Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

In summary, Chalmers argues that while physical explanation is sufficient for explaining structures and functions in many domains, it is unable to fully explain conscious experience. This is because conscious experience is not just a matter of structures and functions, but also involves the subjective experience of being aware. This cannot be reduced to purely physical processes, as it is conceptually coherent that these processes could exist without experience. While physical explanations have been successful in many other domains, they are unable to fully explain consciousness. This is because consciousness is a unique and puzzling phenomenon that cannot be fully understood through reductionist methods.
  • #36
Originally posted by Mentat
Might I suggest a few books?

A Universe of Consciousness, Gerald Edelmann
Bright air, Brillian Fire, Gerald Edelmann
The Emotional Brain, Joseph LeDoux
Synaptic Self, Joseph LeDoux
The Cerebral Code: thinking a though in the mosaics of the mind, William Calvin.


I asked for an example of a plausible theory showing that consciousness is brain. Which one of these is your proposed example? (The truth is that there is no example. There are conjectures and hypotheses, some of them, like Dennett's, quite elaborate. But nothing deserving to be called a theory).

Agnosticism is almost always the best way.
I agree that not making assumptions is always the best way. But there's no inherent virtue in agnosticism.

Actually, to take a third-party approach, and remain rational, he must indeed assume that my statements about my own phenomenological experience are true.
Not in my opinion, but it's a small point.

It's like an anthropologist who goes off to study the rituals and culture of a tribe that worships the god, Feenoman. Let's say that there are two tribes that worship Feenoman, but there are slightly different ideas of what Feenoman is really like, differing between the two tribes (one might say that He has blue eyes, while the other says He has black ones; one might say He has long hair, another might say He's bald; etc). Now, an anthropologist would surely take the objective approach, and never contradict the beliefs of one tribe, simply because the previous tribe said something different about Feenoman. And, if one of the tribesmen should start to appreciate the anthropologist's objective approach, this one too might become a Feenomanologist (I love that pun :smile:) and begin to view his previous god as a fictious character, subject to the interpretations and varying preferences of different tribes.

We are the Feenoman-woshipers, in Dennett's view, and an objective (anthropologist-like) approach needs to be taken before we will ever understand the true nature of phenomenology.

Imo that is an incorrext use of the Feenoman example, and not Dennett's argument.

What exactly do you disagree with?
You said that the heterophenomenological approach deals with subjective experience. But that is precisely what it doesn't deal with. Dennett's argument, stripped to the basics, is functionalist, not much different to the arguments of Watson and Skinner, It is a 'black box, approach in which consciousness is reduced to the behavioural signs of consciousness. Subjective feelings are left out of his theory entirely.

Very true. However, it's my opinion that the reason scientists don't ever mention the heterophenomenological approach is because objectivism is taken for granted by the Scientific Method.
I think you're probably right. This is my complaint.

Well, I gave a brief summary of the "hexagon" theory of William Calvin, in the thread "Correlates of Consciousness".
There is no self-consistent and plausible physicalist theory of consciousness. I'll risk stating that as a bald fact to make it easy for you to find a single exception. (I'll check the thread and respond there to 'hexagon' theory).

Yeah, I can see that. Of course, when looking for a scientific theory of consciousness, one does wish to appeal to the scientists conducting the study, right?
Very true. But there's no point in a theory that appeals to scientists but doesn't stand up to logical analysis.
 
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  • #37
Originally posted by Canute
I'm afraid I don't know anything about Tathagata and so forth, or the sutras.
To me the indestructible Tathagata Womb is the conceptual essence of Buddhism. You find the Womb in the: http://www.buddhistinformation.com/Lankavatara_sutra.htm .
This link might be useful. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/iti/iti4.html#112 [Broken] .
The essence of the Universal Womb as explained in the Anuradha Sutta . Buddha: "Very good, Anuradha. Very good. Both formerly & now, it is only stress that I describe, and the cessation of stress."
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn22-086.html [Broken] ( Samyutta Nikaya XXII.86 - the Anuradha Sutta)
Please note that Buddha himself is also called the Tathagata.

Originally posted by Canute
But I have some questions if you don't mind. What's the relationship between emptiness and the membrane?
The Tathagata Womb is stress (Elasticity that gives in the dual worlds interconnectivity and attraction: gravity). We can use the 'image' membrane as a human concept to present that 'stress'.
The Womb represents Sunyata (emptiness).
This emptiness is transformed (restructured) in local events.
The local events contain basic duality (like photons) or very complex combinations of duality (like we human are).
The local events have a lifetime ... so 'time' comes in.
Between the local events we see Tratityasamutpada (interdependent causality - the Karmatic wheel). That causes suffering (stress on a local level), which is a local (human) attraction to other dual structures. If you want to overcome Samsara you have to reduce the stress in yourself (being attracted to dual forms).

Originally posted by Canute
Doesn't the idea of a physical membrane being fundamental to existence contradict Buddhist ontology completely?
No. What is 'physical' in Buddhism? Where does it stops? Does it exists? When I say a 'real' membrane I mean a basic boundary that has dynamics (the property of stress). That indestructible membrane will always be embedded in the localities (holons) once the infolding begins.
Matter and energy are just different 'appearances' of the membrane.

Originally posted by Canute
How does this theory account for the existence of the membrane in the first place? What is the membrane made of?
.
Seen from the human world the membrane can be represented as singularity. We can use the image of a single basic 'string' which is hollow or a hollow membrane-sphere, which are in fact both the same.
The 'material/energy' of the membrane? You want me to give the answer that Siddartha Gautama didn't gave himself? He gave us 'stress' and 'indestructible'. ;-).

Based on this two elements I offer an engineering concept of how their combination gives locally zones in which duality is joined, and where the coupling creates super-stress.
 
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  • #38
I must admit that I have no idea what you're talking about. I'm not saying that means you're wrong, but it seems a very strange interpretation of the concepts involved.
 
