Differences in Teaching Phys Vs. Chem/Bio?

[ZapperZ]

First of all, what I'm citing is an opinion piece, so I don't intend to pass it off as a "peer-reviewed" idea. Still, I think it needs to be addressed because I never realized that this significant difference is present between physics and chemistry/biology.

The opinion piece was uploaded to Arxiv and can be found here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00273

While it dealt with something that appears trivial, such as the wordings in the description of the academic goals of the Natural Sciences areas, I can't help feeling that the differences are more profound and fundamental than that. This is illustrated quite clearly by the author in the issue of either keeping or dropping the phrase "theoretical investigation" in the description of how knowledge is gathered and evaluated in these sciences.

Toward the end of the process, a colleague who is shepherding the curriculum review contacted me to ask whether dropping “theoretical investigation” from the list would present a problem from the perspective of the Physics Department. The justification given by the review committee for omitting this item was that “if something is a scientific theory it no longer requires investigation.” I had to read that phrase a few times to extract its essence. This was not the opinion of the person who contacted me; she was trying to paraphrase the (adamant) suggestions of another committee member and several science faculty who had been consulted.

You may read the authors reply to this, but this is where I started to think of a possibly profound differences between physics and chem/bio, especially in Biology. This is contained in the rebuttal that the author received:

Theories in biology are developed AFTER experimentation and not before. A theory (in the biological sciences) is a fact and is NOT a mere prediction. A concept that has withstood the test of time and repeated experimentation using multiple approaches is accepted as a theory. For example, evolution by natural selection is a theory. Experiments are performed assuming evolution occurs. It is a guiding principle in other investigations, but it in itself is not being investigated. What we investigate are hypotheses and not theories.

Now, there is certainly an issue of terminology here. As stated by the author, in physics, we seldom use the phrase "hypothesis", because something that we consider to be a hypothesis is usually a "blind guess", or back-of-the-envelope calculations. This will never make it into publication and often seen only as a starting point for a more well-formed theory.

But the more profound and fundamental issue here is the idea of the existence of a theory that is a "fact". While there are theories with a very high degree of validity and certainty, in physics, there is no such thing as a theory being a "fact". There are experimental facts, but no theoretical facts, at least not in the way it is described in biology as stated above. ALL theories in physics are still subject to being investigated, and they will continue to evolve as we know more and learn more.

So I'm not sure if this is truly a real difference between Physics and Bio/Chem, or if it is simply the scientists in this particular school are the ones uniquely having this problem. We have people in all of those fields, and not knowing exactly how things are done in Biology and Chemistry, I defer to you to clarify this.

I've always advised people to study science, even if they don't intend to be scientists, simply because of the benefits one get not only in the knowledge, but also in learning how we gather and acquire knowledge. Now, it seems that within the Natural Sciences, this process of acquiring knowledge may not be uniform throughout. I'd like to know if this is real.

Zz.

P.S. I wasn't sure where to post this. Even though this is an issue involving the academic education in Natural Sciences, it also is dealing with fundamental issues in each of the Natural Sciences field of studies. Since the manuscript was uploaded to the Education section of ArXiv, I followed the same topic line.

 

[Bystander]

Now, it seems that within the Natural Sciences, this process of acquiring knowledge may not be uniform throughout. I'd like to know if this is real.

As a physical chemist, neither "flesh nor fowl," I'll submit the observation that "the natural sciences" exist on a continuum ranging from the clean, well-defined systems investigated by physicists and subject to the seven(?) conservation laws, to the incredibly complex, messy systems of the "real world." The language and conventions that have grown up around studies of "real systems" includes the same words, and similar context, but can NOT be directly transliterated from one end of the continuum to the other.

 

[Hector Mata]

This was a very interesting read!

I think the biology faculty he cites were mostly reacting to the constant attack that their field is under, specifically in the form of "evolution is just a theory". And so they (rightly) point out that evolution is a demonstrable fact, and by "theory" they mean something more like "the set of ideas that explain the phenomena we observe, and correctly predict phenomena yet to be observed at the time they were formulated" (yes, I came up with that on my own ). In that sense, then yes, biology is practically done, in the theoretical aspect (though I understand there's currently an emerging fad for epigenetics). There is no part of speciation that is inconsistent with ecology, for example. To the contrary, they fit in quite nicely.

I majored in chemical engineering before switching to physics for grad school. Mostly I remember that chemistry is really, really hard, especially organic chemistry. Sure, there were different subjects that one learned, but I had a hard time abstracting theoretical principles from them. The only thing I could identify as a unifying theoretical principle was the periodic table. Maybe an actual chemist can help.

Physicists, on the other hand, work with theories (sets of ideas) that are known to be limited, incomplete, or outright inconsistent, despite their elegance, rigor, and even experimental success. On one side we have dozens of decimal places of agreement between (theoretical) calculations and experiment; yet on the other, we know that there's something we're not getting about the ideas that produce those stunning results . So it seems that being well-rounded in theory means, for a physicist, to be perpetually puzzled. Puzzlement arises out of conflicts between ideas, theories are sets of ideas, and so... we study and develop theories, because we know for a fact that we're not done!

Though it's fairly obvious that a biologist is amazed and puzzled by some observation (say, the bizarre mating behavior of some bird or something), I doubt that she's puzzled by the guiding principle that she will use to guide the research she is to perform. In physics, the guiding principles are themselves a source of puzzlement and wonder. I have a theory that this really is unique to physics (see what I did there? )

 

[brainpushups]

I think the issue has mostly to do with the relative simplicity of physics compared to other fields (in terms of mathematical modeling). I am pretty ignorant when it comes to chemistry and biology, but I tend to agree that there is a difference in how science is approached and how terminology is used.

For a minute let's go back to the philosophical origins of physics. Plato argued that true knowledge must be reasoned and that the senses were not to be trusted. In his Timaeus he outlined his cosmology/cosmogony which, among other things, included his geometric theory of matter: that all elements are composed of the platonic solids (and ultimately triangles) which can break apart and form elements of a different type. Now this theory doesn't pass the smell test for a theory in physics today. For one thing it does not allow for quantitative predictions (however, this was not Plato's goal). I was interested in Einstein quote from the article posted by Zz where he responds to the 'what if' question of his theory of general relativity being 'incorrect.'

"When asked how he would have reacted had the experiment shown no deflection, Einstein famously responded 'I would have had to pity our dear Lord. The theory is correct all the same.'"

I would not have expected such a response from Einstein. I think Plato might have responded similarly.

Throughout the middle ages the 'science' of the schoolmen was similarly 'theoretically minded.' Bradwardine and Oresme both came up with the correct formulation for constantly accelerated motion long before Galileo, but the exercise to them was purely academic; they did not think that nature actually behaved this way.

Aristotle was perhaps the first to place an emphasis on the interplay between inductive and deductive reasoning for achieving true scientific knowledge that is somewhat similar to modern day physics if you ignore the fact that he was interested in determining the so-called 'final causes.' Further down the line Bacon argued that science should be purely inductive (though his method was not fruit-bearing) and Descartes argued that science should be entirely deductive (except, interestingly, for his investigations into the nature of light where he performed extensive experiments). It seems like somewhat of a lucky accident that any theoretical progress was made at all. Recall Fermat's surprise when he discovered that his principle predicted the law of reflection and refraction. I can imagine a world where these type of discoveries did not happen and experimental physics would be a completely empirical science and 'theoretical physics' would be perhaps considered philosophy.

This seems to be the (grossly simplified) way in which parts of chemistry, biology, medicine, and social sciences operate (as an outsider looking in). No doubt that this is largely due to the complexity of each field. Unless there is some breakthrough analogous to that of Fermat's Principle or Newton's Laws of Motion in other fields I can't see how the role of theory (in the physics sense) could be the same across the board.

 

[Bystander]

The only thing I could identify as a unifying theoretical principle was the periodic table. Maybe an actual chemist can help.

Jerry March, Advanced Organic Chemistry, puts all those hundreds (thousands?) of "name reactions" into a nice, tidy perspective --- there are only seven reactions in ALL of the whole field of chemistry; that, plus the never explicitly stated understanding that all reactions are possible is all there is to chemistry --- "the details are left as an exercise for the student/reader."

"evolution is just a theory"

Evolution is fact/observation; mechanisms of evolution are theories/hypotheses to be investigated.

If one loosely defines activities of natural scientists as "observations and predictions of the properties and interactions of matter and energy," physicists have the luxury of dealing with operationally defined properties, and life scientists are faced with choosing operations to construct definitions.

 

[Hector Mata]

Jerry March, Advanced Organic Chemistry, puts all those hundreds (thousands?) of "name reactions" into a nice, tidy perspective --- there are only seven reactions in ALL of the whole field of chemistry; that, plus the never explicitly stated understanding that all reactions are possible is all there is to chemistry --- "the details are left as an exercise for the student/reader."

I wish someone had told me that when I went through two semesters of organic chemistry !

I said:

...And so they (rightly) point out that evolution is a demonstrable fact, and by "theory" they mean something more like "the set of ideas that explain the phenomena we observe, and correctly predict phenomena yet to be observed at the time they were formulated"

Then:

Evolution is fact/observation; mechanisms of evolution are theories/hypotheses to be investigated.

I think we agree, more or less.

Anyway, back to the point of the article that began this discussion: do you know if there's such a thing as a "theoretical" chemist or biologist? I remember that in the case of biology there was (is?) a debate about the mechanism at work in evolution: gradualism vs. punctuated equilibrium. I understand the article (and the OP) to be wondering if these sorts of (theoretical?) disagreements, and the debates/experiments/observations by experts that attempt to settle them, merit the label "theoretical investigations". It would seem to me that they do, although the biology faculty at the particular university cited in this case seem to disagree.

 

[Bystander]

I wish someone had told me that when I went through two semesters of organic chemistry !

You and me both.

I think we agree, more or less.

"More," I suspect. That was a very sloppy transition of subject matter on my part. My bad.

such a thing as a "theoretical" chemist

Certainly, and every bit as dangerous in a lab as are theoretical physicists.

or biologist?

Perhaps not recognized as such by biologists (don't know one way or the other), but certainly biologists who recognize various behaviors/phenomena as representative of classes to be examined as classes, those who study populations, and by now I've got my neck stuck out far enough for @Ryan_m_b to chop it off.

Something else to keep in mind is that physics and chemistry have undergone fairly recent "reformations," cleaning out two millennia of just plain useless ideas; biology, and life sciences in general, have only recently, since the reformations in physics and chemistry, microscopes, polymerase chain reaction, etc., acquired the tools to actively investigate and sort through a two to three millennia accumulation of very detailed observations on everything from Galen's anatomy and physiology (good stuff), to folklore about spontaneous generation of life. Yes, the life sciences appear somewhat disorganized, but there's an enormous amount of information that can't just be pitched for the sake of a whole new start as was the case in the physical sciences.

 

[atyy]

First of all, what I'm citing is an opinion piece, so I don't intend to pass it off as a "peer-reviewed" idea. Still, I think it needs to be addressed because I never realized that this significant difference is present between physics and chemistry/biology.

There isn't. I wouldn't take such claims seriously. It would be like saying there is a significant difference present between high energy physics and condensed matter.

 

[atyy]

Anyway, back to the point of the article that began this discussion: do you know if there's such a thing as a "theoretical" chemist or biologist? I remember that in the case of biology there was (is?) a debate about the mechanism at work in evolution: gradualism vs. punctuated equilibrium. I understand the article (and the OP) to be wondering if these sorts of (theoretical?) disagreements, and the debates/experiments/observations by experts that attempt to settle them, merit the label "theoretical investigations". It would seem to me that they do, although the biology faculty at the particular university cited in this case seem to disagree.

Yes, that absolutely is theoretical biology. Just as in condensed matter we want to know what convenient emergent degrees of freedom are (eg. cooper pairs, phonons etc in superconductivity) which usually takes some guess work and there may not be a unique answer, these questions in evolution are about the convenient emergent degrees of freedom. There are still entertaining debates going on. eg. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20740005 and the multiple comments that followed it.

Also, some of the great theorists in biology also did experiments, eg. Hodgkin and Huxley. However, there are others who don't do experiments, eg. Carl van Vreeswijk, Haim Sompolinsky or Nicolas Brunel. (OK, many of these had physics backgrounds, eg. Hodgkin worked on radar in the Second World War.)

 

[martinbn]

There isn't. I wouldn't take such claims seriously. It would be like saying there is a significant difference present between high energy physics and condensed matter.

I think there is at least one significant difference, the amount of maths used at all levels. For example an introductory college course in physics will use quantitative methods, while a biology one could have zero maths.

 

[Andy Resnick]

First of all, what I'm citing is an opinion piece, so I don't intend to pass it off as a "peer-reviewed" idea. Still, I think it needs to be addressed because I never realized that this significant difference is present between physics and chemistry/biology.

The opinion piece was uploaded to Arxiv and can be found here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00273

<snip>

Nice article- thanks for posting the link. Section 'D' is especially noteworthy, IMO. Also noteworthy is the distinction that author draws (on page 4) between testing Physics theories and Biology theories. It's worth pointing out that most of the non-Physics sciences (Biology, Chemistry, Physiology, etc.) are moving towards quantitation for this very reason.

 

[Andy Resnick]

As a physical chemist, neither "flesh nor fowl," I'll submit the observation that "the natural sciences" exist on a continuum ranging from the clean, well-defined systems investigated by physicists and subject to the seven(?) conservation laws, to the incredibly complex, messy systems of the "real world." The language and conventions that have grown up around studies of "real systems" includes the same words, and similar context, but can NOT be directly transliterated from one end of the continuum to the other.

This is old-school thinking. The best counter-example is the growing field of soft condensed matter.

Edit- also, consider the scope of these recent texts:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/3764378050/?tag=pfamazon01-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521036356/?tag=pfamazon01-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1441931961/?tag=pfamazon01-20

 

[Andy Resnick]

There isn't. I wouldn't take such claims seriously. It would be like saying there is a significant difference present between high energy physics and condensed matter.

I disagree- in terms of pedagogical approaches, there are clear and profound differences between a biology class and a physics class. In terms of research, I agree that *the* scientific method can be fruitfully applied to all sciences.

 

[atyy]

I think there is at least one significant difference, the amount of maths used at all levels. For example an introductory college course in physics will use quantitative methods, while a biology one could have zero maths.

It is increasingly rare. Usually, even classical biology requires the natural numbers, eg. 2 eyes versus 3 eyes.

There is also classical Mendelian genetics and population genetics, both of which are mathematical.

 

[atyy]

I disagree- in terms of pedagogical approaches, there are clear and profound differences between a biology class and a physics class. In terms of research, I agree that *the* scientific method can be fruitfully applied to all sciences.

Well, I think a physics class can be just as entertaining as an introductory biology class. It is true that one gets to see pond skaters and cockroaches in biology, but I think there are many demonstrations in physics that are just as interesting.

 

[atyy]

Well, if there is any difference, maybe it is with p6 of the paper in the OP:

"Perhaps the most fundamental of these is that there exists an objective physical reality for us to describe! On top of this we stack all manner of other assumptions: causality, locality, etc. I would wager that there are very few NSF grant proposals that begin with something like “Assuming that there is an objective physical reality, and that causality and locality are safe bets, we propose to study the synthesis of insulin in...” I don’t know if I would go to this level in my courses, either."

That is the view in biology, and in many (attempted) interpretations of quantum mechanics. But would all physicists agree?

Certainly, causality and locality are not safe bets in quantum mechanics, regardless of interpretation.

 

[Andy Resnick]

Well, I think a physics class can be just as entertaining as an introductory biology class. It is true that one gets to see pond skaters and cockroaches in biology, but I think there are many demonstrations in physics that are just as interesting.

You do realize this is a silly thing to say, right?

Never mind that constructs like "hard sphere gas" or "smooth, frictionless surface" simply have no analogy in biology...

 

[atyy]

You do realize this is a silly thing to say, right?

Never mind that constructs like "hard sphere gas" or "smooth, frictionless surface" simply have no analogy in biology...

