- #36
Canute
- 1,568
- 0
Originally posted by Mentat
Might I suggest a few books?
A Universe of Consciousness, Gerald Edelmann
Bright air, Brillian Fire, Gerald Edelmann
The Emotional Brain, Joseph LeDoux
Synaptic Self, Joseph LeDoux
The Cerebral Code: thinking a though in the mosaics of the mind, William Calvin.
I asked for an example of a plausible theory showing that consciousness is brain. Which one of these is your proposed example? (The truth is that there is no example. There are conjectures and hypotheses, some of them, like Dennett's, quite elaborate. But nothing deserving to be called a theory).
I agree that not making assumptions is always the best way. But there's no inherent virtue in agnosticism.Agnosticism is almost always the best way.
Not in my opinion, but it's a small point.Actually, to take a third-party approach, and remain rational, he must indeed assume that my statements about my own phenomenological experience are true.
It's like an anthropologist who goes off to study the rituals and culture of a tribe that worships the god, Feenoman. Let's say that there are two tribes that worship Feenoman, but there are slightly different ideas of what Feenoman is really like, differing between the two tribes (one might say that He has blue eyes, while the other says He has black ones; one might say He has long hair, another might say He's bald; etc). Now, an anthropologist would surely take the objective approach, and never contradict the beliefs of one tribe, simply because the previous tribe said something different about Feenoman. And, if one of the tribesmen should start to appreciate the anthropologist's objective approach, this one too might become a Feenomanologist (I love that pun ) and begin to view his previous god as a fictious character, subject to the interpretations and varying preferences of different tribes.
We are the Feenoman-woshipers, in Dennett's view, and an objective (anthropologist-like) approach needs to be taken before we will ever understand the true nature of phenomenology.
Imo that is an incorrext use of the Feenoman example, and not Dennett's argument.
You said that the heterophenomenological approach deals with subjective experience. But that is precisely what it doesn't deal with. Dennett's argument, stripped to the basics, is functionalist, not much different to the arguments of Watson and Skinner, It is a 'black box, approach in which consciousness is reduced to the behavioural signs of consciousness. Subjective feelings are left out of his theory entirely.What exactly do you disagree with?
I think you're probably right. This is my complaint.Very true. However, it's my opinion that the reason scientists don't ever mention the heterophenomenological approach is because objectivism is taken for granted by the Scientific Method.
There is no self-consistent and plausible physicalist theory of consciousness. I'll risk stating that as a bald fact to make it easy for you to find a single exception. (I'll check the thread and respond there to 'hexagon' theory).Well, I gave a brief summary of the "hexagon" theory of William Calvin, in the thread "Correlates of Consciousness".
Very true. But there's no point in a theory that appeals to scientists but doesn't stand up to logical analysis.Yeah, I can see that. Of course, when looking for a scientific theory of consciousness, one does wish to appeal to the scientists conducting the study, right?
Last edited: