Vitalist nonsense versus Science.

  • Thread starter Mentat
  • Start date
  • Tags
    Science
In summary: You would not be able to feel anything, taste anything, smell anything, or hear anything. You would be completely unaware of your surroundings and completely unresponsive to any stimuli. In summary, without consciousness there would be no experience.
  • #1
Mentat
3,960
3
I don't normally lump all of scientific discovery and inquiry into just "science", nor do I normally call an idea "nonsense", but I have reasons on this particular occasion.

Vitalism was the idea that, no matter how well science and philosophy could explain the function that produce "life", they could never explain what the "life" itself was. This is nonsense. It was shown, through many different fields of science and philosophy (hence the lumping together..."science"), that "life" had no meaning except for those exact functions that the vitalists had deemed unsatisfactory.

So, science has discovered that some supposed "mysteries" are not mysteries at all, but there simply needs to be a re-intuiting of the concept being studied - such that the function that were said to "produce" the mysterious phenomenon can now be seen to be the phenomenon, and there is nothing more to add.

The reason I bring this up is because of the current problems with consciousness. People constantly say that scientific explanations of the functions of the brain will not be enough to explain how they "produce" consciousness. Well, I say (in agreement with Daniel Dennett and many cognitive scientists) that these functions are the consciousness, and there's nothing more (mysterious) to find.

Indeed, I'm surprised that the proponents of the vitalist view of consciousness can't see that they are doing just what the previous vitalists did with regard to "life". In fact, one philosopher has gone so far as to mention these previous vitalists, but then to say that he was different in his view of consciousness, since no physical function could ever be shown to be "subjective awareness"...isn't that exactly what the "life" vitalists said?!? It's not like people with such views are saying that you can't explain these mysteries because the physical functions can't be explained well enough. No, they are/were saying exactly what Chalmers (the aforementioned philosopher was David Chalmers, btw) said: "You can explain all of the physical functions, but you can never explain why this produces the mysterious phenomenon.
 
Physics news on Phys.org
  • #2
Ok. You think Dennett is right and Chalmers is wrong, and there's a few non-philosophers who agree with you. What's your point? And what's vitalism got to do with anything?

Do you actually have an answer to Chalmers, or have you just made your mind up?

Are you aware that Dennett has no impact at all on the debate, other than to generate more of it?
 
  • #3
Ok. You think Dennett is right and Chalmers is wrong, and there's a few non-philosophers who agree with you. What's your point?

And what's vitalism got to do with anything?
 
  • #4
In other words our posts are futile unless we can "Fisk" Chalmers? Nuts to that. And be careful what you ask for.

Without any refereence to Dennett, Chalmers or anybody else's favorite guru there is indeed a lot of unexamined vitalism in the debates on consciousness. And it is right to show it up.
 
  • #5
The reason I bring this up is because of the current problems with consciousness. People constantly say that scientific explanations of the functions of the brain will not be enough to explain how they "produce" consciousness. Well, I say (in agreement with Daniel Dennett and many cognitive scientists) that these functions are the consciousness, and there's nothing more (mysterious) to find.

But see, it ISN'T like that. Life is not a feeling, that's the difference. We can look at something and say "That is alive" or "That is not alive", but we can't look at something and say "That is conscious" and "That is not conscious". That's the first big clue that it is something more than a process.

What it ties into is the question of "Do concepts exist?". When you think, for example, of a horse- is that thought only a pattern of electrons in your brain (technicly if your answer is no, it isn't a PATTERN either, since patterns are concepts), or is it something else? The image of a horse that you have in your mind, is that image simply some electricity (I use ideas like "electricity" and "patterns" here, but be aware that if concepts are not real these things are not real either, since their definitions are concepts. They would still "exist" in a way... Maybe. Heh.), or is it an image produced by electricity?

This question ties into yet another, "Are subjective experiences the only things that matter, or is there some sort of objective reality? What is reality?". Two, actually. I'm not going to go into all of this, we would simply travel along a vast chain of philosophical questions. You see my point though, I hope?