Hmm, no, I don't think it is silly. In what way do you think biology pedagogy is different from physics?

If you're talking about idealizations, there are also idealizations in biology, eg. the concept of species or the integrate and fire neuron.

 

[Andy Resnick]

Hmm, no, I don't think it is silly. In what way do you think biology pedagogy is different from physics?

If you're talking about idealizations, there are also idealizations in biology, eg. the concept of species or the integrate and fire neuron.

The second thing first- that is not analogous at all. In Physics, those conceptual devices (and many others), while idealizations, are in some sense a semi-rigorously defined limit; the limiting case is taken to reproduce the essential features which often account for >90% of the observed phenomenon. Physical models are more accurate the more abstraction is present; this is the opposite of biology- the details matter.

Claiming 'species' as a meaningful idealization is specious.

In terms of pedagogy, as I said there are clear differences in the curricula- in many biology classes, the emphasis is on memorizing a large set of names (gross anatomy), or signalling networks (cell physiology), or biochemical reactions (O-Chem), etc. and 'problem solving' means using logical reasoning to figure out which of the many possible choices is correct. In Physics, the emphasis is on memorizing a small number of rules and creatively applying them to many different phenomena. Physics problems are guided by an underlying theoretical construct; this is not the case for 'RNA World'. There is no 'theory of RNA' to learn.

The central dogma of molecular biology is routinely violated- the protein sequence is insufficient to determine the function (protein folding is essential, and the structure/function relationship is not yet known). Post-translational modification of proteins by carbohydrates, lipids, and other groups results in non-genetically coded protein function. Proteins traffic back to the nucleus and stimulate or inhibit the transcription of other genes- the flow of information is a loop, not linear. By contrast, the law of conservation of energy is not violated under any condition. These essential differences force the pedagogy to differ.

 

[martinbn]

It is increasingly rare. Usually, even classical biology requires the natural numbers, eg. 2 eyes versus 3 eyes.

There is also classical Mendelian genetics and population genetics, both of which are mathematical.

My point precisely, two eyes versus three eyes.

 

[atyy]

The second thing first- that is not analogous at all. In Physics, those conceptual devices (and many others), while idealizations, are in some sense a semi-rigorously defined limit; the limiting case is taken to reproduce the essential features which often account for >90% of the observed phenomenon. Physical models are more accurate the more abstraction is present; this is the opposite of biology- the details matter.

That depends on how one defines "observed phenomena". In many ways, the models of physics like Newtonian mechanics are not 90% accurate. Newtonian mechanics can be off by orders of magnitude, once one takes relativity into account. Similarly, classical physics can be off by orders of magnitude, once one takes quantum mechanics into account.

Claiming 'species' as a meaningful idealization is specious.

Why? To me, "species" is a concept like "atom". Both are useful idealizations that breakdown as fundamental concepts.

In terms of pedagogy, as I said there are clear differences in the curricula- in many biology classes, the emphasis is on memorizing a large set of names (gross anatomy), or signalling networks (cell physiology), or biochemical reactions (O-Chem), etc. and 'problem solving' means using logical reasoning to figure out which of the many possible choices is correct. In Physics, the emphasis is on memorizing a small number of rules and creatively applying them to many different phenomena.

Yes, there are some subjects in biology in which extensive memorization cannot be avoided. However, that is only in certain advanced classes. Neither cell signalling nor classical biochemistry need be taught by memorization, since there is so much to remember that it is only meaningful to domain specialists. I'm terrible with biochemistry, but I can say that the class I took was completely open book and open note (I can't remember what questions they asked in exams, I vaguely remember lots of mechanism questions). I remember the cell signalling class I took quite clearly, and there was very little memorization. Rather, the emphasis was on experimental design and logic.

Physics problems are guided by an underlying theoretical construct; this is not the case for 'RNA World'. There is no 'theory of RNA' to learn.