  • #39
Originally posted by Canute
I must admit that I have no idea what you're talking about. I'm not saying that means you're wrong, but it seems a very strange interpretation of the concepts involved.
Canute ... I had to use semantics and show images but that seems not enough. Your non-understanding is because you look to them with eyes and spectacles of duality. But that OK. My message will work in your unconsciousness because that remembers. I was talking about an universal system that is present in yourself. That emptiness is present in all of us. I wish you success in your path which surely has the right intention. I will stop here, there is no more to say on this.
 
  • #40
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Again, disanalogous cases. The vitalists had only to explain those physical processes directly observable to them; they never had to ask, "why is it that reproduction, growth, etc. are accompanied with life?" On the other hand, when we analyze the brain we are compelled to ask "why is it that brain processing is accompanied with consciousness?"

The "mystification" of consciousness is not a human invention; it is built into the problem itself. That is why the problem is so hard.

Ok, what of Edelman and Giulio, quoted here.
 
  • #41
Originally posted by Fliption
Canute the following is a link to a thread by hypnagogue where this interaction question is addressed. I personally found it to be a compelling argument and didn't see a rebuttal that came close to killing it. You might want to take a look at it if you haven't already.


https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=6793

For what it's worth, I also think the argument is very interesting. I don't think I've countered it well enough to disqualify the possibility. However, it has done nothing to explain the consciousness of an individual not connected to the matrix. If the person is "unplugged" from the matrix (as in the movies), that person would still be conscious, but there would be no duality involved (unless you want to go for infinite regress), and this justification of a certain "duality" doesn't solve any of the problems of consciousness.
 
  • #42
Originally posted by Mentat
For what it's worth, I also think the argument is very interesting. I don't think I've countered it well enough to disqualify the possibility. However, it has done nothing to explain the consciousness of an individual not connected to the matrix. If the person is "unplugged" from the matrix (as in the movies), that person would still be conscious, but there would be no duality involved (unless you want to go for infinite regress), and this justification of a certain "duality" doesn't solve any of the problems of consciousness.

I agree-- the purpose of that thread is only to show that dualism is not logically impossible by showing one case where it seems to hold. In the bigger picture, this should prevent categorical denial of dualism from the logical impossiblity argument, and force people to seriously consider specific claims about dualism on a case by case basis.
 
  • #43
Originally posted by pelastration
Canute ... I had to use semantics and show images but that seems not enough. Your non-understanding is because you look to them with eyes and spectacles of duality. But that OK. My message will work in your unconsciousness because that remembers. I was talking about an universal system that is present in yourself. That emptiness is present in all of us. I wish you success in your path which surely has the right intention. I will stop here, there is no more to say on this.
Well, I agree that reality is ultimately non-dual, and that emptiness is at the heart of all things, including me. But I don't agree with tubes and stuff. You seem to be assigning attributes to emptiness, and that seems to be a conceptual error. But perhaps I've misunderstood you.
 
  • #44
Originally posted by Canute
Well, I agree that reality is ultimately non-dual, and that emptiness is at the heart of all things, including me. But I don't agree with tubes and stuff. You seem to be assigning attributes to emptiness, and that seems to be a conceptual error. But perhaps I've misunderstood you.
Our level of reality in life and science is Dual. The friction of that local duality causes tension (= suffering).
I suggest you think for ourself if duality is possible without ISOLATION, a boundary. What happens with two different energies (ie. + and -) when they are meeting but are not isolated?
 
  • #45
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I agree-- the purpose of that thread is only to show that dualism is not logically impossible by showing one case where it seems to hold. In the bigger picture, this should prevent categorical denial of dualism from the logical impossiblity argument, and force people to seriously consider specific claims about dualism on a case by case basis.

But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious? The Materialistic approach is that the whole conscious process is physical. The idealistic approach is that it is all mental. The Dualistic approach is that it is both, and this approach doesn't get us any closer to understanding consciousness - even if there is a logically feasible way for us to have a sort of dualism going on in our minds.
 
  • #46
Originally posted by Mentat
But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious?

Yes-- but of course, this end cannot even be approached if we reject dualism on grounds of logical impossibility.
 
  • #47
Originally posted by Mentat
But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious? The Materialistic approach is that the whole conscious process is physical. The idealistic approach is that it is all mental. The Dualistic approach is that it is both, and this approach doesn't get us any closer to understanding consciousness - even if there is a logically feasible way for us to have a sort of dualism going on in our minds.
Just to disagree with Hypnogogue for once - monism, dualism, pluralism, materialism and idealism are related in much more complicated ways than this. Mind-body dualism may help explain consciousness, and may not. We don't know yet. Many, including Dan Dennett, think dualism is illogical (so do I, but I haven't read the thread hypno referred to as showing an exception).

One can be either a materialist or an idealist and still be a dualist (or not). There are all sorts of variations.

Hypno - where was your argument for dualism - I missed it.
 
  • #48
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yes-- but of course, this end cannot even be approached if we reject dualism on grounds of logical impossibility.

Well, we should remain open-minded. However, if Materialism makes no claims that are illogical or that lead to infinite regress, and provides a possible explanation of consciousness, then I would suggest that we drop Dualism in favor of Materialism. Yet, it remains to be seen if Materialism really can do all of those things.
 
  • #49
But materialism and dualism are not incompatable. They are not opposites. The definition of materialism is horribly vague. Some materialists also espouse epiphenomenalism. Also dualism may be substance dualism or aspect dualism. They are quite different. It's all a bit of a mess.
 
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  • #50
Originally posted by Canute
But materialism and dualism are not incompatable. They are not opposites. The definition of materialism is horribly vague. Some materialists also espouse epiphenomenalism. Also dualism may be substance dualism or aspect dualism. They are quite different. It's all a bit of a mess.

But, according to this dictionary of Philosophy, Materialism should never refer to anything non-physical. Any reference to such things would put it in the realm of Dualism. Perhaps many things that have been considered "Materialistic" in the past, are not really so?
 
  • #51
It's confusing. The modern term is 'physicalism', which says quite simply that nothing non-physical exists.

However consciousness is a problem in this view. Some physicalists get around this by saying that there is a physical basis for every mental phenomonon, and that feelings, concepts, etc are 'epiphenomenal', non-causal and no more than the steam from a train whistle.

The problem with this is that it is essentially dualism in disguise. Also it ignores the fact that Huxley, who coined the train analogy, was referring to a train that was driven very causally by exactly the same sort of steam. It is also strange that there is no other known case of something being physically caused but not physically causal.

As I see it strict physicalism must assume that feelings, concepts etc. are physical, not an easy position to defend.
 
  • #52
if materialists believe that thoughts, feelings and emotions et al are the result of a chemical reaction or a shooting electron, WHAT triggers the reaction or electron??

imho, condciousness creates the physical and it's attributes. why would the same electron or same chemical reaction create two different behaviors?? even identical twins, with so much in common, are separate and distinct individuals.

peace,
 
  • #53
Originally posted by olde drunk
if materialists believe that thoughts, feelings and emotions et al are the result of a chemical reaction or a shooting electron, WHAT triggers the reaction or electron?

Strictly speaking physicalism is stronger than that. It claims feelings ARE physical, not just physically caused.
 
  • #54
Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

I think we should be much more careful here.Maybe we will never have sufficient reasons to think that consciousness can be reduced at the laws of physics and chemistry indeed.But this does not mean automatically that consciousness,at least qualia,are fundamental features of reality.

The possible incapacity to explain some features of consciousness could also be attributed to our inability to detect all sufficient causes (implying very faint interactions in the neural network) which creates conscious experience (for example the lack of sufficiently precise measurement devices) or a too high complexity (after all human brain is one of the most complex things in the universe).Moreover there could be implied final limitations,for example if consciousness is a chaotic phenomenon,given also its huge complexity,I am not so sure we will ever be able to prove that conscious experience can be reduced at the laws of physics.The simple fact that reductionism,possible,cannot be proved with sufficient reasons does not entail also the conclusion that consciousness do not reduce in reality at physical laws.

Moreover since science has still epistemological privilege,rationality is based only on observed facts studied with the best existing empirical method,the best existing scientific theory will be considered the standard of knowledge in spite of the existence of some phenomena that cannot (still) be 'reduced' to the theory.We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach (which by the way is not reductionist though it let's the door open to find further that consciousness can be reduced at the laws of nature).Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.

Only if the computational emergentist theory will become theoretically and empirically stagnant,for a very long period of time,with a lot of unsolved puzzles piling up in time,in spite of the sustained efforts of the brightest minds on Earth would we have the right to suspect that there could be something extra,possible non amenable to scientific research.But of course even in this case scientists will continue to prefer the best existing theory...
 
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  • #55
Originally posted by metacristi
The possible incapacity to explain some features of consciousness could also be attributed to our inability to detect all sufficient causes
Not so I'm afraid. There are in principle objections to a purely physical explanation that are nothing to do with our ability to observe or measure the brain.

Moreover since science has still epistemological privilege,
What is 'epistemilogical privelege'? (I keep asking this)

rationality is based only on observed facts studied with the best existing empirical method,
Not in the opinion of most people.

the best existing scientific theory will be considered the standard of knowledge in spite of the existence of some phenomena that cannot (still) be 'reduced' to the theory.
Of course scientists will do this. The question is whether they are right to do it.

We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach
So, if consciousnes is not scientifically explicable then we must have a scientific theory that explains it before we should accept that science can't explain it. Hmm.

Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.
It's not that easy. According to science human-like behaviour does not entail consciousness.

The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.
That suggests that we cannot be certain that 2 things + 2 things always equals 5 things, since we can only be sure by experiment, not by logic.

Only if the computational emergentist theory will become theoretically and empirically stagnant,for a very long period of time,with a lot of unsolved puzzles piling up in time,in spite of the sustained efforts of the brightest minds on Earth would we have the right to suspect that there could be something extra,possible non amenable to scientific research.
I rest my case.

But of course even in this case scientists will continue to prefer the best existing theory... [/B]
But of course.
 
  • #56
Canute

Not so I'm afraid. There are in principle objections to a purely physical explanation that are nothing to do with our ability to observe or measure the brain.

Those are purely philosophical objections Canute,I've explained you this many times in our previous encounters.We need hard facts to have sufficient reasons to think there are such 'principle objections' or,for the moment at least,we do not have them.After all human beings are part of nature and in the absence of any known final limitations there are no good reasons to claim that science cannot understand consciousness.Not yet at least.Anyway even assuming there are such limitations the burden of proof is on the claimant (who make a positive claim) to provide sufficient reasons based on observed facts,the base of rationality.I think you know what a positive claim means.It is a claim of priority in knowledge,I'm afraid philosophical objections are not enough to base them.They can only base a rational skepticism.Nothing more.As I've told you many times before the best existing methodology to establishing the truth about natural facts is the actual variant of the scientific method which is entirely based on observed phenomena .This is why scientific truth has privilege over knowledge,it is the standard of knowledge.In other words it has epistemological privilege.To base a positive claim as yours you must either provide a sufficient reason,based on empirical facts,that science cannot understand consciousness or if you reject the empiricism of science you must provide an alternative method of establishing the truth about natural facts proved superior to the scientific method.


Not in the opinion of most people.

This is not at all relevant.The fact that many people believe something does not make it rational.The criterion of rationality about nature remain the systematic observation of facts.That's why for example the majority of the so called 'common truths' (which people agree about based on very superficial observations) are not reliable unlike scientific statements which are accepted only after carefully observing facts,inferring also from experiments their sufficient causes.Do you have another criterion for rationality?Besides I really doubt that 'most people' will disagree with what I said.


Of course scientists will do this. The question is whether they are right to do it.


You lack some basic knowledge of how scientific method works (sorry to say this...again).Scientific truth is openly accepted as fallible,we can only have different degrees of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a theory.The best existing successful hypothesis (the most confirmed so far) is the theory scientists prefer for all practical purposes but it does not imply final claims.Scientists simply prefer it over all other explanations instead of relying on its (approximative) truth especially in cases where we do not have sufficient empirical reasons to assign a high degree of confidence in it.The existence of few puzzles (facts that cannot be accommodated within a theory) and even some anomalies do not really put a pressure on a scientific theory which is theoretically and experimentally evolving.In the case of consciousness we are far from having a relevant number of the sufficient causes which produce the conscious experience,that's why we do not have yet a holistic hypothesis.Still from the known causes we have the right to propose a conjecture making predictions.And it turns out that now that all new experimental evidence regarding the necessary,at least,causes fit very well with the computationalist approach (including the evolutions in AI).Thus the theory is theoretically and empirically progressive.There is no reason for the moment,especially in the absence of any serious scientific quantum or dualist alternatives experimentally backed,to believe into or prefer other (unscientific for the moment) alternative as standard knowledge.Basically scientists prefer the best approach as the standard of knowledge for the moment,they do not NOT RELY however on the actual theory (which imply a high degree of confidence in its truth,empirically based) for we do not have yet sufficient reasons for that (it's clear we are rather at the beginning of our quest).



We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach

So, if consciousnes is not scientifically explicable then we must have a scientific theory that explains it before we should accept that science can't explain it. Hmm.

Who said that if the computational emergentist approach is disproved then science cannot explain consciousness (the emrgentist approach postulates that consciousness is entirely due to macroscopic interactions between neurons,findings in neurology being enough to base a high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct)?Canute are you able to make the difference between the neurological approach and the so called 'quantum consciousness' alternatives or even the 'interactionist dualism' alternatives?The snag with the second and third proposals is that currently they cannot be considered scientific but nothing impedes one day to find such an alternative,based on empirical facts also [superior or at least equal with the actual approach],implicitly proving [or at least casting a doubt in the previous conclusions] that neurology is not enough.Still till we will provide such a serious alternative there is no good reason to renounce at the computational approach (while openly accepting it is fallible).Those who claim that science cannot explain consciousness must provide an empirically based argument (for even if the assumption '[consciousness] cannot be explained by science' is a prediction of a very successful otherwise scientific theory we are entitled to believe in its truth only after having sufficient reasons that we confirmed it empirically).


Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.

It's not that easy. According to science human-like behaviour does not entail consciousness.

Canute there is no claim here that behaviorism is correct (as a matter of fact it is dead from a long time as a serious scientific hypothesis) but only that from all empirical evidence available there is no good reason to think that such an android is not conscious.Though it is indeed possible that it is not conscious (in spite of the fact that when you ask her the response would be that she is conscious) we need further empirical,sound,evidence to think they are not conscious.The scientific truth is provisional in the vast majority of practical cases so we are open to new facts.Empirical facts.Do you understand what I mean?Those who make blatantly the positive claim that it is not conscious should provide such empirical evidence.But it is entirely rational (based on the philosophical arguments pointing the difficulties of the existing approach) to be skeptical or to say that 'my philosophical opinion is that such an android is not conscious'.


The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.

That suggests that we cannot be certain that 2 things + 2 things always equals 5 things, since we can only be sure by experiment, not by logic.

Purely logical problems have no relevance to empirical facts.Here we go directly from axioms to theorems,truths derived from axioms,whilst in science experiment is the highest authority and we must begin from there in constructing backward our theories.Since we have no proof that logical implications have relevance to natural facts we must always confirm the predictions empirically before assigning a high degree of confidence in their truth even if the premises were absolutely true (empirically based).Anyway in the vast majority of cases we cannot assign a very high degree of confidence (which to entitle us to rely on them) to all the premises so we must always be open to accept they are fallible.Returning at our problem,purely philosophical objections never constitute sufficient reasons,as I've already said experiments remain the highest authority.


I rest my case.

If you define yourself as a rational person you have [NOT!] to do so.There is no rational base to sustain the positive claims you made.At most they are rational as entirely subjective,philosophical,views.If you had additionally some relevant first hand subjective evidence,not amenable for the moment to scientific scrutiny,you would be even entitled to believe (not only to be skeptical) that consciousness cannot be reduced to brain processes (for example subjective evidence that a soul does exist).Of course it would be only a [strictly personal] belief,you would have no base to make the positive claim in exterior (implying epistemological primacy also over the knowledge provided by the scientific method) that a soul does exist if you cannot prove it inter subjectively based on the best method existent,the scientific method (at most you can say you have strong subjective evidence to believe,without any claim of epistemical privilege,that a soul does exist).
 
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  • #57
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute

Those are purely philosophical objections Canute,I've explained you this many times in our previous encounters.
I don't need it explaining. I know already.

We need hard facts to have sufficient reasons to think there are such 'principle objections' or,for the moment at least,we do not have them.
You have a very strange idea of the relationship between deduction and induction. These 'philosophical objections' are no more or less than logical objections. You can't just ignore them. The hypothesis that consciousness can be reduced to matter is a philosophical conjecture. It's got nothing to do with observations. There has never been a single scientific observation that suggests it is true.

After all human beings are part of nature and in the absence of any known final limitations there are no good reasons to claim that science cannot understand consciousness.
It is claimed by many people, including me, that the way science defines itself precludes it from explaining consciousness. Nobody is claiming that consciousness is not part of nature.

Anyway even assuming there are such limitations the burden of proof is on the claimant (who make a positive claim) to provide sufficient reasons based on observed facts,the base of rationality.
So where are the facts supporting science's positive claims that it can explain consciousness?

I think you know what a positive claim means.It is a claim of priority in knowledge,I'm afraid philosophical objections are not enough to base them.
There is no 'priority', there is just what can be proved or disproved by whatever method happens to work. Do you really think that science can be conducted without philosophising?

As I've told you many times before the best existing methodology to establishing the truth about natural facts is the actual variant of the scientific method which is entirely based on observed phenomena.
And I've told you before that I think you're wrong.