You can easily imagine yourself without consciousness. You would not have a field of vision; your eyes would take in information and transmit it to your brain as electrical impulses, but there is no reason you would actually "see" the image (you might argue that the definition of "see" is what I have just described. However, you can imagine the same function being carried out without the actual "image" being percieved- therefore there must be some seperation). Variables would be extracted from the image and fed into the programs of your brain (like a computer). Complex equations would take place, chemicals would be released and affect these equations, neurons would fire all over the place... And then a signal would be transmitted to the group of cells known as an "arm" or a "leg" or whatever other part of the body they might be, and it would carry out a task. You can imagine this entire process without the actual quality of "seeing" or of "feeling". There is no reason why you should FEEL an emotion instead of just having the chemicals effect your behaviour. That is what consciousness is, and that is why it is not defined simply as the processes.

I realize that you might just deny this... It is not undeniable fact. Consciousness isn't the processes occurring, it is FEELING the processes occurring. You can deny that you feel anything, but that doesn't serve much purpose. Whether you feel anything or not(or whether you understand the distinction of experiencing and feeling or not- I've talked to some people about this who simply could NOT understand me, but they showed up a day or two later and said they thought and thought and finally got it) is irrelevant, because other people do. You can deny that all you want, but it won't make a difference, because people know they do feel. And feeling is not a function of these processes- self awareness is, experience is, but not feeling. It's impossible for it to be a physical function.

Anyway, I shall stop now. Hopefully you understand what I'm saying. :)
 
  • #6
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
In other words our posts are futile unless we can "Fisk" Chalmers? Nuts to that. And be careful what you ask for.
Did I say that? Uh, no.

I asked what the point of the post was. It's an interesting topic but there's nothing to say to someone who just asserts their opinion with no reasoning to accompany it.

Without any refereence to Dennett, Chalmers or anybody else's favorite guru there is indeed a lot of unexamined vitalism in the debates on consciousness. And it is right to show it up. [/B]
Perhaps, but vitalism in its old form is dead. It just muddles the issues to lump it together with the the issue of consciousnes. A bit of rigour wouldn't go amiss around here imho. Too much temperamental opinion.

It's a fascinating and difficult topic, one which baffles everyone in science at the moment. People post here as if they've never looked into, but are certain of the answer. This stifles sensible discussion.
 
Last edited:
  • #7
You say that vitalism is dead, and that the consciousness discussion is not about vitalism. I say that any position that claims outright that "there are some things scientists will never know" is pure vitalism, unless it's superstition. And that is what I read Chalmers as saying.

And yes I do go back a long way with the arguments of Searle and Nagle and all, and I dearly hope we're not going to retrace that whole weary road again.
 
  • #8
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know has got nothing at all to do with vitalism. Try reading Colin Mcginn and 'mysterianism', and he's a materialist.
 
  • #9
You say that vitalism is dead, and that the consciousness discussion is not about vitalism. I say that any position that claims outright that "there are some things scientists will never know" is pure vitalism, unless it's superstition. And that is what I read Chalmers as saying.

"there are some things scientists will never know"... Science can never provide an understanding of itself. Science is a set of laws describing the physical universe, not a description of those laws. Saying that a certain set of these laws being realized in a certain way IS something else makes no sense. There could be laws governing the laws of science, and laws governing those laws. Without knowledge of such, we can't provide an unquestionable description of any final result (in this case consciousness). Here is how it appears:

consciousness
sciencelaw1 sciencelaw2 sciencelaw3

You can easily say, if we know this to be correct, that the correct combination of sciencelaws produces consciousness, and you are equally validated in saying that these sciencelaws ARE consciousness. A definition or a description of production- they are essentially the same. For instance:

triangle
3lines intersectinglines

That is a definition AND a description of production. Both mean the same thing. However, since science does not describe itself, our consciousness definition could look like this:

consciousness
otherlaw6 otherlaw7
law1 law2 law3 law4 law5
sciencelaw1 sciencelaw2 sciencelaw3
 
  • #10
Of course, that could apply to our triangle example as well... However, triangles are man's creation- so we know all the laws that apply to them (seeing as we created those laws). Consciousness is not our creation... so we don't know all the laws. Also, no one has ever (to my knowledge) actually provided a definition of consciousness (or the functions that produce/define it). What would they be? Everyone's brain is different, yet we are all conscious... Are animals conscious? Computers? Rocks? These discussions aren't very productive without an actual specification of the things that produce/define consciousness itself.
 
  • #11
Originally posted by Sikz
But see, it ISN'T like that. Life is not a feeling, that's the difference. We can look at something and say "That is alive" or "That is not alive"...