There is a theory of RNA to learn. They key idea of the RNA world hypothesis is that RNA has autocatalytic properties and can catalyze its own synthesis. That is how the hypothesis is motivated in the text by Alberts and colleagues http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK26876/

The central dogma of molecular biology is routinely violated- the protein sequence is insufficient to determine the function (protein folding is essential, and the structure/function relationship is not yet known). Post-translational modification of proteins by carbohydrates, lipids, and other groups results in non-genetically coded protein function. Proteins traffic back to the nucleus and stimulate or inhibit the transcription of other genes- the flow of information is a loop, not linear. By contrast, the law of conservation of energy is not violated under any condition. These essential differences force the pedagogy to differ.

Newtonian physics and classical physics are also routinely violated. Energy conservation is not violated in biology either, and it is one of the principles of biology.

 

[Andy Resnick]

That depends on how one defines "observed phenomena". In many ways, the models of physics like Newtonian mechanics are not 90% accurate. Newtonian mechanics can be off by orders of magnitude, once one takes relativity into account. Similarly, classical physics can be off by orders of magnitude, once one takes quantum mechanics into account.

That's not really true- classical physics (especially continuum mechanics) is a highly accurate model for the great majority of human experience. Remember, biology is (currently) constrained to be on Earth and low Earth orbit- the applicability of physics is far greater in spatial and temporal extent than biology. Let's compare oranges and oranges... :)

Why? To me, "species" is a concept like "atom". Both are useful idealizations that breakdown as fundamental concepts.

Taxonomy (like adaptation) is an organizing principle without predictive power. If there is an 'atom' in biology, it's 'cell'. And again, 'cell' provides little to no insight about tissues, organs, organisms, populations. This is not the case for the periodic table- one can go from atom to molecule to polymer, crystals... (and back again) fairly easily.

Newtonian physics and classical physics are also routinely violated. Energy conservation is not violated in biology either, and it is one of the principles of biology.

This is not what I meant at all. I meant that Biology has yet to find its Newton.

Let me be clear- I am trying to restrict my comments to how the subjects are taught in the classroom, especially introductory classes. All scientific fields have a lot in common at the bleeding edge- this is the legacy of several decades of 'multidisciplinary' research.

 

[atyy]

This is not what I meant at all. I meant that Biology has yet to find its Newton.

Let me be clear- I am trying to restrict my comments to how the subjects are taught in the classroom, especially introductory classes. All scientific fields have a lot in common at the bleeding edge- this is the legacy of several decades of 'multidisciplinary' research.

Well, we mostly agree on the latter I think. For example, my reading of your work is that you are a physicist and a biologist - and that biology is not a separate field distinct from physics, rather it is a subfield of physics, just like solid state physics, statistical mechanics, nuclear physics, high energy physics and maybe even string theory are subfields of physics.

OK, I may not be right on that since I have taken the liberty there of "interpreting" your research approach. But if my reading is right, then the only question is how far that extends into the classroom. Given that there cannot be any true divide between the leading edge and what is taught in the classroom, since school kids nowadays learn energy conservation in primary school and Newtonian mechanics in secondary school, there isn't a necessary divide in the pedagogy either.

Actual pedagogy may of course be culture-dependent. My example of the pond skater is from my own experience in primary school (grades 1-6) in Singapore decades ago, when we were introduced to the pond skater in almost the same breath as energy conservation and phase transitions in a single subject called "science".

 

[Andy Resnick]

Well, we mostly agree on the latter I think. For example, my reading of your work is that you are a physicist and a biologist - and that biology is not a separate field distinct from physics, rather it is a subfield of physics, just like solid state physics, statistical mechanics, nuclear physics, high energy physics and maybe even string theory are subfields of physics.

I would not subordinate biology to physics- the mix of the two could be 'biophysics". For myself, there are elements of physics, engineering, and physiology in my published work.

<snip>there isn't a necessary divide in the pedagogy either.

See for yourself- here's the textbook we use for BIO 200:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0321775651/?tag=pfamazon01-20

Compare this with (for example) Halliday, Resnick, and Walker. Especially compare the homework problems. Examples from Campbell typically ask the student for formulate multiple (potentially equivalent) testable hypotheses- can you imagine a Physics homework problem asking for alternate solutions? There is simply *no* (ok, maybe a minuscule tiny amount of) quantification in Introductory Biology courses, and that in itself is a profound pedagogical difference with Introductory Physics.