This is why scientific truth has privilege over knowledge,it is the standard of knowledge.
What?

In other words it has epistemological privilege.
I you use this term again without defining I'll just give up responding. I'm worn out from asking you what you mean by it.

To base a positive claim as yours you must either provide a sufficient reason,based on empirical facts,that science cannot understand consciousness
You mean like lots of thinkers have already done? Do you imagine that philosophy is not based on empirical facts?

or if you reject the empiricism of science you must provide an alternative method of establishing the truth about natural facts proved superior to the scientific method.
Why does it have to be superior? It just needs to be a way of doing it. Are you allergic to philosophy or something? If you are you won't be able to do any science.

The criterion of rationality about nature remain the systematic observation of facts... snip...Do you have another criterion for rationality?Besides I really doubt that 'most people' will disagree with what I said.
Well I'll disagree. Rationality consists in thinking rationally. It's not the exclusive preserve of any particular sub-discipline of academic study. Also 'facts' may be observed or deduced.

You lack some basic knowledge of how scientific method works (sorry to say this...again).
Very funny.

Scientific truth is openly accepted as fallible,we can only have different degrees of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a theory.
Yes, this is where it differs from philosophical deduction.

The best existing successful hypothesis (the most confirmed so far) is the theory scientists prefer but it does not imply final claims. Scientists simply prefer it over all other explanations instead of relying on its (approximative) truth especially in cases where we do not have sufficient empirical reasons to assign a high degree of confidence in it.
Perhaps you shopuld bear this in mind when you're claiming that science can overcome the logical arguments of many philosophers and explain consciousness.

In the case of consciousness we are far from having a relevant number of the sufficient causes which produce the conscious experience,that's why we do not have yet a holistic hypothesis.Still from the known causes we have the right to propose a conjecture making predictions.And it turns out that now that all new experimental evidence regarding the necessary,at least,causes fit very well with the computationalist approach (including the evolutions in AI).
Sorry but that's nonsense.

Thus the theory is theoretically and empirically progressive.There is no reason for the moment,especially in the absence of any serious scientific quantum or dualist alternatives experimentally backed,to believe into or prefer other (unscientific for the moment) alternative as standard knowledge.
What do you mean 'alternative to standard knowledge'. What standard knowledge? We don't know, that's the whole point. I think you mean standard assumptions.

Who said that if the computational emergentist approach is disproved then science cannot explain consciousness
I don't know. Generally people generalise their objection, and simply say that science cannot explain consciousness. This is sometimes for the simple reason that science can't even define it, and can hardly start explaining it before it's done even this.

{QUOTE](the emrgentist approach postulates that consciousness is entirely due to macroscopic interactions between neurons,findings in neurology being enough to base a high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct)?[/QUOTE]
There is not one shred of evidence that it is correct.

Canute are you able to make the difference between the neurological approach and the so called 'quantum consciousness' alternatives or even the 'interactionist dualism' alternatives?
Yes.

The snag with the second and third proposals is that currently they cannot be considered scientific
I agree. The question remains whether they are right or wrong.

Still till we will provide such a serious alternative there is no good reason to renounce at the computational approach (while openly accepting it is fallible).
In the opinion of many there are some very good reasons.

Those who claim that science cannot explain consciousness must provide an empirically based argument
That's exactly what they do, which is why those objections are taken seriously.

(for even if the assumption '[consciousness] cannot be explained by science' is a prediction of a very successful otherwise scientific theory we are entitled to believe in its truth only after having sufficient reasons that we confirmed it empirically).
You can't confirm scientifically that something cannot be explained by science. The idea is irrational.

there is no good reason to think that such an android is not conscious.Though it is indeed possible that it is not conscious (in spite of the fact that when you ask her the response would be that she is conscious) we need further empirical,sound,evidence to think they are not conscious.
There is no such empirical evidence. It cannot be proved either way, or so science asserts. There is no scientific test for the presence or absence of consciousness. Science has not yet managed to prove that consciousness exists.


The scientific truth is provisional in the vast majority of practical cases so we are open to new facts.Empirical facts.Do you understand what I mean?
I understand exactly what you mean, and agree. Fortunately philosophically deduced conclusions are not provisional.

Purely logical problems have no relevance to empirical facts.
So pigs might fly?

Since we have no proof that logical implications have relevance to natural facts we must always confirm the predictions empirically before assigning a high degree of confidence in their truth even if the premises were absolutely true (empirically based).
Of course.

Returning at our problem,purely philosophical objections never constitute sufficient reasons,as I've already said experiments remain the highest authority.
You're drawing a line between science and philosophy that doesn't exist.

If you define yourself as a rational person you have [NOT!] to do so.There is no rational base to sustain the positive claims you made.
Yes there is.

At most they are rational as entirely subjective,philosophical,views.If you had additionally some relevant first hand subjective evidence,not amenable for the moment to scientific scrutiny,you would be even entitled to believe (not only to be skeptical) that consciousness cannot be reduced to brain processes
That's what I've been saying. Of course I have first hand subjective evidence not amenable to scientific scrutiny, it's called experience. It's all any of us have when it comes to consciousness (or anything else come to that). You've said this yourself by arguing that one can't tell whether an android is conscious or not.

(for example subjective evidence that a soul does exist).
I don't think souls exist.
 
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  • #58
Well I agree with Canute. Completely. Science is a tool of philosophy. Not the other way around. Nor are they competing approaches to knowlegde. SO I'm pretty sure scientists haven't dropped a pig out of an airplane to see if it can fly.

It seems to me that if you have no emperical evidence either way, then philosophical implications would certainly influence the focus of experiments and scientific theories. It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.

I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infinitely reducable?
 
  • #59
Originally posted by Fliption
It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.
That's it exactly.

I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infinitely reducable? [/B]
Well, we know that the BB is unreducable. Some assert that spacetime is likewise, and that there are fundamental quanta of time and space. Some argue that consciousness is.

All in all it seems that a thing becomes scientifically irreducable when reducing it further would involve departing science and appearances for metaphysics and reality.
 