Ah, but we can't. Have you been to my other thread "Why call it 'alive'?"? There is no working definition of life. However, there is the biological definition, and from that we can say "this is alive and that is not alive", but this speaks only of functions, which the vitalists thought was not enough. Consciousness, as per the intentional stance, is also "just a function" which the current vitalists don't seem to think is enough.

What it ties into is the question of "Do concepts exist?". When you think, for example, of a horse- is that thought only a pattern of electrons in your brain (technicly if your answer is no, it isn't a PATTERN either, since patterns are concepts), or is it something else? The image of a horse that you have in your mind, is that image simply some electricity (I use ideas like "electricity" and "patterns" here, but be aware that if concepts are not real these things are not real either, since their definitions are concepts. They would still "exist" in a way... Maybe. Heh.), or is it an image produced by electricity?

I actually (currently) think that the image of a horse is a spatial stimulation of synchronously-firing interneurons in the neocortex, which was begun in response to the observation of a horse.

You can easily imagine yourself without consciousness. You would not have a field of vision; your eyes would take in information and transmit it to your brain as electrical impulses, but there is no reason you would actually "see" the image (you might argue that the definition of "see" is what I have just described. However, you can imagine the same function being carried out without the actual "image" being percieved- therefore there must be some seperation). Variables would be extracted from the image and fed into the programs of your brain (like a computer). Complex equations would take place, chemicals would be released and affect these equations, neurons would fire all over the place... And then a signal would be transmitted to the group of cells known as an "arm" or a "leg" or whatever other part of the body they might be, and it would carry out a task. You can imagine this entire process without the actual quality of "seeing" or of "feeling". There is no reason why you should FEEL an emotion instead of just having the chemicals effect your behaviour.

But this is a vitalist-type statement, and flies in the face of the Scientific Method. This Method would dictate that there "FEELings" are "just" chemicals that effect your behavior. Why should there be anything else?

I realize that you might just deny this... It is not undeniable fact. Consciousness isn't the processes occurring, it is FEELING the processes occurring.

But "feeling" is also a process.
 
  • #12
Originally posted by Canute
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know has got nothing at all to do with vitalism. Try reading Colin Mcginn and 'mysterianism', and he's a materialist.

The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know isn't exactly my definition of "vitalism". It is, IMHO, the claim that some mysteries exist on a plain beyond that of the physical processes that "produce" them. The problem with this is that, in the first instance (the instance to do with "life"), it was shown that the supposed "mystery" really was (not "was produced by", but was) the physical processes involved; and, in the second case (with regard to consciousness) it is now stunting science's ability to do what it does, since so many people are still holding to the vitalist view that "you may explain all of the physical processes involved, but you will never explain the mysterious phenomenon that they produce.
 
  • #13
Originally posted by Mentat
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know isn't exactly my definition of "vitalism". It is, IMHO, the claim that some mysteries exist on a plain beyond that of the physical processes that "produce" them.
That is not vitalism, that is mysticism.

The problem with this is that, in the first instance (the instance to do with "life"), it was shown that the supposed "mystery" really was (not "was produced by", but was) the physical processes involved;
Nobody has shown that (if I understand you right). It's the just the scientifically orthodox hypothesis.

and, in the second case (with regard to consciousness) it is now stunting science's ability to do what it does, since so many people are still holding to the vitalist view that "you may explain all of the physical processes involved, but you will never explain the mysterious phenomenon that they produce. [/B]
You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.

I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

I don't think many of these folk would be pleased to be called a vitalist.
 
  • #14
Originally posted by Canute
...You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.

While I agree with Canute here, I also think that vitalism is the metaphysical doctrine that living organisms possesses a non-physical inner force or energy that gives them the property of life of organic matter. Maybe this helps, maybe it doesn't.


The belief dating to around 1600 that matter was divided into two classes based on behavior with respect to heat: organic and inorganic. Inorganic material could be melted but could always be recovered by removing the heat source. Organic compounds changed form upon heating and could not be recovered by removing the heat source. The proposed explanation for the difference between organic and inorganic compounds was the Vitalism Theory, which stated that inorganic materials did not contain the "vital force" of life and lasted until the mid-nineteenth century.

© Eric W. Weisstein

I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

Why are the people you selected pretty much all dead? I have a question. What's wrong with mysticism? To begin, mysteries about life persist in the face of reductionist science.
 
