfectly clear in my definitions:

Idealistic philosophy of mind: There is something more to consciousness than the physical.

Materialist philosophy of mind: There is nothing more to consciousness than the physical.

What's wrong here?

Mentat, if you can define the 2 views to the point that everyone can agree on it, then fine I'll move on. But I don't believe that you can do it while restricting your use of useful words. Before you respond, PLEASE read what zero is posting and read what I've posted and actually "think" about it. Don't spend what little time you have online (1 hour?) doing your thinking and responding. Print this stuff out if you can and in your non- internet time, think about it. Then come back and respond. Otherwise we get no where.

Well, I'm responding to an E-mail, looking up information for my friend who's wife is dying of cancer, and reading two other threads. However, I have put all of these other things on hold (as I usually do when responding to one of your posts) and giving it my undivided attention. I've thought carefully before typing, and I hope it shows (even though that's what I've been doing this whole time (except when I got angry, and I apologize again for that)).

As to Zero's post on page 47, I don't see it's relevance. Maybe you meant a different page?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, I have looked through all post lately with the search word "control", and I found nothing of the sort you say I said ('keeping our brains under our control').

The word probably hasn't come up, but the implication is rather common in your posts (of which I quoted just two examples).

What you quote is the result of your interpretation. In what I wrote, 'havc to check' refers to what 'the brain knows', i.e. if you have to check its results, then it is not the brain that does the final thinking.

That's the point! You cannot say "YOU" keep "IT" in check unless "YOU" are something other than "IT". You continually refer to the self as "checking" on the brain, but that implies that the conscious self is something other than the brain.

I admit that my formulation might have been a bit flimsy. BTW, what I say does not exclude the automatisms in judging which many people have installed -- gut reactions, knee jerk gestures, etc. But that's not the best of the mind -- which is why, for making sure, the automat won't do (which some call "the brain", but which is in fact only the automatized mind and its physiological traces of mental activity). When I talk about our brains doing some thinking, I take up your own view, and I ask how that can be. There is no need to mix up things.

But you are not "taking up my view". You are getting close sometimes, but you always fall short of truly understanding me, since you continually refer to the conscious self as something other than a part of the brain.

 

[Fliption]

Ok, let's see if we can make some progress here.

Originally posted by Mentat
If I may interject, I didn't say that, I just said that I had seen a logical flaw with certain views, and so I didn't spend my time reading how someone expounded on a view that was already (as far as I could see) logically impossible.

I understand this. But as info, complexity theory is a scientific topic that has nothing directly to do with the philosophical discussion of materialism versus Idealism. So to say that's it's premises are flawed based on your understanding of Idealism is not entirely appropriate. Also, I've been reading your dialogue with Hypnagogue in the thread on telepathy. I see him using "emergent properties" and similar concepts several times and you have allowed him to do it with little fuss. I can only guess as to why this is.

Oh please, you have yet to get beyond the two logical (notice, not scientific or philosophical, but just plain logical) flaws in the Idealistic (any Idealistic) philosophies of the mind. I know that you weren't trying to prove Idealism, but you have taken the side of many Idealistic beliefs in previous threads, and (more importantly) have used Idealistic terms in your very definitions (which you said were supposed to be free of bias).

Let me define how I use the term "bias" because you keep saying that my definition is biased in the same way that Zero's is and it clearly is not. To me the words that the definition uses don't determine whether it is biased or not. To determine whether a definition is biased, I envision it being used in a discussion between a materialist and an idealist. If the definition uses words that mean the same things for the 2 sides and they are clear on what their disagreement is, then the definition is successful. If the definition does not allow one side to make any statements at all because it assumes the conclusion of the opponent, then it is biased. If you go back to the thread where I typed in the dialogue between the materialist and the idealist, you'll see that I was trying to show how Zero's definition is not useful because the words mean different things to different people.

HOWEVER, I can make the statement "A materialist does not believe that anything originating from the "mind" actually exists because a materialists doesn't believe the mind exists". The idealist view would simply be the reversal of this view. By using this as our distinction, the views of the materialists ARE NOT compromised in any way. Hence it is not biased. All you have done is state that it is biased because certain words are present. You have not shown an example in a mock dialogue or anything else showing how this definition disallows the materialists conclusion simply because it uses a word like "mind" in the sentence. But let's move off of this for now and move to your definition rather than Zero's.