  • #60
Originally posted by Canute
All in all it seems that a thing becomes scientifically irreducable when reducing it further would involve departing science and appearances for metaphysics and reality.

Right, but I want to hear one of the people with an opposing view answer it.
 
  • #61
Originally posted by Fliption
It seems to me that if you have no emperical evidence either way, then philosophical implications would certainly influence the focus of experiments and scientific theories. It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.

I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infinitely reducable?
You can ask yourself if reducing 'events' to mathematical points isn't oversimplifying and brings wrong conclusions. Just think about non-commutative math; (a sock over a shoe is not the same a shoe over the sock).
In a specific spacetime geometric approach it can be proven that adding 1 to 2 is not the same as adding 2 to 1, you get another result.
 
  • #62
Canute

You have a very strange idea of the relationship between deduction and induction. These 'philosophical objections' are no more or less than logical objections. You can't just ignore them. The hypothesis that consciousness can be reduced to matter is a philosophical conjecture. It's got nothing to do with observations. There has never been a single scientific observation that suggests it is true.


If you have not yet understood that science does not make final claims there is nothing to add.I refrain to add more...I don't have the time (or patience) to teach you some basic notions of pure philosophy or philosophy of science.No one claim that philosophy is not involved in science,on the contrary,the roots of science lie deep in philosophy.But not all philosophical ideas are science or,even more important,automatically true.

Sometimes mental experiments are useful to show that a certain assumption implies a contradiction with the already accepted knowledge.But this coherentist approach is not always relevant,for example some quantum mechanics ideas are not coherent with the classical approach (the existence of quantas of energy and so on).

Anyway I do not think we have to use the above argument in this case,simply the philosophical arguments against the emergent computational conjecture do not involve such final contradictions.On the contrary there are very good physicalist philosophical answers at the objections put forward by the 'qualia' sustainers.I'm afraid only the experiment can settle things in a sound way.

Till then we have a conjecture,the best we could achieve so far,that works well in the case of all evidence we have though,in my opinion,is far away from giving us sufficient reasons to consider it (approximatively) correct.I even doubt that neurology alone is enough.But I cannot deny that the actual approach is the best possible approach of the moment,derived from all experimental evidence we have now.

Science tries to find the causes,necessary and/or sufficient,that produce the conscious experience.Based on them an explanation is proposed,a tentative theory which make also new predictions apart from accomodating the already observed facts.From all empirical evidence we have so far it was proposed such a conjecture,an attempt to explain consciousness,successful for the moment,but which we must test further.A fallible conjecture,we do not even have a holistic hypothesis to test further (as I said we do not know all relevant necessary or sufficient causes that produce conscious experience,based on which to propose a detailed hypothesis).Representing the best we could do as of know,in the light of all evidence we have.No final claims are involved here.

The fact that some physicalists pretend,from observed facts,that science can surely explain consciousness is no better than your positive assertion for we are far away from having a holistic hypothesis extensively tested practically (or at least an android I talked about previously).Such considerations can count at most as philosophical assumptions.It is possible to be so indeed but for the moment we do not have sufficient reasons,derived from evidence,to think it will really be so.All unbiased scientists will recognize there is still a lot of work to do.

It is true now that science has as an axiom the assumption that nature can be understood but the introduction of this axiom was absolutely necessary for the internal coherence of the scientific method.We do not have sufficient reasons to believe it is true in absolute (axioms do not automatically entail belief in them).Indeed the existence of sufficient experimental arguments against would lead inevitably to its demise.But certainly neither have we the right to make the positive claim that consciousness,for example,cannot be understood by science,from all knowledge we have so far.
 
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  • #63
Metacrista, I could be wrong but I don't believe that anyone has made the claim that science cannot understand nature. I don't think anyone is disputing this assumption. I think the philosophical position being discussed here is whether consciousness can be reductively explained or is it a fundamental aspect of reality. So I'll ask my question again...

"When does science consider something as fundamental?" "How long does it attempt to reduce before it concedes?" I'm sure there is an answer to this but no one has answered it yet.
 
  • #64
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute

If you have not yet understood that science does not make final claims there is nothing to add.I refrain to add more...I don't have the time (or patience) to teach you some basic notions of pure philosophy or philosophy of science.
No you're right, I don't think that there's much chance of you doing that. You miss the point that it doesn't whether science makes final claims or not. It's completely irrelevant.

No one claim that philosophy is not involved in science,on the contrary,the roots of science lie deep in philosophy.
Well then we're all agreed.

Anyway I do not think we have to use the above argument in this case,simply the philosophical arguments against the emergent computational conjecture do not involve such final contradictions.
Unfortunately some of them do.

On the contrary there are very good physicalist philosophical answers at the objections put forward by the 'qualia' sustainers.
Please name one then we can discuss it.

I'm afraid only the experiment can settle things in a sound way.
Nobody has yet managed to think of one that might settle the matter. I suppose that could be just coincidence.

Till then we have a conjecture,the best we could achieve so far,that works well in the case of all evidence we have though,in my opinion,is far away from giving us sufficient reasons to consider it (approximatively) correct.I even doubt that neurology alone is enough.But I cannot deny that the actual approach is the best possible approach of the moment, derived from all experimental evidence we have now.
Well I deny it, and so do many others, on logical grounds.

All unbiased scientists will recognize there is still a lot of work to do.
Unbiased scientists are something of a rarity. They tend to take the axioms of science as their starting point.

It is true now that science has as an axiom the assumption that nature can be understood but the introduction of this axiom was absolutely necessary for the internal coherence of the scientific method.
Very true, and a good point. Unfortunately it may be internally consistent but wrong.

But certainly neither have we the right to make the positive claim that consciousness,for example,cannot be understood by science,from all knowledge we have so far.
How so? What's the difference between a final claim, which you say science cannot make, and a positive claim?

Anyway, let's leave this. How would you answer Fliptions question.
 