  • #15
I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

Not one of these worthy gentlemen has stunted the growth of science. No, not even Plato. Nor have the philosophers who have erected "The Hard Problem" into job security. Science ignores them and goes about its business.
 
  • #16
Originally posted by Canute
That is not vitalism, that is mysticism.

I see. So vitalism was just a form of mysticism (to do with the essence of "life")?

Nobody has shown that (if I understand you right). It's the just the scientifically orthodox hypothesis.

Yes, it is the scientific answer. And since it was the scientific answer in this case, why should we not assume (as has Dennett) that the scientific answer to the problem of consciousness is that it is the process?

You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.

I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.

I don't think many of these folk would be pleased to be called a vitalist.

Well, I won't state my personal opinions about those particular people; however, I know that Chalmer's view looks just like the vitalist view of life, and that's why I posted this thread: To see if the consciousness problem can be gotten rid of by a more scientific approach.
 
  • #17
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
Not one of these worthy gentlemen has stunted the growth of science. No, not even Plato. Nor have the philosophers who have erected "The Hard Problem" into job security. Science ignores them and goes about its business.
Of course your're right. I was pointing out to Mentat that it was a bit daft to think that they had.

As you say, science has no way of addressing the hard problem, but must carry on regardless.
 
  • #18
Originally posted by Mentat
I see. So vitalism was just a form of mysticism (to do with the essence of "life")?
I suppose so. I'm not quite sure of the defintions of these things.

Yes, it is the scientific answer.
Science doesn't have an answer. It has a hypothesis.

And since it was the scientific answer in this case, why should we not assume (as has Dennett) that the scientific answer to the problem of consciousness is that it is the process?
Because nearly everybody else thinks the idea doesn't make any sense. Science would love to adopt Dennett's view, but it can't. It doesn't add up, even to most scientists.

Well, I won't state my personal opinions about those particular people; however, I know that Chalmer's view looks just like the vitalist view of life,
I doubt that Chalmers would agree.

and that's why I posted this thread: To see if the consciousness problem can be gotten rid of by a more scientific approach. [/B]
The evidence of science, and the analysis of the logic of the situation by philosophers suggests that it can't. Perhaps science can 'get rid' of it if decides to redefine itself slightly, but not otherwise, at least according to most people who don't earn a living looking for it scientifically.
 
Last edited:
  • #19
Mentat

No, they are/were saying exactly what Chalmers (the aforementioned philosopher was David Chalmers, btw) said: "You can explain all of the physical functions, but you can never explain why this produces the mysterious phenomenon.

Actually Chalmers' position is much more complex,he doesn't claim that science cannot explain consciousness,he is only skeptical that neurology alone will be able to explain it.I have saved once from the net an interview with Chalmers,here is an excerpt from it:

You argue in your work that neuroscience will not be able to give a complete theory of consciousness. Do you think that current scientific work on consciousness is misguided?


Chalmers:Sometimes the sort of non-materialist view I put forward is seen as anti-scientific, but I don't see it that way at all. I argue that neuroscience alone isn't enough to explain consciousness, but I think it will be a major part of an eventual theory. We just need to add something else, some new fundamental principles, to bridge the gap between neuroscience and subjective experience. Actually, I think my view is compatible with much of the work going on now in neuroscience and psychology, where people are studying the relationship of consciousness to neural and cognitive processes without really trying to reduce it to those processes. We are just getting much more detailed knowledge of the associations and correlations between them. Things are still in early stages, but one can imagine that as we build up and systematize our theories of these associations, and try to boil them down to their core, the result might point us toward the sort of fundamental principles I advocate. Of course that's a long way off yet.


Basically he argues,without making positive claims,that the actual knowledge is necessary but not sufficient to explain all features of consciousness as we know it.His position is rational the 'zombies','Mary's chamber' or 'Chinese room' philosophical arguments against the computational emergentist approach are enough to back a rational skepticism.Indeed,nonwithstanding Dennet's brave attempt,we are far from having sufficient reasons that the emergentist computational theory of consciousness is (approximatively) correct.I would name it a conjecture,we are only at the beginning of our quest to find a 'holistic' theory of consciousness (any unbiased scientist will recognize this).