For most practical purposes, you are right, except that he never really tackled the subject of consciousness - in nearly that amount of depth - in any of his other books, and thus left some room for interpretation of what his personal opinion on consciousness really was.

In readings that I have had, he has expressed opinions on the mind/body problem. I assume they would be similar.

and you have yet to counter, and show that your definitions really aren't biased.

In my view, it is you who must show why my definition is biased. All you have said is that it uses idealistic words. But you haven't shown why this doesn't allow the materialists to maintain his views. The use of these "idealist" words are merely for communication. I'll try to show why this definition is better than the alternatives.

Idealistic philosophy of mind: There is something more to consciousness than the physical.

Materialist philosophy of mind: There is nothing more to consciousness than the physical.

What's wrong here?

Well that's the first time I've seen your definition written like that. The first issue is that I wonder if ldealistic ideas only apply to consciousness? Does it not apply to the whole universe? It seems the definition would have to be expanded a bit. But you did say it was a "theory of the mind" so I'll go with it.

The biggest problem with this definition is the word "physical". First of all, I don't think an idealists gives a rats rear what is physical or what isn't. An idealist believes that the products of mind (or consciousness if you like) have a primary existence over things not of the mind. Whether it is physical or not isn't as relevant as whether it is a product of the mind. This is the true distinction between the 2 views. Whether something is "physical" or not is simply a characteristic that materialists have placed on it after the fact.

But putting that opinion aside there are still more problems. What does it mean to be physical? Earlier you said something about energy and interactions. OK, so what exactly are the criteria for something to be considered energy? These questions will continue with each answer you give. I'm not trying to be difficult. But I know that these words have a common sense meaning to all of us and we all have our own understanding. Can these labels be applied to "new" things as we discover them and the definition of Idealism/Materialism be maintained? What if we discover something new that doesn't fit into these definitions? Then we either have to go ask idealists and materialists what their beliefs are with regard to this thing so that we can tweak our definitions of energy and matter so that the definition of materialism and idealism remain intact. Or, we have to change the definitions of idealism to say something like "we believe nothing is physical...with the following exceptions..." Very sloppy.

If I can look at any thing, idea, concept, etc in the universe and claim that either an idealist or a materialist does or does not believe in it, based on the definition of Idealism/materialism, then it is a good definition. For example, if 50 years from now we come across a new "thing" in the universe that doesn't quite fit your definition of energy does that mean it isn't physical? What am I to do if I want to know what the idealists position is on such a thing? Do I ask the idealists what he thinks of this new things existence and then call it physical or not based on his answer? Or do I claim it is physical or not base on other criteria at the expense of the idealists definition?

The better option is to use Heusdens academic definition. To just say that creations of the "mind" (as it is consistently understood by everyone) are what Idealists believe are the primary existence. So if we consider a black hole or some exotic form of dark matter(or even some other unimaginable thing). I no longer need to study whether it meets all the criteria of "physical" or "energy" or whatever other criteria I would eventually need. All I have to ask is, "would an existing black hole continue to exist without a mind to conceive of it? Does it exists separate from my mind?" The answer is "yes". So it is a materialists concept. The same thing can be applied to "color", and "taste". However, both of these things would cease to exist if I didn't exists to conceive of them. So they are not material(in the philosophical sense). Using words like "mind" and "consciousness" is for convenience only. Because everyone knows what we're talking about and there is no gray area. Is there? No matter what thing you think up or discover, I automatically know whether it is idealists or materialist by asking the questions above. And I think everyone would agree. Because that IS the distinction between the 2 views.

As I said earlier, if we use your definition I can continue to ask you more and more questions about what the words really mean. It will eventually come to an end somewhere, where everyone agrees on the definition and no more questions need to be asked. But I am certain that what you'll find when you get to that point is that you have built materialism into your definition. We can go through the exercise if you want but I'm certain if you go through the exercise in your head you'll see it too. This is why I asked pages ago "what would it take for you to be convinced that materialism is wrong?" using your own definition of materialism as your basis. I asked this question because I know there is no answer. The answer that you gave begged the question because you merely said that "an idealiists would have to show X" You didn't say what X could be, nor whether it is logically possible at all by definition

As to Zero's post on page 47, I don't see it's relevance. Maybe you meant a different page?