  • #65
The definition of elemental changes with the development of science. For example obviously the chemical "elements" were once thought to be elemental; they were made of "atoms" from the Greek for indivisible. Later isotopes were discovered which showed the chemical elements weren't truly elemental, and the subatomic particles were discovered which showed the atoms weren't truly indivisible.

About all that modern science treats as philosophically elemental is constants of nature, and if you follow the posts up in physics, you'll see discussions of them varying (speed of light, fine structure constant, etc.).

You have to distinguish from a conscious decision not to question a given thing for the present, from an out and out statement that it is elemental. For example we have "elementary" particles in quantum physics, but according to string physics they are made of something else. Strings currently occupy the role where they are not inquired into, but that doesn't mean they are truly regarded as elemental in a way a philosopher would understand the word.
 
  • #66
Fliption

I do not think I understand.Science itself does not make any assumptions about the ultimate nature of consciousness.Not yet.We have a conjecture that works for all our practical purposes,now at least.Some people,scientists or not,are over optimistic.Based on the current state of affairs and especially due to some philosophical arguments they inferred that physicalism is enough.For example many use Daniel Dennett's arguments pro physicalism (brilliant otherwise,strictly philosophically speaking)...to claim the end of dualism.Due to some contradictions with some accepted knowledge now.Or it is clear that Dennet's arguments,though strong against the Cartesian type of dualism,fail to account for all types of dualism.It is a possibility and nothing more.

Science's primary goal is to find all relevant necessary and sufficient causes of physical phenomena that can be possible inferred from known facts.There might be more but since we cannot put all of them in evidence we must content with what we have,based only on observed facts.But we will never postulate the existence of theoretical constructs that are superfluous to explain all observed facts.Especially at this stage of research when there is no need to postulate that 'qualia' is something fundamental since the actual approach is theoretically and empirically evolving (if you understand what I mean).Basically there is no good reason for that,experimentally derived.To be accepted the qualia approach should also make some new,testable predictions,in order to qualify as a scientific hypothesis.

Finally,to address your question we can only establish degrees of confidence in the truth of some scientific assumptions.There is indeed a problem with induction so that,technically speaking,science cannot give us certitudes in many cases (though obviously it give us even certitudes).However when we have relevant test samples,we are entitled to have a high degree of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a certain statement,to believe that it is very close to the actual truth.

For example if we will build androids whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,in the absence of any serious scientific alternative approach,there are sufficient reasons to believe that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) true.Practically we are still open to new data but in its absence there is no good reason,empirically based,to think that subjective experiences imply something extra.

It would be more or less the same if we could first extensively test successfully a holistic theory of consciousness.We would be entitled to use 'qualia' as a further scientific construct only if it made further predictions which we could test empirically.In their absence there is no good reason to think that the best existing approach is not able to explain the remaining puzzles later.The possible existence of final limitations cannot change things.

A problem would be if,in the absence of any evident limitations or serious scientific alternatives,the actual conjecture will become theoretically and empirically stagant for a long time.As I said this could be a hint that the best existing approach fail to take in account something more fundamental.This might be exactly the case with the computational approach.But as I've already said it would always exist the possibility to postulate that this 'something more fundamental' is a final physical limitiation we are not aware yet (for example that some interactions in the complex neural network of the brain are chaotic) or that quantum mechanics is involved in a way not understood yet.Or,much more simply,to invoke the emergent phenomena argument,they are more than the simple sum of the constituents.Basically such a failure of the computational approach does not constitute a sufficient reason to think qualia is fundamental.

Finally we can see Chalmers' pan protopsychism as a form of physicalism too since it involves the interaction between brain and some fundamental features of reality.So eventually physicalism might still be right though,possible,due to some final limitations (for example HUP),we will never have sufficient reasons to believe that.
 
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  • #67
Canute

Unfortunately some of them do.

If you had read more carefully the literature on Mary's chamber argument you would have known that there is no edge for the qualia argument,practically it fails to prove the internal inconsistence of the actual approach,being not sound.Basically we can talk of the same things using different terminologies.For example take the sentences 'Cicero was an orator' and 'Tully was an orator'.They seem two different concepts having the same referent but Cicero is in fact Tully.Likewise there is no good reason to think that the scientific approach cannot explain subjective experience.Not yet at least.

As for some other arguments (zombies or Chinese Room) they can qualify only as mere possibilities.Even Chalmers for example admits that he talks of the logical possibility of zombies (which does not mean automatically physical possibility).He uses the argument to suggest 'that there is no logical entailment from physical facts to facts about consciousness, whereas there is such an entailment in most other domains.'
Unfortunately,though philosophically acceptable,it is not scientifically acceptable for we must have first sufficient reasons to think they can exist practically.
I'm afraid,we never have the right to argue that one logical possibility is (automatically) empirically possible before testing it practically.I've already explained to you that not even predictions about natural facts (logical deductions from the premises) of a very successful scientific theory otherwise (many other predictions confirmed practically) are not considered true before soundly confirming them practically first.Not even in the extreme case that all premises are empirically derived (additionally having a high degree of confidence in their truth) and the prediction is unique and inevitable logically.
 
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  • #68
Originally posted by metacristi
Fliption

I do not think I understand.Science itself does not make any assumptions about the ultimate nature of consciousness.


Well, maybe not officially. I haven't seen a theory yet that doesn't involve consciousness being an effect of the brain. I'd say that all this research is based on the assumption that consciousness comes from brains. I realize that science is defined in such a way that this assumption should be denounced once it is found to be incorrect. My question is asking "at what point does this happen?" What would have to happen for this assumption to be dropped?

Especially at this stage of research when there is no need to postulate that 'qualia' is something fundamental since the actual approach is theoretically and empirically evolving (if you understand what I mean).Basically there is no good reason for that,experimentally derived.To be accepted the qualia approach should also make some new,testable predictions,in order to qualify as a scientific hypothesis.

Are you suggesting that current theories actually make testable predictions on subjective experience? I'd like to hear more about this.