 

[atyy]

I would not subordinate biology to physics- the mix of the two could be 'biophysics". For myself, there are elements of physics, engineering, and physiology in my published work.

Thanks for the perspective!

See for yourself- here's the textbook we use for BIO 200:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0321775651/?tag=pfamazon01-20

Compare this with (for example) Halliday, Resnick, and Walker. Especially compare the homework problems. Examples from Campbell typically ask the student for formulate multiple (potentially equivalent) testable hypotheses- can you imagine a Physics homework problem asking for alternate solutions? There is simply *no* (ok, maybe a minuscule tiny amount of) quantification in Introductory Biology courses, and that in itself is a profound pedagogical difference with Introductory Physics.

Maybe it is cultural. I've read many books on the level of Campbell, but have never looked at their problems.

At the level of Campbell, there is probability and statistics, and the concepts of null hypothesis, chi-squared test etc, which is essentially the same reasoning used to discover the Higgs boson. The corresponding physics level has the constant acceleration formulas F=ma, v=ut+at^2/2, F=uN, F =GMm/r^2. I'm not sure I'd call those more mathematically advanced than the probability and statistics one learns in genetics. They don't seem much more advanced than the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium condition, so I'm not sure I'd say the difference is profound.

Perhaps a case can be made by noting that in physics the calculus is introduced earlier. Is some mathematical threshold crossed with the calculus? Or can we just say calculus is all just a simple extension of speed = distance/time (differentiation) and distance = speed * time (integration and the fundamental theorem of calculus), and the idea that small part of a nonlinear function can be well approximated by a straight line (Taylor series)?

 

[Andy Resnick]

Perhaps a case can be made by noting that in physics the calculus is introduced earlier. Is some mathematical threshold crossed with the calculus? Or can we just say calculus is all just a simple extension of speed = distance/time (differentiation) and distance = speed * time (integration and the fundamental theorem of calculus), and the idea that small part of a nonlinear function can be well approximated by a straight line (Taylor series)?

I guess I don't understand what you are trying to say- at least, I don't understand how this supports your (apparent) disagreement with the OP and quoted manuscript.

 

[atyy]

I guess I don't understand what you are trying to say- at least, I don't understand how this supports your (apparent) disagreement with the OP and quoted manuscript.

Here I am trying to see if I can agree with you at the start by highlighting calculus as a something different that physics uses early, and biology late. Then I try to state the counterargument (my point of view) that the advanced mathematics of physics is not really more advanced than the mathematics used in biology. My point of view is that the non-rigourous mathematics used in physics - up to the level of Weinberg's QFT text - is essentially simple. I concede that rigourous mathematics is something else.

However, with respect to the question in the OP, I think our whole discussion is tangential. There the paper in the OP raised the possibility that there is a fundamental difference in the philosophy of science between biology and physics. That is simply not true. I have been taking it that everyone (including you) agrees on this, and the discussion on pedagogical approach is tangential.

Or have I misunderstood you on that point?

 

[atyy]

For the case that biology does contain "advanced mathematics" take a look at http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/networks_isi/turin_web.pdf. If you click on the pictures in his slides, you will get a link to the source. For example, the picture on slide 13 links to http://www.sbgn.org/Main_Page .

And yes, even very "simple" theories can lead to testable predictions. An example is the idea that the basal ganglia's action on the cortex is two disinhibitory pathways http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK10847/figure/A1253/?report=objectonly. All we have here are arrows and signs of interactions, no quantification as to the strength of the interaction. Yet this theory led to deep brain stimulation! In turn the success of deep brain stimulation is showing how inadequate the simple theory is (which biologists of course already knew from many other things before deep brain stimulation), despite its success. This is in turn leading to more experiments and theory to better understand the basal ganglia. (Of course, biologists, doctors and engineers apart, the drug addicts played a very important role - see MPTP.)



If one thinks about it, classical genetics and the whole theory (yes, theory!) of ordering and complementation groups is a complete mathematical theory. It is complete in mathematical coherence like Newton's theory. And it is also incomplete, like Newton's theory relative to special relativity.