Sorry, it is on page 49.

 

[Fliption]

Sorry this was a duplicate and the forum won't let me delete it. So I edited it to say this!

 

[BoulderHead]

Originally posted by Fliption
Sorry this was a duplicate and the forum won't let me delete it. So I edited it to say this!

When did this happen?

Let me see if I can delete this...
[edit]
Hmmm, the function has been disabled I'd say.

 

[Zero]

I'm sorry...idealism is nonsense, and if that makes materialism circular, then so be it. Idealism, by definition, is irrational, illogical, and cannot construct a useful and coherent position. Therefore, circular or not, materialism is the best we have to go on. Sorry you geys wasted all this time posting, but I am right, you are wrong, and that's what you'll have to live with.

 

[Zero]

BTW...I ROCK!


Seriously, though...idealism is useless as a tool, whether it is true or not. Because it is based on subjectivism, it suggests that the universe is different for each person, and is therefore useless for communicating ideas. It is similar to allowing each person to invent their own language; while each individual language may be perfectly suited to its inventor, it makes communication impossible.

 

[sascha]

Mentat, you are rather amusing in wanting to tell people what they mean when they say something -- for example in addressing this to me: "The word probably hasn't come up, but the implication is rather common in your posts (of which I quoted just two examples)."

In detail, the self being something other than the brain does not imply that checking means checking the brain, especially if I have made clear that I mean checking one's thoughts. Whether you believe these are the result of the brain -- just like piss is the result of the kidneys (a view dating back to LaMettrie, many cemnturies back) -- is none of my business. You should not mix up what you think and what others think. Maybe you should tell this to your brain...

In what you say afterwards, as so many other times you only ask me to follow your beliefs. This is precisely what I will never do. In insisting you miss the point of what I discuss: the role of automatisms.

 

[amadeus]

Originally posted by Zero
Seriously, though...idealism is useless as a tool, whether it is true or not. Because it is based on subjectivism, it suggests that the universe is different for each person, and is therefore useless for communicating ideas. It is similar to allowing each person to invent their own language; while each individual language may be perfectly suited to its inventor, it makes communication impossible.

But, Zero, look at this forum and tell me if that isn't exactly what's happening. Communication is, more often than not, impossible. You are claiming that materialism would improve communication, but you don't seem more successful at communicating your ideas than the idealists are. What is wrong? Why is it that your claims of improved communication lack substantiation in fact?

(I can already hear you saying, "what's wrong? the non-materialists are what's wrong, they don't understand what I say!". Just kidding...)

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by amadeus
But, Zero, look at this forum and tell me if that isn't exactly what's happening. Communication is, more often than not, impossible. You are claiming that materialism would improve communication, but you don't seem more successful at communicating your ideas than the idealists are. What is wrong? Why is it that your claims of improved communication lack substantiation in fact?

(I can already hear you saying, "what's wrong? the non-materialists are what's wrong, they don't understand what I say!". Just kidding...)

What I mean by communication, is that if I see a ball, and decribe it as an object, someone else can come behind me and identify that object. A materialists says 'There is a ball on the couch, it had a diameter of about 8 inches, it is made of knobby red rubber, and it has a picture of Elmo on it'
An Idealist would say 'look at the lovely ball, it makes me feel gooshy inside...'

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Ok, let's see if we can make some progress here.

I sure hope so.

I understand this. But as info, complexity theory is a scientific topic that has nothing directly to do with the philosophical discussion of materialism versus Idealism. So to say that's it's premises are flawed based on your understanding of Idealism is not entirely appropriate. Also, I've been reading your dialogue with Hypnagogue in the thread on telepathy. I see him using "emergent properties" and similar concepts several times and you have allowed him to do it with little fuss. I can only guess as to why this is.

Well...actually, I have rebuked (probably the wrong term, since I have no authority to "rebuke" anyone...perhaps "corrected" or "commented on" is better?) him for having used such terms that imply "emergent properties", but, IIRC, we came to an agreement on which terms were OK to use provided the understanding was made beforehand that these were just for the purpose of discussion.