And I wouldn't know if such a theory of "qualia" would be useful or not because I haven't seen one. Has there ever been a theory that stepped outside of the assumption mentioned above to see what a different approach would warrant? If you know of such work that entertains consciousness being fundamental then let us know what it is and where information can be found.

Practically we are still open to new data but in its absence there is no good reason,empirically based,to think that subjective experiences imply something extra.

Doesn't the idea that you cannot ever know for certain imply that there is a piece that you don't understand? That there may be something extra? How can you reductively have no uncertainty when it comes to how an airplane burns fuel and flies but yet you cannot know for certain whether that airplane is having subjective experience unless subjective experience is somehow different?

A problem would be if,in the absence of any evident limitations or serious scientific alternatives,the actual conjecture will become theoretically and empirically stagant for a long time.As I said this could be a hint that the best existing approach fail to take in account something more fundamental.This might be exactly the case with the computational approach.But as I've already said it would always exist the possibility to postulate that this 'something more fundamental' is a final physical limitiation we are not aware yet

This seems like the scientists answer to the "god of the gaps" phenomenon. Many people here accuse others of trying to insert god wherever there are knowledge gaps. This is simply the reverse. "If we do not know it, it is because we haven't learned it yet."

I see no assurance from your response that there really is an answer to my question. Which I fear means that this debate will continue to go on and on, regardless of how obvious the answer really is.
 
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  • #69
New testable predictions? What if it makes the same predictions and also illiminates the philosophical problems? Though I do think if it were an accurate theory, new predictions would likely result.
But how do you know that this avenue would not be fruitful? Has it been tried?

I wouldn't know if such a theory would be useful or not because I haven't seen one. Has there ever been a theory that stepped outside of the assumption mentioned above to see what a different approach would warrant? If you know of such work that entertains consciousness being fundamental then let us know what it is and where information can be found


It must not only 'resolve the philosophical problems' (anyway the fundamental qualia would be a tautology in this case) and accommodate all reliable experiments made so far.It must also make new testable predictions where the fundamental qualia to be an absolutely necessary theoretical construct.Otherwise it is of no scientific use,there is absolutely no reason to think that the usual approach is not enough to explain subjective experience.

Anyway even it makes new predictions is not enough to think that qualia is indeed fundamental (as I argue below we must prove this practically).No,I do not know of any such theory apart from philosophy.Which for the moment is of no use for science.There is even a joke on this made by scientists about the utility of philosophy in cognitive sciences: 'Science tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber whilst philosophy tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber where there is no black cat'...


Well, maybe not officially. I haven't seen a theory yet that doesn't involve consciousness being an effect of the brain. I'd say that all this research is based on the assumption that consciousness comes from brains. I realize that science is defined in such a way that this assumption should be denounced once it is found to be incorrect. My question is asking "at what point does this happen?" What would have to happen for this assumption to be dropped?

Science is based on observed facts only.And all we observe form empirical evidence so far is that mind is a product of the brain.This is not assumed true,this is the only conclusion which can be drawn from facts,a fallible truth.We cannot postulate the existence of new theoretical constructs if they do not have power of explanation and do not make new predictions, testable predictions.Besides there is no reason to believe that qualia is fundamental even if such a theory would be successful.Scientists have reasons to believe only in confirmed facts (even if only indirectly).So we still have to prove empirically that qualia is fundamental.


Doesn't the idea that you cannot ever know for certain imply that there is a piece that you don't understand? That there may be something extra? How can you reductively have no uncertainty when it comes to how an airplane works but yet you cannot know for certain whether something is having subjective experience?

Sometimes might be important.Sometimes not,since they involve very small effects that could not be detectable practically.But these situations are not linked,we have different degree of confidence in their truth upon their merits,experimentally certified.That's why we have a high degree of confidence that a plane built using the best scientific approach will fly but a much lower one for the assumption that the computational approach is approximatively correct (we do not even have a holistic hypothesis).Still this does not imply science cannot attain certitudes or quasi certitudes on some domain of definitions (for example water will always remain H2O even if superstrings are at the base of our universe or that the inverse square law of gravitation is approximatively correct at the macro level).Especially when talking about facts that do not imply generalizations.But since science never permit the assignation of a high degree of confidence in a statement about the natural world without extended research in all relevant situations there is no danger.Besides even in those cases we are always open to new data.


This seems like the scientists answer to the "god of the gaps" phenomenon. Many people here accuse others of trying to insert god wherever there are knowledge gaps. This is simply the reverse. "If we do not know it, it is because we haven't learned it yet."


Actually it has nothing to do with that argument,I haven't used the appropriate words,mea culpa.That means simply 'we do not know for the moment,but there is no good reason to believe that qualia is fundamental,there are plenty of other acceptable possibilities we are aware of'.On the contrary positing that qualia is fundamental would be not only unscientific but illogical.


I see no assurance from your response that there really is an answer to my question. Which I fear means that this debate will continue to go on and on, regardless of how obvious the answer really is.


Neither do I,or science,try to offer certitudes.All that science tries to find are sufficient reasons which explain the observed facts.And very often it succeeds.Still this does not imply that 'flat earthers' have disappeared...

But we do not have yet such sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness.So that you are fully entitled to be skeptical.Or me.But if you make the positive claim that the actual hypothesis is wrong you must back this with sufficient arguments,experimentally verifiable.Or,if you do not accept the empiricism of the scientific method,you must provide another method,proved superior,on empirical grounds.
 
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  • #70
Metacristi

Fliption has seen your argument off but one more point. You say that science deals only in observations. This isn't quite the case. Science deals in third-person observations.

Experiences are not third-person observable. It therefore follows that if experiences exist then science cannot explain them. However if you argue, as you do, that experiences don't exist then you are still not right to assert that science can explain them, since in this case there is nothing to explain. Science cannot explain something that doesn't exist. The fact is that science is defined in such a way that it cannot explain experiences.

Whether experiences do or do not exist is also not a matter for science, it is a matter for personal judgement. However obviously they do, otherwise there would be no consciousness debate.
 

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