Even older theories such as the tonotopic organization of the ear, postulated in the late 1800s, and confirmed around 1930, with many refinements in measurement including significant ones in the 1970s and 1980s, are the basis of another successful technology - the cochlear implant.

But again, look at the Baez paper - "qualitative" does not mean non-mathematical.

 

[atyy]

Another objection. The paper in the OP writes "Though it may be possible to develop models that speak to such questions, these models likely aren’t contingent upon the veracity of Natural Selection, and thus these models do not grant falsification power."

I hope he does not mean to say that natural selection cannot be falsified. In fact, Darwin himself already knew examples in which natural selection is falsified. [bolding below is mine, I also note that there is some sloppiness in the quoted statement below.]
http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/sexual-selection-13255240
Charles Darwin proposed that all living species were derived from common ancestors. The primary mechanism he proposed to explain this fact was natural selection: that is, that organisms better adapted to their environment would benefit from higher rates of survival than those less well equipped to do so. However he noted that there were many examples of elaborate, and apparently non-adaptive, sexual traits that would clearly not aid in the survival of their bearers. He suggested that such traits might evolve if they are sexually selected, that is if they increase the individual's reproductive success, even at the expense of their survival (Darwin 1871).

 

[Andy Resnick]

<snip>

Or have I misunderstood you on that point?

You did indeed- the abstract states quite clearly:

'I was surprised to find that perceptions of scientific pedagogy varied significantly among the scientific disciplines, especially concerning issues of philosophy of science and epistemology, manifested in the approaches to teaching theoretical concepts and their development.'

As I repeatedly stated, my remarks were restricted to *pedagogical* differences for *introductory* courses.

 

[atyy]

You did indeed- the abstract states quite clearly:

'I was surprised to find that perceptions of scientific pedagogy varied significantly among the scientific disciplines, especially concerning issues of philosophy of science and epistemology, manifested in the approaches to teaching theoretical concepts and their development.'

As I repeatedly stated, my remarks were restricted to *pedagogical* differences for *introductory* courses.

But how about the emphasis on "philosophy of science and epistemology?" If anything, biology puts hypothesis testing up front and quantitatively in genetics. That is exactly the same method used in discovering the Higgs boson.

So far we have mainly discussed how "advanced" the mathematics used is, which is really tangential to "philosophy of science and epistemology".

 

[Andy Resnick]

I feel trapped in a Kurosawa movie...

 

[atyy]

I feel trapped in a Kurosawa movie...

Well, we shall just have to disagree then, since our experiences in biology are different. Mine was as a student, having done biology at every level, but never having taught it - and as an amateur in physics, also having taught freshman physics. Yours is as a professional physicist, and now addressing the question as one also teaching introductory biology.

But I have to ask then - if there is a difference - then how do things "make sense as a whole"? Is there something missing in introductory biology as well as introductory physics, and biology and physics bring complementary perspectives? Or is there a clash of cultures, with one view being inferior or contradictory or less general to the other?

Also, if you use a different philosophy in research, why don't you teach that philosophy to your students? Don't you want your students to have the best and most modern view?

I will now make it a point to watch some Kurosawa :)

 

[atyy]

As I have said repeatedly throughout this thread, I believe the thesis of the paper in the OP is wrong. It does not describe any level of biology education that I had. And yes, I acknowledge that Andy Resnick is an expert in this area, and I am quite intrigued (and disturbed) that he gives the paper in the OP support.

So I want to add yet another point of rebuttal to the paper. Section D of the paper describes the postulation "What if gases are made up of tiny particles, too small to see, and they just bounce around inside of a volume and don’t interact with one another?". What I wish to stress is that this sort of postulation is not unique to physics, and that Mendel's postulate of a gene and its independent assortment is an analogous sort of theorization.

Another articulation of that analogy is found in http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3176118/.

One of the great theories of biology is evolution. Evolution is analogous to cosmology in that both ask questions of history. The interplay of particle physics and cosmology described in http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-ph/0201178 is analogous to the interplay of the laws of inheritance and evolution named the "modern synthesis".