I would argue also that vitalists do not make the generic claim that science cannot understand life,maybe some of them but not all,many of them merely doubt that the current known facts can lead to a successful theory of life.A sort of 'interactionist dualism' (we cannot put in evidence currently,the interaction being too weak) is still a feasible posibility (though we have no dualist scientific hypothesis as of now).Indeed,at most,Dennet's arguments are efficient against the cartesian type of dualism,but not against all types of dualism.Eccles' hypothesis (though it does not attain the status of scientific hypothesis) is a good example:dualism neither needs a 'cartesian theatre' nor break the conservation of energy law...The mistery remains...only time will settle things...
 
Last edited:
  • #20
Originally posted by Canute
Science doesn't have an answer. It has a hypothesis.

What's the difference?

Because nearly everybody else thinks the idea doesn't make any sense. Science would love to adopt Dennett's view, but it can't. It doesn't add up, even to most scientists.

And yet all of the scientific attempts at explaining consciousness have fallen right into Dennett's predicted standards (and I've read at least 4 by now).
 
  • #21
Originally posted by Mentat
What's the difference?
An hypothesis is not a theory.

And yet all of the scientific attempts at explaining consciousness have fallen right into Dennett's predicted standards (and I've read at least 4 by now). [/B]
This is not surprising. All scientific attempts to explain it can be expected to fail, for reasons Metacristi outlined.
 
  • #22
Originally posted by Canute
An hypothesis is not a theory.

No one mentioned theory. You said "answer". And scientists have indeed come up with theories of consciousness (Edelmann and Calvin are the two I mention more often, but there are others)...that's true theories, ones that have made pre-/post-dictions that turn out to be true.

This is not surprising. All scientific attempts to explain it can be expected to fail, for reasons Metacristi outlined.

Falling into Dennett's standards indicates failure? No, no, the fact that they all follow the line of reasoning that Dennett predicted they'd follow is all I was pointing out...there is no failure in this.
 
  • #23
I've said this elsewhere, but I suppose it bears stating again since this thread is exclusively devoted to the 'vitalist' issue. The claims surrounding the 'hard problem' of consciousness and the vitalist theory of life are not analogous.

The problem of explaining life involves explaining objectively observable structures and functions such as growth, reproduction, etc. To vitalists, it was inconceivable that these structures and functions could be explained via physical processes, so they posited the existence of the immaterial spirit. However, the central problem nonetheless remained one of explaining objectively observable structures and functions; once these had been explained, there was nothing else that needed explaining, and so the explanatory problem was solved. The explanatory posit of the immaterial spirit was no longer needed, and thus discarded.

The problem of explaining consciousness involves explaining first person subjective experience. It is obvious that consciousness is associated with brain functioning, but the nature of the link between these two is far from obvious. In particular, for any purely physical explanation of consciousness, we will still be left with the question of why consciousness should be associated with physical processes at all; there is nothing in our understanding of time, space, matter, and energy that makes it conceivable that these things arranged in the proper way should somehow result in conscious experience. This problem is not raised by way of explanatory posits, as with the vitalists, but rather is the central issue in need of explanation.

Thus we have a persistent question built into any attempts at explaining consciousness: Why are the physical structures and functions of the brain accompanied by consciousness? There is no analogous built-in question in explaining life; it is meaningless to ask "why are the structures and functions of growth, reproduction, etc. accompanied by life?" since here there is no reason to suppose that anything above and beyond the structures and functions needs explaining. With consciousness there is reason to suppose just this, since any purely physical account of consciousness leaves us with an epistemic gap.

[edit for phrasing error]
 
Last edited:
  • #24
Thus we have a persistent question built into any attempts at explaining consciousness: Why are the physical structures and functions of the brain accompanied by consciousness? There is no analogous built-in question in explaining life; it is meaningless to ask "why are the structures and functions of growth, reproduction, etc. accompanied by life?" since here there is no reason to suppose that anything above and beyond the structures and functions needs explaining. With consciousness there is reason to suppose just this, since any purely physical account of consciousness leaves us with an epistemic gap.

And here is where the philosopher departs from the scientist. For science does not propose to answer, or ask, why questions. Except in the trivial sense of "The neurochemical structure of the brain supports consciousness because it can".
 
  • #25
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
And here is where the philosopher departs from the scientist. For science does not propose to answer, or ask, why questions. Except in the trivial sense of "The neurochemical structure of the brain supports consciousness because it can".

Let me rephrase that then. Science can and does answers questions of the general formulation "How is it that X can account for Y?", such as "How is it that the microscopic structures and functions of H2O can account for the macroscopic properties of water?" However, it appears that a purely physically reductive account of consciousness cannot answer the question "How is it that physical structures and functions can account for consciousness?"
 