Let me define how I use the term "bias" because you keep saying that my definition is biased in the same way that Zero's is and it clearly is not. To me the words that the definition uses don't determine whether it is biased or not. To determine whether a definition is biased, I envision it being used in a discussion between a materialist and an idealist. If the definition uses words that mean the same things for the 2 sides and they are clear on what their disagreement is, then the definition is successful. If the definition does not allow one side to make any statements at all because it assumes the conclusion of the opponent, then it is biased. If you go back to the thread where I typed in the dialogue between the materialist and the idealist, you'll see that I was trying to show how Zero's definition is not useful because the words mean different things to different people.

Yes, I completely agree with this definition of "bias", and I was making (or, attempting to make) the same distinction, but I focused on the fact that it was the words being used which make the definition unintelligible to both sides of the discussion. That's why I said that yours made the same mistake as what you accused Zero's of (btw, we can completely drop the discussion of Zero's original definition if you want...perhaps starting a separate thread about it later, because I think it's side-tracking this thread way too much).

HOWEVER, I can make the statement "A materialist does not believe that anything originating from the "mind" actually exists because a materialists doesn't believe the mind exists". The idealist view would simply be the reversal of this view. By using this as our distinction, the views of the materialists ARE NOT compromised in any way. Hence it is not biased.

Actually (man, I wish I could just leave this alone!), it is still slightly biased. Remember your thread (at least I think it was yours) some time ago that dealt with what it really meant to "exist" (oh, wait a minute, that could have been Eh's thread...I'm not really sure). After all, if you can refer to "it" then there is an "it" and thus "it" exists. Anyway, this point comes back to mind when you say that "A materialist doesn't believe that anything originating from the mind actually exists..." because: 1) Everything that exists, actually exists; and 2) According to the materialist, nothing "originates from the mind".

Thus, I guess what I'm saying is that the distinction between Materialism and Idealism is not (as you seem to be saying) a difference in belief on whether the things that exist "inside the mind" "actually exist", but rather whether there is really anything that exists "inside the mind".

I will have to complete my response in my next post, since I have run out of space.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
All you have done is state that it is biased because certain words are present. You have not shown an example in a mock dialogue or anything else showing how this definition disallows the materialists conclusion simply because it uses a word like "mind" in the sentence.

Ok, a mock dialogue:

Materialist: So what really is the difference between your beliefs and mine?
Idealist using Fliption's definition: Well, I believe that the things produced by the mind are what really exist, and the physical things are just secondary.
Materialist: You believe that what is what really exists?
Idealist: The things produced by the mind.
Materialist: What things that are produced by the mind? You mean electrical stimuli?
Idealist: No, not the physical things produced by the brain, the phenomenal things produced by the non-physical mind.
Materialist: There is no non-physical mind.
Idealist: Oh, then I guess the difference isn't that you believe the things in the mind don't "really exist", but rather that there are no things produced in the mind.
Materialist: That's right, in fact I don't think there is a mind, except for the physical organ called the "brain".

So, you see, the difference was not (as the Idealist using Fliption's definition believed) what importance or what status (really existing or just emerging from what really exists) was placed on phenomenal events, but rather the difference was whether one believed that there were phenomenal events ITFP.

But let's move off of this for now and move to your definition rather than Zero's.

Good idea.

In my view, it is you who must show why my definition is biased. All you have said is that it uses idealistic words. But you haven't shown why this doesn't allow the materialists to maintain his views. The use of these "idealist" words are merely for communication. I'll try to show why this definition is better than the alternatives.

Yes, but when (in my mock dialogue) the Materialist was confronted with the idea of "things that exist inside the mind", he was at a complete loss, since there are no such things in his paradigm. The fact that the implication of "non-physical thoughts" exists in the Idealist's original definition made his original definition biased and unintelligible by his Materialist aquaintance.

Well that's the first time I've seen your definition written like that. The first issue is that I wonder if ldealistic ideas only apply to consciousness? Does it not apply to the whole universe? It seems the definition would have to be expanded a bit. But you did say it was a "theory of the mind" so I'll go with it.

You have point. Yes, I suppose we should limit ourselves to just discussing the Idealistic approach to theories of mind for now. However, I think it can be applied in many different circumstances if we just remember that the Idealist believes that something other than the physical exists, and the Materialist does not.