  • #26
Originally posted by Mentat
No one mentioned theory. You said "answer". And scientists have indeed come up with theories of consciousness (Edelmann and Calvin are the two I mention more often, but there are others)...that's true theories, ones that have made pre-/post-dictions that turn out to be true.
I suppose one could argue ad nauseum about what is a theory and what is a hypothesis and what is a conjecture and what is an answer. But certainly there is as yet nothing one could call a scientific explanation of consciousness. There are just conjectures, including Edelmann's process based ideas, Dennett's hetero-phenomenology, Crick's oscillations, Blackmore's memes, Penrose's quantum decoherence in tubules, etc etc.

I don't know Calvin but Edelmann, in his book written with Guilio Tononi, makes it very clear from the start that the fact that consciousness has a scientific explanation is an assumption only. He states this a number of times. He is perfectly up-front about acknowledging that he has no proof and no evidence for it.

Falling into Dennett's standards indicates failure? No, no, the fact that they all follow the line of reasoning that Dennett predicted they'd follow is all I was pointing out...there is no failure in this. [/B]
Hetero-phenomenology does not explain feelings. Philosopher Geoffrey Harnard has tirelessly pointed this out to Dennett, but with no answer yet. A theory of consciousness that says nothing about feelings is not very impressive. It's a throwback to Watson and Skinner, but a little more sophisticated than behaviourism.

Hypnogogue states the case clearly. There is an explanatory gap that no scientific theory has yet managed to cross, even speculatively. It cannot be crossed by science, as Chalmers and Mcginn argue, since there is a category mismatch.

Chalmer's is quite right when he says that scientific attempts to explain consciousness almost invariably use one of two strategies. Either the 'hard problem' is ignored, or consciousness is arbitrarily redefined in such a way as to obscure it. If you read any current journal on consciousness you can see this happening in nearly every scientific paper.
 
Last edited:
  • #27
Let me rephrase that then. Science can and does answers questions of the general formulation "How is it that X can account for Y?", such as "How is it that the microscopic structures and functions of H2O can account for the macroscopic properties of water?"

I don't think it does. Are you talking about statistical mechanics? That's just a calculating system for getting numbers. Where does science concern itself with "how is it" that small scale physics causes big scale physics?

The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me.
 
  • #28
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me. [/B]
You seem to be saying that neuroscientific data and conscious experience are two different categories of things, with no category between. Isn't this counter to your main argument?
 
Last edited:
  • #29
Originally posted by Canute
I suppose one could argue ad nauseum about what is a theory and what is a hypothesis and what is a conjecture and what is an answer. But certainly there is as yet nothing one could call a scientific explanation of consciousness. There are just conjectures, including Edelmann's process based ideas, Dennett's hetero-phenomenology, Crick's oscillations, Blackmore's memes, Penrose's quantum decoherence in tubules, etc etc.

Calvin's theory, is indeed (by the scientific definition of "theory") a theory. Dennett's heterophenomenology is a theory also, but not a theory of consciousness - instead, it is a theory of what a theory of consciousness should look like.

I don't know Calvin but Edelmann, in his book written with Guilio Tononi, makes it very clear from the start that the fact that consciousness has a scientific explanation is an assumption only. He states this a number of times. He is perfectly up-front about acknowledging that he has no proof and no evidence for it.

Sure, but he also shows that philosophical attempts will go on forever without answering the question of consciousness, and so, for those of us who want results, there should instead be a scientific answer, and this one will not be confined by epistemic or other such metaphysical bounds. It will, instead, only be bound by the usual boundaries of science.

Hetero-phenomenology does not explain feelings. Philosopher Geoffrey Harnard has tirelessly pointed this out to Dennett, but with no answer yet. A theory of consciousness that says nothing about feelings is not very impressive. It's a throwback to Watson and Skinner, but a little more sophisticated than behaviourism.

Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.

Hypnogogue states the case clearly. There is an explanatory gap that no scientific theory has yet managed to cross, even speculatively. It cannot be crossed by science, as Chalmers and Mcginn argue, since there is a category mismatch.

Chalmer's is quite right when he says that scientific attempts to explain consciousness almost invariably use one of two strategies. Either the 'hard problem' is ignored, or consciousness is arbitrarily redefined in such a way as to obscure it. If you read any current journal on consciousness you can see this happening in nearly every scientific paper.