The biggest problem with this definition is the word "physical". First of all, I don't think an idealists gives a rats rear what is physical or what isn't. An idealist believes that the products of mind (or consciousness if you like) have a primary existence over things not of the mind. Whether it is physical or not isn't as relevant as whether it is a product of the mind. This is the true distinction between the 2 views. Whether something is "physical" or not is simply a characteristic that materialists have placed on it after the fact.

I disagree. A person who believes that something exists "in the mind" (no matter what status they give such a thing) is an Idealist, and is believing in something non-physical, since there are obviously no "purple cows" in my physical brain.

But putting that opinion aside there are still more problems. What does it mean to be physical? Earlier you said something about energy and interactions. OK, so what exactly are the criteria for something to be considered energy? These questions will continue with each answer you give. I'm not trying to be difficult.

No, I think you are making a valid point. However, for the purpose of this discussion, I think I can re-define "physical" as: Composed of wavicles and/or having effect on spacetime.

Thus, something that is produced "inside consciousness" cannot be physical, since it is not composed of wavicles (wave/particles) and has no effect on spacetime.

But I know that these words have a common sense meaning to all of us and we all have our own understanding. Can these labels be applied to "new" things as we discover them and the definition of Idealism/Materialism be maintained? What if we discover something new that doesn't fit into these definitions? Then we either have to go ask idealists and materialists what their beliefs are with regard to this thing so that we can tweak our definitions of energy and matter so that the definition of materialism and idealism remain intact. Or, we have to change the definitions of idealism to say something like "we believe nothing is physical...with the following exceptions..." Very sloppy.

Again, very valid point, however I think my new "redefinition" may help some (possibly not though, I await your scrutiny of it).

If I can look at any thing, idea, concept, etc in the universe and claim that either an idealist or a materialist does or does not believe in it, based on the definition of Idealism/materialism, then it is a good definition. For example, if 50 years from now we come across a new "thing" in the universe that doesn't quite fit your definition of energy does that mean it isn't physical? What am I to do if I want to know what the idealists position is on such a thing? Do I ask the idealists what he thinks of this new things existence and then call it physical or not based on his answer? Or do I claim it is physical or not base on other criteria at the expense of the idealists definition?

I will answer your question with a question: How do you "come across" something that doesn't interact with energy or spacetime? After all, as humans, our only way of percieving anything about the world is through our five senses, and they only percieve effects of energy and spacetime.

So, really, your hypothetical scenario becomes rather moot, when confronted with the fact (fact according to Materialists that is) that one can never become conscious of something without using one of his five physical senses.

This is why I asked pages ago "what would it take for you to be convinced that materialism is wrong?" using your own definition of materialism as your basis. I asked this question because I know there is no answer. The answer that you gave begged the question because you merely said that "an idealiists would have to show X" You didn't say what X could be, nor whether it is logically possible at all by definition

I don't quite understand your problem with my response. I said that they would have to show that an intermediary, that was neither physical nor non-physical, exists (which is logically impossible, but is absolutely vital to the Idealistic approach*) and that they would have to get around the homunculan problem as well. Neither of these seem to "beg the question" as you say; they appear to be perfectly rational objections to me.


*It is not really vital to holding an Idealistic view (which is the view that non-physical things exist), however, it is vital to believing that the mind is non-physical, since the mind interacts with the rest of the self on a constant basis.

 

[amadeus]

Originally posted by Zero
What I mean by communication, is that if I see a ball, and decribe it as an object, someone else can come behind me and identify that object. A materialists says 'There is a ball on the couch, it had a diameter of about 8 inches, it is made of knobby red rubber, and it has a picture of Elmo on it'
An Idealist would say 'look at the lovely ball, it makes me feel gooshy inside...'

I knew that's what you meant, but I still think you are missing an important point. First, your distinction between materialists and idealists above is not correct; idealists know as much about inches, rubber, and Elmo as materialists do. If anything, the major difference between them is that the materialist will say there is no such thing as a lovely ball, unless "lovely" can be demonstrated to be similar to "inches", "rubber", etc. If anything, the problem with non-materialists is that they insist on talking about things that cannot be talked about. With that part of your argument I would have no problem but...

What exactly is "materialism"? How many inches does it measure? What is it made of? Does it look like Elmo?

So while materialistic things are easy to describe, materialism itself is as subjective as anything idealists talk about. Worse, I take it that the reason materialists like materialism is because "it's lovely and makes them feel gooshy inside..."

You can run but you cannot hide...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, you are rather amusing in wanting to tell people what they mean when they say something -- for example in addressing this to me: "The word probably hasn't come up, but the implication is rather common in your posts (of which I quoted just two examples)."

I wasn't telling you what you meant, merely what you implied (whether on purpose or not).

In detail, the self being something other than the brain does not imply that checking means checking the brain, especially if I have made clear that I mean checking one's thoughts. Whether you believe these are the result of the brain -- just like piss is the result of the kidneys (a view dating back to LaMettrie, many cemnturies back) -- is none of my business. You should not mix up what you think and what others think. Maybe you should tell this to your brain...

Understand what I'm saying, please: If "I" check on my "thoughts" then (according to the materialist view, which I am currently taking) that means that the brain (which is the same as "me") checks on it's thoughts. But this is not logical since the "thoughts" themselves are merely physical functions of the brain, having no separate existence.

In what you say afterwards, as so many other times you only ask me to follow your beliefs. This is precisely what I will never do. In insisting you miss the point of what I discuss: the role of automatisms.

I didn't ask you to take on my beliefs, I only assumed that you were (for the sake of this part of the debate) taking my side hypothetically. You said - in a previous post, from which all of this recent discussion (between you and I) has followed - that "if you take the Materialist PoV, that the brain is the self, then you have the problem of whether "it" does it right", or something like that. My problem with that statement (and the subsequent justifications of it) is that you are not taking my side of the argument, even though you said that this problem arises from doing just that.

 

[sascha]

But, Mentat, there still is a problem with what you say: If for you the only way of understanding "checking one's thoughts" is to mean "the brain checks on it's own thoughts (which is illogical, because it introduces a split)", then there is no way in which logic can make sense to you, since in pure logic there is only one thought checking on other thoughts -- and thus in your terminology 'the brain checking the brain'... Or what?

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
we came to an agreement on which terms were OK to use provided the understanding was made beforehand that these were just for the purpose of discussion.


Actually (man, I wish I could just leave this alone!), it is still slightly biased. Remember your thread (at least I think it was yours) some time ago that dealt with what it really meant to "exist" (oh, wait a minute, that could have been Eh's thread...I'm not really sure). After all, if you can refer to "it" then there is an "it" and thus "it" exists. Anyway, this point comes back to mind when you say that "A materialist doesn't believe that anything originating from the mind actually exists..." because: 1) Everything that exists, actually exists; and 2) According to the materialist, nothing "originates from the mind".

I've placed these 2 paragraphs above together because my comment addresses them both. I did see you comment on Hypnagogues words and I saw the agreement. This agreement is exactly what I've been trying to get here. The whole reason you were able to make that agreement was because you understood what he meant by the words and phrases that he was using. And that is the only objective that language has. To allow for communication. So the words worked. This is what I've been trying to do here for the last 40 pages. I've pointed out that the whole point in using certain words was to allow for a definition that everyone understood and a clear distinction could be made. Whether these concepts actually exists or not is not relevant. Maybe I've just done a poor job of trying to get this because Hypnagouge seemed to accomplish it so easily.

Also, for the whole "existence" discussion, I just don't understand how you think you can disagree with anyone if you aren't willing to accept the words that the other side uses? For example, if a guy on the street tells you to watch out for the Pink Unicorn in your path, you will likely disagree with him that a pink unicorn even exists. Not to mention you see nothing in front of you. So, pink unicorns don't exists, yet you are using the word. The existence of the pink unicorn(and all it's droppings) IS the distinction between your 2 views. How can you disagree with this man if you aren't even willing to use the word of the very thing that separates your view? IMO, you can't. Which is what I've been saying. You cannot disallow these key words without completely crippling idealisms ability to argue it's point.

Thus, I guess what I'm saying is that the distinction between Materialism and Idealism is not (as you seem to be saying) a difference in belief on whether the things that exist "inside the mind" "actually exist", but rather whether there is really anything that exists "inside the mind".

I could be slow but I've read this several times and I don't see a difference. It's probably me but maybe there's a typo?