Might you state what the "hard problem" is, in terms that restrict a scientific inquiry into the matter?
 
  • #30
Originally posted by Mentat
Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.

Feelings, in the way Harnard uses the term, is not something to be lumped in with the rest of conscious experience. Harnard uses the term "feelings" synonymously with "conscious experience" to highlight the idea that every conscious experience feels like something-- after all, if it did not, it wouldn't be a conscious experience in the first place.

Dennet's theory aims to systematically bring out the associations between physical processes and feelings, but it does not coherently explain how physical processes should feel like something in the first place.
 
  • #31
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think it does. Are you talking about statistical mechanics? That's just a calculating system for getting numbers. Where does science concern itself with "how is it" that small scale physics causes big scale physics?

Precisely by explaining the properties of macroscopic physics in terms of the properties of microscopic physics. For instance, the macroscopic liquidity of a liquid can be explained in terms of the chemical bonding structure of the atoms/molecules which compose the liquid.

The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me.

But we have a clear conceptual picture of how the small scale physics accounts for the large scale physics. We do not have a clear conceptual picture of how physics at any scale can account for consciousness, and there are strong reasons to believe that we never will unless we accept that our fundamental ontology (those things which are taken to exist axiomatically, without further explanation: spacetime and matter/energy) is somehow altered or expanded to take the existence of consciousness into account.
 
  • #32
Originally posted by Mentat
Calvin's theory, is indeed (by the scientific definition of "theory") a theory. Dennett's heterophenomenology is a theory also, but not a theory of consciousness - instead, it is a theory of what a theory of consciousness should look like.
Ok. Let's just say that none of these theories have gained any degree of acceptance.

Sure, but he also shows that philosophical attempts will go on forever without answering the question of consciousness, and so, for those of us who want results, there should instead be a scientific answer,
Precisely what philosophers argue, in reverse. Take your pick.

and this one will not be confined by epistemic or other such metaphysical bounds. It will, instead, only be bound by the usual boundaries of science.
Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.

Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.
What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming concensus.

Might you state what the "hard problem" is, in terms that restrict a scientific inquiry into the matter? [/B]
It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html [Broken]
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #33
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Feelings, in the way Harnard uses the term, is not something to be lumped in with the rest of conscious experience. Harnard uses the term "feelings" synonymously with "conscious experience" to highlight the idea that every conscious experience feels like something-- after all, if it did not, it wouldn't be a conscious experience in the first place.

Dennet's theory aims to systematically bring out the associations between physical processes and feelings, but it does not coherently explain how physical processes should feel like something in the first place.

No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.
 
  • #34
Originally posted by Canute
Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.

The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.

What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming concensus.

Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.

It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html [Broken]

Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.

If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;


Then one will have explained conscious experience. All one has to do is by-pass the philosophical question of "what makes this physical process 'produce' this outcome" and look at it scientifically (see my thread on Faulty Expectations of a Theory of Consciousness.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #35
Originally posted by Mentat
No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.
I agree that this is exactly what he does. The question is whether this approach might lead to an explanation or whether it just begs the question. I'd say the latter.

The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.
Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding. Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.

Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.
Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.

Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.
Ok, but you've got some healthy opposition.

If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
I would say that, more simply put, Chalmer's position is that we need to expain the existence of 'what it is like to be'. As this is not a meaningful scientific description or defintion he argues that science needs to consider redefing itself in order to include consciousness, and thus have a chance of explaining it. In a sense the 'hard problem' is finding a scientific definition for consciousness, for only if we can find one can we say that it is a scientific entity. Calling it physical is a sort of bulldozer of a strategy, and is completely ad hoc and counterintuitive. Many people, me incuded, cannot make sense of this hypothesis.
 
Last edited:

Similar threads

Replies
4
Views
939
  • General Discussion
Replies
12
Views
1K
Replies
17
Views
1K
  • Quantum Interpretations and Foundations
Replies
26
Views
1K
  • General Discussion
Replies
4
Views
605
  • Feedback and Announcements
Replies
25
Views
2K
  • Quantum Interpretations and Foundations
3
Replies
94
Views
4K
  • General Discussion
Replies
5
Views
1K
  • Poll
  • General Discussion
8
Replies
246
Views
30K
Back
Top